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This thesis analyses European standardisation of services and its impact on private law. It tells a 
story of two paradoxes. 
First of all, the EU – in particular, the European Commission – would like European 
standardisation of services to improve the internal market for services. However, it is not actually 
taking any steps to guarantee that European standardisation of services facilitates free movement 
of services. With the New Approach for goods, European standardisation of goods has been 
made a tool for internal-market building. Such a regulatory approach has not been developed for 
European standardisation of services. As a result, it is difficult for the EU to exercise control 
over the reasons of stakeholders to start working on European services standards. An analysis of 
European standardisation in the healthcare and tourism sectors shows that parties start making 
European services standards for various reasons, which often have little to do with the 
improvement of the internal market. Therefore, the Commission cannot rely on European 
standardisation as a regulatory strategy to improve free movement of services. 
Secondly, because there is no European regulatory framework in which European services 
standards play a clear role, the parties which make European services standards become 
responsible for their application in law. They want their standards to play a role in private law – 
in particular, in contract law and in certification schemes. However, although stakeholders want 
European services standards to be applied in private law, they do not really care about the 
requirements which are imposed by private law. European services standards are not adopted in 
a legal vacuum – they regularly interact and clash with existing legal regulation. There is a real 
risk that European services standards might contain provisions which breach the free movement 
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i. The European Regulatory Private Law Project 
 
a. General project hypotheses 
This thesis is about the interaction between European standardisation of services and private 
law. It is part of a research project which started at the European University Institute in October 
2011. This project is entitled “The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law” (“the 
ERPL project”).1 Since this thesis forms an integral part of the research project – which does not 
prevent one from reading it as a self-standing contribution –, it is appropriate to first of all 
outline the basic set of hypotheses with which the research project started in October 2011.  
In the last decades, the academic debate about the relationship between the EU and private law 
has been dominated by discussions about the codification of private law at the European level. 
Various attempts have been made, primarily by academics, to identify and develop a common set 
of private law principles which could lead to the adoption of a European Civil Code.2 Most of 
them were comparative law exercises which focussed on the traditional areas of private law in 
the Member States – contract law and tort law. The work on a European Civil Code was 
effectively part of the project of a European Constitution, which was strongly supported by the 
European institutions. The project of a formal European Constitution failed after negative 
referenda in France and the Netherlands, and the fate of the European Civil Code does not seem 
to be much better. Even in its current form of an optional instrument its future is uncertain after 
negative reactions from a number of national parliaments.3  
The starting point of the ERPL is that the focus on a European Civil Code is perhaps too much 
oriented on the past. While many of the continental Member States adopted a civil code as part 
of their nation-building projects, the EU has not followed the same logic. If nation-building was 
one of the primary aims of the Member States in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the main aim 
of the EU has always been to build an internal market.4 From that perspective, the EU can be 
                                                          
1 H. Micklitz, ‘Project Application: The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law (ERPL) – The 
Transformation from Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition’, http://blogs.eui.eu/erc-erpl/project-
description, last accessed on 28 December 2014. 
2 For the background, see H. Micklitz, ‘The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law’, (2009) 28 Yearbook 
of European Law 3, 4. 
3 See M. Heidemann, ‘European Private Law at the Crossroads: The Proposed European Sales Law’, (2012) 20 
European Review of Private Law 1119, 1121. 




regarded as an example of the transformation from the nation state to the market state.5 In this 
process, private law has been employed as a tool to construct and complete the internal market. 
This does not only include the traditional areas of private law such as contract and tort, but also 
others areas of law in which the EU has exercised influence on private law through the adoption 
of secondary EU law, such as regulations and directives.6 In the ERPL project this different type 
of private law is called European regulatory private law (“ERPL”). It is clear that the European 
legislator has played an important role in the expansion of ERPL. But it does not stop there – 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) has played an equally important role both 
through the interpretation of secondary legislation and through its case law on the four 
freedoms. All of this means that it becomes crucial to adopt a perspective which is able to 
combine both EU law and private law. Only if such an approach is taken can it be clear what the 
reach and impact of ERPL is. ERPL extends beyond the borders of the traditional domains of 
private law and encompasses many areas of law which from a national law perspective would be 
considered as public law. The interwoven nature of EU law and private law is one of the key 
starting points of the ERPL project. 
It has departed from the premise that ERPL constitutes an independent legal order – a “self-
sufficient” legal order – which interacts with national private law orders.7 As has already been 
emphasised above, the building of the internal market has been its primary aim. Two of the main 
driving forces behind ERPL are economisation and politicisation. Economisation means that 
private law is employed as a tool to structure the economy – to give shape to the EU’s internal 
market.8 Its regulatory purpose is twofold – on the one hand it is necessary to shape the market, 
while on the other hand it enables participants to participate in the market. In parallel to this 
process of economisation, a second process of politicisation can be identified.9 In order to be 
able to improve the internal market, the EU has had to rely significantly on new governance 
mechanisms, such as co- and self-regulation. This has resulted in a politicisation of both of 
private law making and of the application of private law. In the EU governance takes place in a 
complicated transnational network of public and private actors. This network is horizontal in 
that the traditional hierarchy between States and private parties can no longer be maintained.10 
                                                          
5 H. Micklitz and D. Patterson, ‘From the Nation State to the Market: The Evolution of EU Private Law as 
Regulation of the Economy Beyond the Boundaries of the Union?’, in B. van Vooren, S. Blockmans and J. Wouters 
(eds.), The EU’s Role in Global Governance, (Oxford, OUP, 2013), 59-78. 
6 H. Micklitz, above n 1, 5. 
7 Ibid., 6. 
8 Ibid., 2. 
9 Ibid., 3. 
10 K. Ladeur, ‘The State in International Law’, in C. Joerges and J. Falke (eds.), Karl Polanyi, Globalisation and the 




Private law has escaped the boundaries of the State.11 The increased influence of private parties 
in governance has also resulted in a need for constitutionalisation of private law and for 
establishing accountability and transparency mechanisms in new modes of governance.12 
At a more abstract level, the ERPL project aims to identify and analyse the transformation from 
the traditional concept of autonomy to functionalism in competition and regulation in the 
internal market.13 It is based on the understanding of ERPL as a self-standing legal order, which 
consists of (i) the substance of ERPL, (ii) the general principles of ERPL and (iii) common 
principles of civil law.14 Finally, it tests the interaction between ERPL and national private law 
orders by using four parameters: intrusion and substitution, conflict and resistance, hybridisation 
and convergence.15 The progress of the project has been documented in two working papers, 
which were both edited collections with papers of the two annual meetings of the ERPL project 
organised in May 2012 and May 2013.16 
b. The parameter of convergence and European standardisation of services 
This thesis tests the parameter of convergence. In the project application, convergence is 
described as “a process of mutual approximation of the two different legal orders”.17 This 
process does not directly lead to merged legal orders – “they still exist side by side, but they are 
drawing nearer to each other”.18 The project application could be interpreted in such a way that 
the process of convergence would take place between national private law orders and ERPL. As 
such, it would be a vertical process, in which the national private law orders would draw closer to 
ERPL. However, this is not how convergence is interpreted in this thesis. Rather, convergence is 
considered as a horizontal process of approximation between the national private law orders 
which grow more closely towards each other.19 This process is encouraged by the intervention of 
ERPL. This intervention constitutes the vertical dimension of convergence, which has an impact 
on the horizontal process. 
                                                          
11 R. Michaels and N. Jansen, ‘Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanisation, Globalisation, Privatisation’, (2006) 
54 American Journal of Comparative Law 843. 
12 F. Cafaggi, ‘The Making of European Private Law: Governance Design’, in F. Cafaggi and H. Muir Watt, The 
Making of European Private Law, (Cheltenham, Elgar Publishing, 2008), 289-352.  
13 H. Micklitz, above n 2, 9-20. 
14 H. Micklitz, above n 1, 6-7. 
15 Ibid., 8. 
16 H. Micklitz and Y. Svetiev (eds.), ‘A Self-Sufficient European Private Law: A Viable Concept?’, EUI Working 
Papers LAW 2012/31 and H. Micklitz, Y. Svetiev and G. Comparato (eds.), ‘European Regulatory Private Law: The 
Paradigms Tested’, EUI Working Papers LAW 2014/04. 
17 H. Micklitz, above n 1, 8. 
18 Ibid. 
19 W. van Gerven, “Private Law in a Federal Perspective”, in R. Brownsword et al. (eds.), The Foundations of European 




Both the economisation and politicisation aspects of the ERPL project are clearly visible in the 
set-up of this thesis. The focus is on European standardisation of services. The starting point is 
that such European standardisation of services takes place with the intention to improve the 
internal market for services – the economisation aspect. The politicisation aspect is that the 
focus is not on internal market-building through harmonisation of legislation, but rather through 
European standardisation. European standardisation through the European standardisation 
organisation CEN is one of the main examples of new governance in the EU, which has 
previously been used as a tool to improve the free movement of goods. This led to the adoption 
of the New Approach.20 The question now is whether European standardisation can also be 
employed to improve the internal market for services. Since it constitutes co- or self-regulation, 
European standardisation of services has to obtain binding force in law through a second step, 
such as its application in public or private law. This is where ERPL interacts with the national 
private law orders. The starting hypothesis of this thesis is that the European standards which 
have been adopted through European standardisation are subsequently being applied in private 
law at the national level. This application, based on a common European source, would bring the 
national private legal orders closer to each other. As such, if this process of convergence worked 
effectively, it would constitute an alternative to European harmonisation of legislation. In order 
to be effective, there would have to be both a standard-making process for services at the 
European level and the application of these standards in the national private law orders. 
All of this means that convergence has two dimensions. The first takes place at the European 
level – it is the European standardisation process. The standard-making process in itself cannot 
be sufficient to increase convergence. Therefore, the second dimension is the application of 
European standards in private law, for example in contract or in tort law. The combination of 
these two dimensions could result in a process of convergence of national private law orders on 
the basis of the intervention of ERPL. Within these two dimensions, three constitutive elements 
can be identified – European standardisation, the internal market for services and private law. 
The thesis will take the triangular relationship between European standardisation, free 
movement of services and private law as its starting point.  
ii. Methodology 
 
a. The two services sectors and their legal framework 
                                                          




Two services sectors have been selected for this thesis: the healthcare sector and the tourism 
sector. This selection has primarily been determined by looking at the services sectors for which 
European standards are being made or have been made through CEN. The focus is exclusively 
on standardisation through CEN. This has been done to keep the research manageable, but also 
because CEN is a genuinely European standardisation organisation which has been integrated in 
the governance approach of the EU in the context of the New Approach. As such, it is 
particularly representative of ERPL. At the same time, it should immediately be emphasised that 
European standardisation of services is a relatively new development. Therefore, there are not 
that many European services standards (yet). This has made it necessary to occasionally extend 
the focus of the thesis to European standardisation of goods, particularly when it comes to the 
application of European standards in private law. 
The healthcare sector is an interesting sector from the perspective of ERPL, since it has 
traditionally been regulated primarily through public law at the Member State level. The EU does 
not have competence to adopt legislation to harmonise the delivery of healthcare services. 
Nevertheless, the EU has had an impact on the healthcare sector through the application of the 
free movement provisions to the organisation and delivery of healthcare services at the national 
level. Moreover, a few years ago the EU adopted a directive to facilitate the cross-border 
movement of patients.21 The foundation of this directive is still that Member States are 
individually responsible for the organisation of their healthcare systems. In parallel to these 
developments at the European level, one can also identify important developments in the 
regulation of healthcare services at the national level. Many Member States have introduced – to 
different extents – privatisation and competition in their healthcare systems. This has made the 
patient – who was traditionally in a very hierarchical relationship towards his doctor – much 
more like a consumer. The increased privatisation of healthcare services has made the function 
of private law in the regulation of healthcare services more important. This, in combination with 
the various developments at the European level, means that there is scope for European 
standardisation and private law to play a role in the regulation of healthcare services. 
The healthcare sector is compared with the tourism sector. Unlike the healthcare sector, tourism 
has not traditionally been very strictly regulated by public law at the national level. Private law 
has always played a more important role. Moreover, the EU does have limited competences in 
tourism and has also adopted instruments in this sector on the basis of its internal market 
                                                          





competence – the best example is the Package Travel Directive.22 The EU is working towards an 
EU policy on tourism to ensure that Europe remains one of the most attractive tourist 
destinations in the world.23 Furthermore, the tourism sector is genuinely European – even 
international – in that the whole idea of tourism is that there should be cross-border movement 
of tourists and tourism service providers. The internal market dimension is obvious. On that 
basis, the tourism sector forms an interesting comparison with the healthcare sector.  
For both sectors the thesis follows the same strategy. First of all, the regulatory framework at the 
European level is discussed. Three levels of regulation are analysed – firstly, the impact of free 
movement law; secondly, the impact of secondary EU law; thirdly, the possible role and impact 
of European standardisation in the sector. Each of these levels is discussed from the perspective 
of convergence, which means that their harmonising impact – both in public and private law – is 
analysed. After the discussion of the European regulatory framework the focus shifts to the 
national level. The interaction between public and private law in the regulation of services at the 
national level is analysed. This opens up the possibility to discuss the potential scope and impact 
of the application of European standards in private law. The next step is to present two or three 
case studies for both services sectors. These case studies have been based on empirical research, 
for which the methodology is explained below. The combination of the analysis of the legal 
framework and the empirical research makes it possible to conclude each chapter with an 
analysis of the potential and dynamics of European standardisation in both services sectors. 
The final two chapters deal with the application of European standards in private law at the 
national level. Unlike the two chapters on European standardisation in the healthcare and 
tourism sector, these two chapters start from a national private law perspective. However, there 
is a lot of interaction with the European level. For example, the impact of European 
standardisation process itself on the application of European standardisation is significant. 
Similarly, the enforcement of European standards in private law might become more difficult if 
they do not comply with free movement law, competition law or the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive (“UCTD”). The cases which are discussed in these chapters come from national courts 
in the United Kingdom, Germany, France and the Netherlands. While the approach is not 
strictly comparative, research has been undertaken in these four Member States to identify all 
relevant cases at the national level. In addition, relevant judgments from the CJEU are discussed. 
It has proved difficult to find cases at the national level in which European standards were 
                                                          
22 Council Directive 90/314/EEC on package travel, package holidays and package tours. 
23 Commission Communication, ‘Europe, the world's No 1 tourist destination – a new political framework for 




applied in private law. As will become clear later in the thesis, this empirical reality is of 
significance to the analysis of the potential for convergence through European standardisation. 
b. Empirical research and case studies: socio-legal research 
One of the key starting points of the ERPL project is that the impact of ERPL cannot be tested 
only by looking at the books. It is important to combine legal analysis with empirical research to 
find out what is going on in practice. Such empirical research will highlight many aspects which 
would otherwise remain hidden to academic research. To this end, several interviews have been 
organised with persons who were involved in European standardisation of services or in the 
application of European standards in private law. Most of the interviewees were either 
representatives of organisations which were involved in European standardisation, stakeholders 
who were participating in European standardisation or lawyers involved in cases in which 
European standards played a role. Interviewees were selected via ‘purposive sampling’, which 
meant that they were chosen on the basis of their expertise or involvement in recent European 
standardisation projects. The interviewees were sometimes also able to point to other persons 
who could be interesting to talk to. As a consequence, some of the interviews were the result of a 
‘snowball effect’. Efforts have been made to ensure that the interviews took place in a 
sufficiently broad number of Member States, including a new Member State.  
Most of the interviews were organised during the second year of the research leading to this 
thesis. During some of these interviews I was accompanied by Dr Thomas Roethe, a German 
sociologist. The interviews were open-ended – there were no prepared questions or 
questionnaires. As a result, they were usually very general discussions in which the interviewees 
were offered an opportunity to present their opinion and ideas about European standardisation 
of services and its impact on private law. The formal interviews were all recorded, but I also 
organised a few more informal interviews which were not recorded. A complete list with the 
interviews can be found at the end of the thesis. I have listened to all interviews at least five 
times – sometimes alone, sometimes with Thomas Roethe. The key passages of all interviews 
have been transcribed. They have subsequently been analysed using an approach based on 
objective hermeneutics.24 This meant that Thomas Roethe and I would read the text of the 
interviews to discover its structure of meaning. Once a possible structure of meaning was found, 
we would seek to identify in the transcripts other passages which could verify this structure of 
meaning. On that basis, we would interpret the interview. This approach has helped significantly 
                                                          
24 See J. Reichertz, ‘Objective Hermeneutics and Hermeneutic Sociology of Knowledge’, in U. Flick, E. von Kardoff 




to understand what was going on in the interviews both at the conscious and unconscious level. 
The approach has not been applied to all interviews, but it has helped to shape their analysis. 
Therefore, the analysis based on the legal framework in combination with the interviews can 
properly be described as socio-legal research. 
Most of the case studies presented in the chapters are based on interviews, but not all the 
interviews have made it into a case study. The two exceptions are the case studies based on 
Fra.bo25 and EMC Development,26 which are both judgments of the CJEU. For these case studies, 
the analysis has taken place solely on the basis of the judgments of the CJEU and on an analysis 
of what happened before and after the cases. Therefore, they are less empirical than the other 
case studies. For all case studies, the information provided in the interviews has been presented 
as neutrally as possible in the case studies. I have attempted to refrain from any analysis in the 
case studies, with the exception of a few clarifications. To emphasise that the case studies 
primarily represent the narrative of the interviewees, I have used footnotes to make the source of 
a particular statement clear. The deeper analysis of the interviews takes place in the analysis parts 
of the various chapters. The only exception is the section on the perspective of key players on 
European standardisation in Chapter II, in which I have combined both the information and my 
own analysis. Again, footnotes are used to identify the information on the basis of which the 
analysis has been made. 
iii. The argument and structure of the thesis 
 
a. The argument of the thesis 
The thesis tests the triangular relationship between European standardisation, services and 
private law. Within this triangle, three different relationships can be identified. The discussion of 
the relationships in this triangle is part of an investigation into the ability of European 
standardisation of services to increase convergence in private law – meaning that the private law 
orders of the Member States are brought closer to each other. Since European harmonisation of 
laws might not be fully effective in increasing convergence between national private law orders, 
alternative strategies such as European standardisation could be considered. However, as 
European standardisation does not have the same binding force as European harmonisation of 
laws, a process of convergence in private law through European standardisation necessarily 
                                                          
25 Case C-171/11, Fra.bo SpA v. Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches eV (DVGW) – Technisch-Wissenschaftlicher 
Verein, judgment of 12 July 2012, not yet reported. 




requires two steps: first, the adoption of European standards for services; second, the application 
of these European standards in private law. If both these two steps are successful, it can be 
assumed that the standards which are expected of service providers in private law have become 
more converged. The standard of care expected from service providers in contract and in tort 
would be defined by reference to a common European standard adopted through European 
standardisation. The process as set out above requires that European services standards are made 
and that they are subsequently applied in private law. In other words, there is no convergence in 
private law through European standardisation if one of the two steps is missing or ineffective. 
The argument which is defended in this thesis is that there are some serious difficulties with both 
the relationship between European standardisation and services and the relationship between 
European standardisation and private law. There are difficulties with standardising services at the 
European level. These difficulties are ignored, or simply not dealt with, by CEN. The European 
Commission is uncertain about European standardisation of services and has decided that 
European standardisation of services should be more closely supervised. The extent to which 
services can actually be standardised remains unclear. But above all, it seems that stakeholders do 
not really trust CEN to be a genuine platform through which they can standardise their service 
activities. This uncertainty is reiterated by the absence of a regulatory framework for European 
standardisation of services, such as the New Approach for goods. There is no coherent 
regulatory approach for European standardisation of services at the European level. As a result, 
the extent to which European standardisation of services will actually play a role in the regulation 
of services remains uncertain. Faced with this uncertainty, private law is not prepared to open its 
arms to European standardisation either. The legitimacy deficit of the European standardisation 
process has an important impact on the application of European standards in private law. 
Furthermore, there is a real possibility that European standards, if applied in private law, come 
under strict review of the free movement provisions. At the moment, there are indications that 
certain European services standards might not actually comply with the free movement 
provisions.  
The aftermath of the PIP breast implants scandal in France has shown that there is potential for 
convergence in private law through European standardisation. In particular, the various cases 
which have been brought have highlighted the role of certification bodies. The potential liability 
of certification bodies could increase convergence in private law through European 
standardisation. However, the pressure for convergence in these cases comes from the regulatory 




guarantee the effective application of the New Approach. Because there is no New Approach for 
services, the same pressure for convergence does not exist in the field of services. This means 
that there is no pressure by the EU to apply European services standards in private law and that 
their application remains entirely dependent on national private law. 
In conclusion, European standardisation of services does not yet seem to be an effective strategy 
to increase convergence in private law. The two steps which are necessary for a successful 
process of convergence to take place are encountering serious problems. At the end of the thesis, 
two paradoxes of convergence are identified. First of all, it seems that while the European 
Commission would like European standardisation of services to develop in such a direction that 
it can really contribute to the improvement of the internal market for services, it is not actually 
taking any steps to control or guarantee that European standardisation of services complies with 
free movement law. Secondly, while stakeholders would like to apply European standards in 
private law, they do not actually seem to care about the requirements which are imposed by 
private law before European standards can successfully be applied. It is not until these paradoxes 
are resolved that the idea of convergence in private law through European standardisation might 
become more realistic. 
b. The structure of the thesis 
Chapter I starts with a discussion of the theory of convergence in private law. It is a concept 
which has featured frequently and prominently in the discussion of the Europeanisation of 
private law, but it is quite abstract and has been given different meanings. Therefore, it will be 
given a concrete meaning in the context of this thesis and the ERPL project. Chapter II will 
discuss the general legal framework for European standardisation and the extent to which 
European standardisation of services is embedded in that framework. As far as the first 
relationship between European standardisation and services is concerned, the thesis argues that 
European standardisation of standardisation cannot simply be considered as identical to 
European standardisation of goods. Two different dimensions are highlighted: the substantive 
(what constitutes a service and what is the impact of standardisation on services?) and the legal 
dimension (how are services regulated by law and what role can European standardisation play?). 
From a substantive point of view, standardising a service goes beyond standardising a product, in 
that it also seeks to standardise social interaction between service provider and recipient. The 
standardisation process is less scientific and technical. Furthermore, the legal dimension is 
different. Services standards have no clear role to play in the European regulatory framework for 




standardisation of services in the Standardisation Regulation 2012 appears to be cosmetic. The 
role of the Services Directive 2006 remains unclear. Moreover, it should be noted that services 
standards, as they regulate social interaction, are likely to interact much more directly with 
existing legal regulation. As a result, it becomes necessary for European standardisation of 
services to take the legal framework in which the standards should play a role into consideration. 
Overall, the legal framework for European standardisation of services is fragmented and 
incoherent. This is likely to have an impact on the willingness of stakeholders to start making 
European services standards.  
After this horizontal perspective on services in general, the thesis moves on to discuss European 
standardisation initiatives in two specific services sectors – the healthcare and tourism sectors. 
These two sectors are discussed in Chapter III and Chapter IV. For both sectors, the thesis starts 
with discussing in detail the European legal framework for the regulation of the services. This 
means that attention is paid to both primary and secondary EU law. Through this discussion, it 
becomes possible to discuss the possible role of European standardisation in private law. 
Furthermore, this European framework has to be linked to national regulatory frameworks. In 
particular, the thesis focusses on the interaction between public and private law in the regulation 
of healthcare and tourism services. As a result, the extent to which convergence in private law 
through European standardisation will have an impact on the regulation of these services will 
become clearer. Finally, for each of the sectors a number of case studies are discussed. 
With the case studies, it becomes clear that the fragmentation at the European level has a real 
impact on standardisation initiatives in particular services sectors. Important parallels can be 
observed in both the healthcare and tourism sectors. There appear to be problems at three levels: 
first, the parties involved; second, their reasons to get involved in European standardisation; and 
third, the effect of standardisation on the delivery of the service. With regard to representation, 
European standardisation is considered a threat to the autonomy of stakeholders. This is because 
parties involved in a number of European standardisation processes do or did not sufficiently 
represent the entire sector. This has raised the suspicion that European standardisation is used 
by external parties to impose regulation on the sector. As far as the motivation to standardise is 
concerned, in both sectors it is clear that the facilitation of free movement is not one of the main 
concerns of the parties involved. In fact, some of the cases show that European standardisation 
is used as a tool to restrict or protect the market. Thirdly, as regards the impact of European 
standardisation, in both sectors it is claimed that European standardisation is fundamentally 




standardisation would endanger the evidence-based nature of medical practice and could be used 
to legitimise medical treatment which could not be standardised through evidence-based 
standardisation. This could lead to a process of de-professionalisation. Similarly, in the tourism 
sector, European standardisation would eliminate the diversity which is the very reason why 
tourists seek to travel around the world. Unlike classification through hotel stars, European 
standardisation would be inflexible in that it would not allow for diversity to be taken into 
account. In addition to the sector-specific problems, there is also a general problem that public 
authorities, particularly in the healthcare sector, object to European standardisation and seek to 
exercise their influence at the European level by blocking or influencing European 
standardisation processes. 
The discussion of the case studies concludes the discussion of the relationship between 
European standardisation and services. It is clear that there are some serious obstacles and 
problems. These problems resonate in the discussion of the relationship between European 
standardisation and private law. Chapter V discusses the application of European standards in 
private law and the role of the UCTD, while Chapter VI analyses the extent to which free 
movement law and competition law impose conditions on convergence. European standards will 
not successfully be applied in private law if the standards do not comply with the requirements 
which are imposed by these areas of law.  
In Chapter V, the application of European standards in contract law and tort law is discussed. 
For both areas of private law, the various cases which have been brought in France, the UK and 
Germany by victims of PIP breast implants are used as case studies. In contract law, European 
standards are unlikely to be directly incorporated in contracts between service providers and 
consumers. The result is that the standards do not directly become the contractual standard of 
care. Their role remains primarily evidential. A similar function can be observed in tort law. 
Courts are unwilling to make a direct link between a breach of a European standard and a breach 
of the duty of care in tort. They regularly add requirements to the provisions of European 
standards. However, there is also a risk that they simply prefer to rely on national standards 
instead of European standards. As a result, European standards are insufficient as a regulatory 
tool to harmonise liability in private law at the national level. It is emphasised that the application 
of European services standards in private law is entirely dependent on the willingness of national 
private law – including courts and stakeholders – to apply and use European standards in the 
determination of the required standard of care. European services standards suffer from the 




law. Finally, the role of the UCTD as a review mechanism for the application of European 
standards as standard terms in contracts is discussed. 
In Chapter VI, the impact of free movement law and competition law on convergence in private 
law is discussed. Each of the two areas of law has a dual function from the perspective of 
convergence. On the one hand, convergence in private law becomes conditional on the 
compliance of European standards with the free movement provisions and the competition law 
provisions. European standards will not be applied in private law if they do not respect the free 
movement provisions, for example. On the other hand, the possibility that European standards 
might not be applied in private law provides pressure on standardisation organisations and 
stakeholders to make standards which are compatible with the requirements imposed by free 
movement law and competition law. As such, they also impose a process of convergence on 
European standardisation. Based on an analysis of Fra.bo, it is argued that the free movement 
provisions are increasingly applied to private regulation if private regulation is able to have an 
impact on the market. Therefore, the application of the free movement provisions to European 
standards constitutes a test to see to what extent European standardisation really has an impact 
in the internal market for services. It will be argued that the competition law is less likely to be 
applied to the application of European services standards in private law. This also means that its 
convergent impact on European standardisation is less significant. 
In the final chapter, Chapter VII, the thesis returns to the triangular relationship between 
European standardisation, services and private law and links this directly to the potential for 
convergence. Some broader comparisons are drawn between European standardisation in the 
healthcare and tourism sectors. Three themes are discussed – the parties which initiate European 
standardisation, the triggers for European standardisation and the impact of European 
standardisation on the quality of services. Furthermore, the absence of a European regulatory 
framework for European standardisation of services is discussed and linked to the lack of a 
direct impact of European services standards on liability in private law. At the end of the thesis, 
the two paradoxes are analysed. Some suggestions are made about how to resolve the paradoxes 
and how to increase the potential for convergence in private law through European 



























I. CONVERGENCE IN PRIVATE LAW, EUROPEAN 
STANDARDISATION AND FREE MOVEMENT OF 
SERVICES 
i. The discussion about convergence in private law 
a. The limits of “top-down” convergence in private law through European 
harmonisation 
In the European context, the combination of the terms “private law” and “convergence” usually 
provokes very strong reactions. Without doubt, an important contributing factor to this 
controversy has been the work of Pierre Legrand, who has written extensively on the possibility 
of convergence of private law in the EU.1 Basically, his argument is that harmonisation of 
legislation at the European level does not result in effective convergence of private law. As such, 
Legrand is critical of those who believe that the very introduction of a harmonised legal rule – 
convergence through harmonisation – is sufficient to realise convergence in the application of 
that rule. A sole focus on the transplantation, or importation, of the rule would be too limited 
and would ignore the existence of very different legal cultures across the EU. The application of 
a rule cannot be considered without also looking at the legal culture in which the rule is received. 
And this is exactly the main obstacle to convergence. According to Legrand, “[t]he meaning of 
the rule is, accordingly, a function of the interpreter’s epistemological assumptions which are 
themselves historically and culturally conditioned”.2 As a result, a common lawyer in the United 
Kingdom will still interpret a rule which has been harmonised at the European level completely 
differently from a civil lawyer in France. Although convergence might have been realised in the 
books – this is what Legrand calls a “bookish” approach3 – in practice the rule is still applied 
differently across the EU. One of the important tenets of Legrand’s argument is the fundamental 
difference in approach between common lawyers and civil lawyers. That difference, well 
established in the legal education of lawyers, cannot be remedied by the mere introduction of a 
similar rule. As a consequence, Legrand emphasises cultural and sociological differences – legal 
rules are considered as (a manifestation of) culture. After all, “[e]ach English child is a common-
law-lawyer-in-being long before she even contemplates going to law school”.4 
                                                          
1 Most prominently, P. Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of Legal Transplants’, (1997) 4 Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 111, 
and P. Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems Are Not Converging’, (1996) 45 ICLQ 52. 
2 P. Legrand, above n 1, 114. 
3 Ibid., 122. 




The simplicity of Legrand’s argument is also one of its pitfalls. While Legrand accuses his 
opponents – in particular, Alan Watson5 – of a formalistic approach towards legal rule-making, 
he himself has adopted a rather primitive understanding of culture.6 In effect, Legrand denies the 
possibility of interaction between legal rules and (legal) culture. Although he is right to emphasise 
that harmonisation can never in itself be sufficient to create convergence in law across the EU, 
the process of harmonisation can set in motion a convergent development. The introduction of a 
legal rule at the European level could necessitate a cross-border dialogue about how the rule 
should be applied as consistently and uniformly as possible. Such an exchange could eventually 
result in some degree of convergence in the application of the rule. Certainly, it would be a 
gradual process, and the approximation of laws would only be the start, but the assertion that 
legal cultures themselves are not open to influences from other legal systems appears to be rather 
primitive. Legal cultures, as well as other cultural manifestations, are subject to cross-cultural 
exchange. Cultures may themselves develop in a convergent way. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that Legrand – as he himself is ready to acknowledge7 – has presented very limited 
empirical evidence for his arguments. 
Some of this empirical evidence has been provided by Gunter Teubner, who has discussed the 
reception and application of the concept of “good faith” in English law.8 Good faith was 
introduced in English law by the implementation of the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts.9 By focussing on the subsequent implementation and application of that rule in 
English law, Teubner seeks to demonstrate that this “foreign” rule, transplanted into English law 
through European harmonisation, had the effect of a “legal irritant” in the English legal system.10 
No convergent effect was reached by the harmonisation of the rule and the English concept of 
good faith has developed in a very different way from the German concept, which was the 
original source which the EU had tried to transplant across the various jurisdictions of the EU 
Member States.11 The irritation of the new rule did not result in convergence, but it rather 
created a new product which had little to do with the original intention of the process of 
harmonisation.12 
                                                          
5 A. Watson, ‘Aspects of Reception of Law’, (1996) 44 Am. J. Comp. L. 335. 
6 See G. Helleringer and K. Purnhagen (eds.), Towards a European Legal Culture, (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014). 
7 P. Legrand, above n 1, 119. 
8 G. Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences’, 
(1998) 61 MLR 11. 
9 Council Directive 93/11/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts. 
10 G. Teubner, above n 8, 12. 
11 See also H. Micklitz and N. Reich, ‘The Court and Sleeping Beauty: The Revival of the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive’, (2014) 51 CML Rev 771, 775-781.  




In order to get away from the somewhat formalistic focus on harmonisation of legal rules,13 Jan 
Smits has argued that it is better to focus on the decision-making process rather than on the 
outcome.14 Convergence can also take place in the arguments which are being taken into account 
in the process of reaching a decision on a certain legal problem. As such, the decision-making 
process becomes the subject of convergence. According to Smits, “the focus should be on 
identifying common sets of arguments that can be weighed in different ways in the various 
national jurisdictions”.15  
Overall, what lessons can be learnt from this discussion, most of which took place in the 1980s 
and 1990s? Two points should be emphasised. Firstly, convergence is an abstract term which has 
to be specified in a particular context. The discussion about convergence is not brought forward 
by general abstractions. Rather, it should be applied to specific cases, and it should receive its 
meaning through particular examples. Secondly, harmonisation, or approximation of laws, is but 
one strategy to increase convergence at the European level. While Legrand’s criticism of the 
convergent potential of harmonisation might have been overstated, it is true that harmonisation 
of laws has its limitations. The “top-down” nature of harmonisation, imposing a rule “from 
above” at the European level, encounters certain obstacles to convergence. First of all, a 
European directive has to be implemented at the national level. It is already at this point that 
divergent developments might take place across the EU. Secondly, the national legislation which 
implemented a Directive has to be interpreted by national judges. At both stages, the 
implementation and interpretation stage, there is a risk that divergence might occur across the 
EU. As such, it is clear that harmonisation of legislation does not guarantee the consistent 
application of the rule. Therefore, it is useful to consider other strategies for convergence in law 
as an alternative to European harmonisation.  
b. “Bottom-up” convergence through European standardisation as an alternative to 
European harmonisation 
One of the main proponents of alternative strategies for convergence at the European level has 
been Walter van Gerven. In particular, through the “Ius Commune” Project,16 Van Gerven has 
argued for more emphasis on “bottom-up” convergence. By bottom-up convergence, Van 
                                                          
13 See also T. Wilhelmsson, ‘The Contract Law Acquis: Towards More Coherence through Generalisation?’, 4th 
Europäischer Juristentag, (Wien, Manz, 2008), 111-153. 
14 J. Smits, ‘Contract Law in the European Union: Convergence or Not?’, Tilburg Institute of Comparative and 
Transnational Law Working Paper No. 2008/1. See also J. Smits, ‘Convergence of Private Law in Europe: Towards a 
New Ius Commune’, in Esin Örücü and David Nelken (eds.), Comparative Law: A Handbook, (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2007), 219-240. 
15 J. Smits, above n 14, 5. 




Gerven means that the convergent effect would not derive from harmonisation, but rather from 
cooperation and coordination between the various national legal orders.17 The advantages of 
such bottom-up convergence would be, first of all, that it would firmly root European law in the 
national systems, and, secondly, that it would realise convergence between the European legal 
order and the national orders.18 As a result, it could potentially avoid primacy conflicts. 
Therefore, Van Gerven argues for a kind of coordination through what he calls the “Open 
Method of Convergence”.19 Essentially, he focusses on soft convergence which would establish 
itself as hard convergence through judicial practice. His primary example of such a strategy for 
convergence would be the doctrine of consistent interpretation.20 As such, Van Gerven appears 
to rely primarily on the judiciary as the main actor in initiating and encouraging a process of 
convergence. The result of that convergence would be a more standardised application of private 
law rules across the EU. Therefore, the Open Method of Convergence could be described as a 
method of standardisation. 
 
Although Van Gerven focusses almost exclusively on the judiciary, this does not exclude the 
possibility of other actors instigating a process of soft convergence at the European level. One of 
these processes could be co-regulation or self-regulation. This is where European standardisation 
enters into the arena. It could exactly be one of the processes of soft coordination which Van 
Gerven refers to. European standardisation involves the voluntary making of European 
standards for goods and services by the sector itself. The standardisation process takes place at 
the European level, through the European standardisation organisation CEN, where the national 
standardisation organisations are represented by national representatives. As such, it could be 
argued that European standardisation is very much like a “top-down” process, which would 
result in the adoption of a European instrument which has to be applied at the national level. But 
this is not correct. The end-result of a European standardisation process, a European standard, is 
not legally binding in the 27 Member States. Although the precise legal status of the instrument 
is different in the 27 Member States,21 the standard an sich does not have any binding force. As a 
consequence, unlike harmonisation, European standardisation does not impose a binding rule on 
                                                          
17 W. van Gerven, ‘Private Law in a Federal Perspective’, in Roger Brownsword et al. (eds.), The Foundations of 
European Private Law, (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011), 337-351.  
18 Ibid., 342. 
19 Ibid., 343. See also W. van Gerven, ‘Bringing (Private) Laws Closer to Each Other at the European Level’, in F. 
Cafaggi (ed.), The Institutional Framework of European Private Law, (Oxford, OUP, 2006), 37-78. 
20 Ibid., 344-348. 
21 H. Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005), 101-143. See also H. Schepel and 
J. Falke, Legal Aspects of Standardisation of the EC and EFTA, Volume 1: Comparative Report, (Luxembourg, Office for 




all Member States. It is just the coordination of a “soft law rule” which takes place at the 
European level. 
 
At the same time, however, an important difference with Van Gerven’s strategy is that the actors 
in European standardisation are not necessarily lawyers, which means that the link between 
European standardisation and legal practice cannot directly be made. There is no guarantee that 
the link from European standardisation to law can easily be made. The effect of European 
standardisation in law is not as automatic as, for example, with consistent interpretation or 
judicial cooperation. After the adoption of a European standard, a subsequent step is necessary 
to make the link from the European standard to its convergent effect in law. This is where the 
link from European standardisation to private law is made. Private law provides one route to 
give binding effect to European standards. European standards can be incorporated in contracts 
(as express terms), or can be used by the judiciary to determine the required standard of care in a 
contractual dispute (as implied terms). Similarly, European standards can be used to determine 
the standard of care in tort cases, to decide whether or not liability in negligence can be 
established.22 In these various ways, a European standard could be applied in private law. The 
standards of care agreed in the European standard would then become binding standards in law. 
If this process took place in the various EU Member States, the standards of care throughout the 
EU would become more converged through the initial European standardisation process and the 
subsequent application of European standards in private law. 
 
It is important to note that the subsequent application of European standards in national private 
law, through which the actual “bottom-up” convergence takes place, is a voluntary process. The 
choice of service providers to incorporate a European standard in a contract or the choice of the 
judiciary to refer to a European standard in a negligence case is a voluntary decision. It would be 
based on the recognition that a European standard expresses the appropriate standard to be 
expected from service providers in private law. In addition, certification of service providers 
could take place on the basis of European standards. Such European standards will only be 
applied if they adequately reflect the standard which can be expected from a service provider. 
Consequently, convergence “in practice” usually precedes convergence in law – the European 
standard must have been accepted as applicable by the sector itself –, and convergence through 
the application of standards in private law is, as a result, closer to “bottom-up” convergence than 
to “top-down” convergence. A European standard, like any private standard, must have proved 
                                                          
22 A. Ogus, ‘Regulation of Services and the Public-Private Divide’, in F. Cafaggi and H. Muir Watt (eds.), The 




itself before it will be applied in law. This process is a combination of what Van Gerven has 
called soft coordination at the European level combined with voluntary (judicial) application and 
enforcement in private law at the national level. 
 
In summary, this alternative strategy for convergence is essentially a two-stage process. First, a 
European standard has to be developed through CEN. Second, that European standard has to 
be applied in private law. It should immediately be noted that such a strategy encounters 
problems which are not too different from harmonisation at the European level. However, it 
essentially involves one stage less than European harmonisation of legislation. While with 
harmonisation the national judge will always start with the national legislation which implements 
a European directive, this is not necessary for European standardisation. The national judge can 
directly rely on the European standard, for example to specify a duty of care. However, this does 
not mean that the European standard does not contain any concepts which are open to multiple 
interpretations at the national level. Furthermore, this alternative strategy assumes that the link 
between European standardisation and private law can easily be made. However, the extent to 
which national private law is open to receive and apply European standards is something which 
will have to be tested in the next chapters. Before these questions can be treated in more detail, it 
is, first of all, necessary to discuss how convergence in private law through European 
standardisation works, what it means and why it would occur. This is what will be done in the 
next section of this chapter. 
 
ii. Convergence in private law through European standardisation 
 
a. How would convergence in private law through European standardisation work? 
Essentially, the process of convergence through European standardisation has already been 
summarised in the section above. Two stages can be identified: first, the standard-making 
process at the European level; second, the application of these standards in private law at the 
national level. Both stages are necessary for a process of convergence in private law through 
European standardisation to take place. 
 
The first step is the standardisation process at the European level. The process will be discussed 
in more detail in the next chapters, but it necessarily involves a meeting of minds of the 
stakeholders in a particular sector. The term “stakeholders” is very broad and general. In the 




the adoption of a European standard in that sector. This will inevitably include the businesses in 
a particular sector, or their professional associations, but also consumers, the State and non-
profit organisations. One of the challenges for European standardisation, which will be discussed 
in the next chapter, is to make the European standardisation process more inclusive and to 
include as many stakeholders as possible. The stakeholders from various Member States – not 
necessarily all Member States – meet at the European level to identify a set of common standards 
which are subsequently incorporated in a European standard. For services standards, for 
example, these standards usually focus on the qualifications of service providers and the process 
of service provision. A European standard is always based on consensus between all parties 
which are taking part in the standardisation process.23 This means that the first convergent effect 
is taking place at the European level in the standardisation process through regulation of the 
concept of quality of care. The parties will have to agree on a common definition of what 
constitutes the minimum level of care required from a service provider. Once a European 
standard has been adopted, it will contain a set of standards which have to be fulfilled by 
producers or service providers. The standard is then published by the national standardisation 
organisations.24 This concludes the first stage of the process of convergence. 
 
The second stage of the process of convergence is the application of the standard in private law. 
To be able to assess the ability of European standardisation to realise convergence in private law 
as an alternative to legal harmonisation, the application of European standards in law is crucial. 
The fact that the standard has now been set as the professional standard through a European 
process of self-regulation does not automatically mean that it will also be set as the legal standard 
to be expected from service providers in private law. Although it could be argued that there 
would frequently be market pressure for service providers to comply with a particular standard, 
that pressure alone is not sufficient to realise convergence in law. This does not exclude the 
possibility that the market pressure could lead to the “voluntary” application of the standard in 
contractual relationships. As a consequence, for the second stage of the process of convergence, 
a decision is necessary to apply the European standards – to put their provisions into practice. 
This decision does not necessarily have to be express – it can start with the application of the 
standards in practice. Such application in practice would subsequently encourage the application 
of the standards in private law. However, it is important to note that the simple adoption of a 
                                                          
23 The European Standardisation Organisations have adopted the World Trade Organisation’s principles in the field 
of standardisation. The concept of consensus is also defined in Annex II of Regulation 1025/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on European standardisation.  
24 The European Standardisation Organisations do not own copyright in European standards. The standards are 




European standardisation is never sufficient to increase convergence in private law – the 
convergence has to result from the application of the standards in practice. A distinction should 
be made between the application of European standards in contract law and in tort law. There 
are basically two groups who could encourage convergence through the application of European 
standards. The first group would be the stakeholders themselves, who could apply a European 
standard in contract law. This could be a contract between the service provider and service 
recipient, but also between service providers and their association of service providers.25 The 
incorporation in contract law would mean that the contracts expressly provided that the service 
provider complies with the standards of care as set out in a European standard. Another 
possibility would be for the stakeholders to create a certification body, which would check that 
service providers complied with a European standard. This is often also a (quasi-)contractual 
relationship. In tort law, stakeholders could refer to European standards to defend themselves 
against liability claims. The European standard would be used as a benchmark to demonstrate 
compliance with the required standard of care in tort.  
 
As an alternative, the judiciary could be relied on to give European standards binding force in 
private law. This could be as an implied term of the contract, or simply in determining the 
contractual standard of care to be expected from the service provider. In both examples, the 
European standard would be used to specify – or concretise – the required duty of care in 
private law. A similar process could occur in a tort case. The judge could refer to a European 
standard to determine what standard of care is owed by a service provider to the service 
recipient. For example, in medical negligence cases, the standard could assist in an assessment of 
the required standard of care of a medical practitioner. In most cases an expert would be 
required to give evidence, but this expert could use the European standard to give an indication 
to the court of the standard of care which is expected from a medical practitioner. Again, 
therefore, it would be the stakeholders themselves who would refer the judiciary to the 
European standard and invite the judiciary to give binding force to the European standard in 
private law. 
 
To conclude, this second stage is necessary to complete the process of convergence in private 
law. The application of European standards in practice provides a bridge from the adoption of 
European standards to their harmonising impact on private law. One of the questions which will 
have to be answered is whether this two-stage “bottom-up” strategy can result in an effective 
                                                          





application of European standards in private law. Such a strategy for convergence will only be 
effective if two problems can be overcome. Firstly, the judiciary will use certain qualitative 
criteria for deciding whether or not to adopt the European standard as the required standard of 
care in contract or tort. The European standardisation process, and the standard itself, will have 
to fulfil these criteria before they can be applied and enforced in private law.26 This is a problem 
which will be discussed in Chapter V. 
 
Secondly, the judicial application of a standard means that the standard will have to be 
interpreted. This is where Legrand’s “no convergence” argument becomes relevant again. What 
is the difference between interpreting a legislative instrument which has been adopted to 
implement a European directive and interpreting the provisions of a European standard? Two 
differences, which have already been referred to above, can be identified: first, with 
harmonisation through directives, the judge will be basing his decision primarily on the national 
implementing legislation. A risk of divergent interpretation could already flow from the simple 
fact that the European legislation had to be implemented in national law. Second, the source of 
interpretation will be a European standard which has been agreed by stakeholders in the sector. 
It is a self-regulatory instrument which has not been drafted by lawyers, but which has been 
agreed by the stakeholders in a particular sector. As such, the language could be presumed to be 
somewhat different from legal instruments, such as directives, which have been adopted top-
down. The substance of the standard could be more technical, and more adapted to the 
particular requirements of the specific sector which has developed the European standard.  
 
b. Why would convergence in private law through European standardisation occur?  
Independent from the question how a process of convergence in private law through European 
standardisation would occur, it is another matter to analyse why such a process has to take place. 
What are the reasons to attempt to increase convergence between legal orders? Roger 
Brownsword has distinguished four different reasons to increase convergence between legal 
orders: political reasons, economic/efficiency reasons, health and safety reasons and moral 
reasons.27 Within the European context, it is clear that convergence through harmonisation has 
primarily served the purpose of building an internal market. The foundations of that internal 
market are not only built on economic and efficiency reasons, but also on a very strong political 
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conviction of integration through free movement.28 It is in that light that the various directives 
which have affected national private law should be considered. Although they are mainly based 
on economic and efficiency reasons, consumer protection can ultimately be considered as a tool 
to build a more effective and efficient internal market. 
Through the adoption of various directives, for example on unfair terms in consumer contracts, 
private law is made an instrument – is “instrumentalised” – to realise a better-functioning 
internal market. As a consequence, convergence in private law becomes a strategy to improve the 
internal market. A recent and prominent example of the instrumentalisation of private law is the 
Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law (“CESL”), published by the 
European Commission (“the Commission”) in October 2011.29 The fundamental assumption on 
which this proposal is based is that unification of national sales laws will result in more cross-
border activity. It is assumed by the Commission that the uncertainty of not knowing a foreign 
legal system is an obstacle to the use of cross-border transactions.30 Therefore, the aim of the 
instrument is to remove that obstacle by creating the possibility of a CESL which is accessible to 
all parties and effectively removes a transaction from the specific national legal regime in which it 
takes place. Despite the fact that the application of the Regulation is of a voluntary nature, in 
that parties can choose to opt-in and make the Regulation applicable to their transaction, the 
CESL represents an attempt to realise an ultimate form of convergence – a European legal 
framework which would effectively replace the use of national legal systems. The convergence 
would arise from the application of the CESL in practice. Harmonisation would be achieved not 
through legislation but through the practical impact of the CESL on business transactions.31 
 
Although the focus of the CESL is on the free movement of goods, private law can similarly be 
instrumentalised to increase the free movement of services. However, services in the EU have 
primarily been regulated through free movement law. Article 56 on the Treaty of the Functioning 
of the European Union (“TFEU”), which provides for the right to free movement of services, 
was used to remove obstacles to the free movement of both service providers and service 
recipients.32 Certain requirements imposed on service providers or recipients by Member States 
were eliminated if they were discriminatory or prevented access to the market for service 
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providers or recipients coming from another Member State. As such, the focus of the regulation 
of services through the free movement of services was on negative integration.33 In this process, 
obstacles to the functioning of the internal market for services have gradually been removed. 
However, there has been little positive integration, for example through harmonisation, to 
replace national regulation of services by a European equivalent. A distinction should be made 
between regulated markets, in which the EU has encouraged liberalisation through very precise 
and technical harmonisation, and horizontal services more generally. For regulated markets 
which were previously under State control, such as telecom and energy, the EU has adopted 
standards through legislation.34 This has not happened for all other services. In these services 
sectors, European standardisation could then go one step further and make a positive case for 
which requirements should be imposed on service providers. As a consequence, it would be 
closer to positive integration.  
 
The next question is whether European standardisation has any specific purpose which 
harmonisation of legislation would not have, or whether it is also simply being instrumentalised 
as a tool for internal market building. This links back to another argument made by 
Brownsword, namely whether convergence takes place “for the sake of convergence” – because 
compatibility is considered to be necessary – or because we believe that convergence might 
actually be a good thing.35 Article 26 of the Services Directive 2006 (“the Services Directive”) 
encourages the use of various voluntary European regulatory tools to increase the compatibility 
of services, with the aim to encourage free movement of both service providers and services 
recipients.36 Standardisation is mentioned as one of the tools in Article 26(5). From the wording 
of the section, we could simply conclude that this is all about compatibility and, therefore, about 
convergence for the sake of convergence. However, Article 26 is part of a section on the quality 
of services, and the quality of services is also expressly mentioned as one of the purposes of 
standardisation.37 Consequently, it is not just convergence for the sake of convergence. It is 
assumed in Article 26 that convergence through standardisation will also improve the quality of 
services, which will in turn be an incentive for more cross-border movement of service 
recipients. However, as will become clearer in the next chapters, the relationship between 
European standardisation and quality of services is complicated and requires further analysis. 
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Overall, it would be too simple to argue that convergence in private law through European 
standardisation has the efficiency of the EU internal market as its sole objective. Improving the 
quality of services is a second important objective. It is of course intended that the improved 
quality of services should again make the EU internal market more efficient. However, it would 
not only make the EU internal market for services more efficient, it would also raise the quality 
of service provision at the national level. As such, national service recipients should also benefit 
from the convergence without having to access cross-border services. This will become more 
obvious when the various examples of European standardisation initiatives in the healthcare and 
tourism sectors are discussed. 
 
c. What does convergence in private law through European standardisation mean? 
A distinction should be made between the substantive impact of convergence in private law 
through European standardisation and its procedural impact. Focussing on European 
standardisation of services, a European standard would define the substantive standards to be 
expected from service providers. This means that the various elements which are used to define 
the required quality of a particular service are given a common European meaning. If these 
standards were applied in private law, the substantive requirements of the duty of care in 
contract or tort would be defined by reference to a common European standard and, 
consequently, would become more converged. By way of example, the following elements of the 
service process are frequently being standardised in European standards:38 
 
(i) Education/training requirements: the standard could identify the required level of 
training which service providers should have completed before they can provide a 
particular service. Moreover, it could provide how much training is necessary for a 
particular part of the service. For example, the European standard on Aesthetic 
Surgery Services will provide which surgical treatments can be performed by general 
practitioners and which treatments have to be performed by consultants with 
specialist training in plastic surgery 
(ii) Facilities: the standard could prescribe which facilities should be available to service 
recipients and which facilities are suitable for which (part of the) service. 
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Furthermore, the standard could identify the materials or devices to be used in the 
provision of the service 
(iii) Communication/information: the standard could set out what information should be 
given to the service recipient before the contract is concluded and the service is 
provided. This could extend to information which has to be given during the service 
process, as well as after the service has been provided 
(iv) The service provision itself: the standard could provide which specific elements a 
service process has to provide. For example, in the case of healthcare standards, the 
standard could provide how a particular wound should be closed, or at which stage 
of the treatment it should be closed 
(v) After-care and complaints: a standard could oblige service providers to have a 
complaint mechanism in place. Moreover, it could set out the requirements imposed 
on a service provider after the actual service has been delivered 
(vi) Monitory of quality: monitoring of quality is an important element of the regulation 
of quality of care of service providers. The standard could specify how the quality of 
the service should be monitored, for example through internal or external visitation 
or certification 
 
This process of substantive convergence in the elements of the service provision will also have a 
spill-over effect on the substantive meaning of certain private law concepts. For example, a 
European standard could have an impact on the concept of competence in private law. Similarly, 
the standard could have an impact on the availability of a particular remedy in private law if it 
provides that a particular remedy should or should not be available.  
 
From a procedural point of view, the very existence of a European standard might also have a 
convergent impact on private law. It could be that the existence of a standard would result in a 
presumption that compliance with the standard is required. As such, a breach of any of its 
provisions would automatically result in liability in private law. This would mean that the 
traditional obligation of a service provider would be construed as an obligation de résultat – the 
obligation to satisfy or fulfil the requirements of the standard – rather than an obligation de moyens, 
which is usually required for service contracts.39 As a result, this could mean that once a breach 
of the European standard has been established by a claimant in a contract or tort case, the 
burden of proof would shift to the service provider to establish that there has not been a breach 
                                                          




of the duty of care. The service provider would then have to justify why he breached the 
European standard without breaching the duty of care in private law.40 Again, if European 
standardisation were to have such an impact, this would mean that European standardisation 
would have a convergent effect on the determination of liability in private law. 
 
d. How could convergence in private law through European standardisation be 
tested? 
If convergence through standardisation was all about the efficiency of the EU internal market for 
services, it could simply be tested by counting the number of service recipients or service 
providers who move to another Member State to receive or provide services as a result of the 
adoption of a European standard in a particular sector. Such an approach would have to develop 
a strategy to test and determine the causal link between the adoption of a standard and the free 
movement of service recipients or providers. This would be quite problematic, since many 
initiatives for European standardisation take places in sectors in which there is already a 
significant amount of cross-border movement. It cannot automatically be assumed that the 
adoption of a European standard would necessarily increase the amount of cross-border 
movement. Because it is difficult, if not impossible, to define one unitary test for convergence 
through European standardisation, a test with two limbs will be adopted. The test closely follows 
the process of convergence in private law through European standardisation as it has been 
developed in the sections above: 
 
(i) How many European standards are being adopted? In which sectors are European 
standards being adopted? 
(ii) Are these European standards subsequently applied and enforced in private law at 
the national level?  
 
As can be seen from the two limbs, the first part of the test is more quantitative than qualitative. 
The explanation for that choice is rather simple: without any European standards, there would 
never be any convergence in private law through European standardisation, because the 
European standards which are needed to increase that convergence are missing. The focus of 
this first part of the test is necessarily on the standard-making at the European level, and at 
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standardisation through CEN. In Chapter II, the European legislative framework for 
standardisation of services will be set out. Chapters III and IV will discuss the making of 
European standards in the healthcare and tourism sectors. 
 
The second test is the more qualitative assessment. This requires an assessment of what happens 
with a European standard once it has been adopted. If it is never used or referred to in legal 
disputes – which could be either in contract or in tort – there would not be any convergence in 
private law. However, it is insufficient to look only at case law. A case-law focussed approach 
should be combined with looking at contracts in which a European standard has been 
implemented or is referred to. This is an alternative way of giving legal effect to a European 
standard in private law. Similarly, European standards might be applied in certification schemes. 
The key issue for the application of European standards in private law is that there has to be a 
direct link between the adoption of European services standards and the liability of service 
providers in contract or tort law. This is closely linked to the procedural dimension of 
convergence explained above. European standards only increase convergence in private law if 
the provisions of European standards have an impact on the determination of liability of service 
providers in contract or tort law. Otherwise, European standards would not have any legal effect 
and would not be effectively enforced in private law. This means that European standards must 
be applied as the required standard of care in contract or tort. This, and the role of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive (“UCTD”), will be analysed in Chapter V. Furthermore, it is important 
that European standards comply with the requirements which are imposed by EU law. Free 
movement law and competition both impose requirements on European standards. If the 
standards are not compatible with these requirements, there is a risk that they will not be applied 
in private law. As a result, compliance with the free movement provisions and the competition 
law provisions becomes a condition for convergence. This will be discussed in Chapter VI. 
 
The second part of the test will, therefore, have to involve an assessment of the application and 
enforcement of European standards in private law. This requires an analysis of the extent to 
which European services standards have an impact on the determination of liability of service 
providers in private law. Furthermore, European services standards have to comply with the 
requirements which are imposed by EU law before they can be successfully applied in private 
law. In conclusion, for convergence in private through standardisation to occur, both stages of 
the test have to be fulfilled. By following the process from the standard-making to the 




European standardisation to increase convergence in how a particular service is regulated in 
private law.  
 
iii. The regulation of services in the EU, its impact on convergence in private law 
and the role of European standardisation 
 
a. Free movement of services under Article 56 TFEU 
 
So far, this chapter has discussed European standardisation in general, without focussing on 
services in particular. At this point in the chapter, the link from European standardisation to 
services will be made. First of all, it is necessary to investigate to what extent the case law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (“the CJEU”) has resulted in convergence in how a 
particular service is regulated across the EU. The second step will be to see to what extent 
secondary EU law, and in particular the Services Directive, has had a convergent impact. 
Furthermore, the impact of these two levels of service regulation – through primary and 
secondary EU law – on private law has to be discussed. This discussion will open up the 
possibility to discuss the possible role and impact of European standardisation on the regulation 
of services through private law and its interaction with primary and secondary EU law. 
 
From the very first cases on the free movement of services, as provided in Article 56 TFEU, the 
focus of the CJEU has been on the removal of restrictions to the free movement of services 
created by Member States. As Jukka Snell and Mads Andenas have pointed out,41 the 
identification of a restriction, which necessarily has to have cross-border impact and has to have 
an effect which is more than de minimis, has enabled the CJEU to assume the competence to 
regulate. Once such a restriction has been identified, the burden shifts to the national regulator 
which is required to justify the restriction by some overriding reason in the public interest. 
Concerns about the quality of a service could be such an overriding reason. This public interest 
is closely linked to the protection of service recipients and consumers, which appears to be one 
of the major justifications accepted by the CJEU in the field of services.42 In addition to the 
identification of such an overriding reason of public interest, the restriction in place must also be 
proportionate. This requires an assessment of the suitability and necessity of the restriction.43 
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If the CJEU finds that a restriction cannot be justified or is disproportionate, the Member State 
in question will be required to remove the restriction. The restriction will not be replaced by a 
European solution imposed by the CJEU, but the Member State will rather be forced to accept 
the regulatory choice made by the Member State of origin. This would be most obvious for cases 
in which the defendant Member State raised quality of care concerns as a justification for the 
imposition of a restriction. It would not exactly be mutual recognition, in the way that it has been 
introduced for the free movement of goods, but it could have a similar result. If a restriction to 
free movement of services imposed by a Member State cannot be justified, the outcome might 
very well be that it has to recognise and accept the regulatory measure of another Member State. 
This is particularly important for (technical) standards for products or services.44 
 
How this works in practice can best be illustrated by an example.45 The German regulator of 
tourist guides refuses permission for a Dutch tourist guide to provide tourist guide services to a 
group of Dutch tourists in Berlin. The basis for the refusal is that the guide has not undertaken 
the same amount of training as a German tourist guide. This is because the Dutch training for 
tourist guides is shorter than the German training. Therefore, there is a risk, according to the 
German regulator, that Dutch tourists will be misinformed about the many highlights of Berlin. 
The CJEU might find that this constitutes a restriction to the freedom of the Dutch tourist guide 
to provide services abroad. If Germany cannot justify the restriction, the final outcome is that it 
has to accept that the Dutch training is sufficient. The result would be some sort of indirect 
mutual recognition. For future cases, this could mean that it would be useful for the German and 
Dutch authorities to have a discussion about the training requirements with a view to avoid 
future litigation. Moreover, the German regulator would be required to look more precisely at 
the Dutch training requirements. The negative integration instigated by the CJEU could then be 
a trigger for European standardisation to enable regulators to agree on a set of European 
standards. 
 
The example above is based on the recognition of qualifications of a service provider. But it is 
not difficult to find an example which is more directly about the quality of a service provider. A 
Dutch patient travels abroad to receive healthcare services in an Austrian private clinic. He 
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subsequently applies to his Dutch healthcare insurer for reimbursement of the costs of the 
treatment. The Dutch insurer investigates the Austrian clinic and concludes that the treatment 
was of such a low quality that it refuses to compensate the Dutch patient for this treatment. If 
this restriction to the free movement of the patient to receive healthcare services abroad is found 
to be justified, it effectively means that the Dutch insurer’s interpretation of quality of care 
prevails over that of the Austrian clinic. However, again, it does not mean that the CJEU 
attempts to define a common European concept of quality of healthcare. Negative integration is 
“kassatorisch” – it tells parties what they cannot do, but it does not provide a positive solution. 
 
So far, one could argue that this tool of removing obstacles is more of a procedural solution than 
a substantive solution. Quality of care is used as a negative concept – a lack of quality can be 
employed as a justification for imposing a restriction on the free movement of service providers 
or recipients. Implicitly, however, the CJEU’s decisions in the examples given above also express 
a more substantive judgment about the quality of the service provided (or the quality of the 
training of the service provider). For example, in the case of the Dutch tourist guide, if the CJEU 
holds that the restriction cannot be justified, it implicitly finds that the Dutch tourist guide 
training is of sufficient quality and has to be accepted as appropriate by the German authorities. 
However, what the exact meaning of the minimum quality level is can only be identified through 
litigation or through an exchange between regulatory authorities. This is a time-consuming and 
expensive process. Furthermore, there is a risk that the constant removal of obstacles might lead 
to a race to the bottom, and that the pressure of regulatory competition – and the risk of 
litigation – forces national regulators to adopt the lowest possible level of quality regulation.46 
This was exactly the fear in certain Member States after reading the first draft of the Services 
Directive. The debate on the risks of regulatory competition in the EU was revived after the 
controversial decisions of the CJEU in Viking47 and Laval.48  
 
What does the case law of the CJEU mean from the perspective of convergence? Clearly, the 
ability of the case law to bring the various regimes which regulate services at the national level 
closer to each other is limited. The CJEU is no legislator – the tool of identifying and eliminating 
restrictions to free movement of services does not enable it to substitute its own regulatory 
solution. It simply provides a mechanism whereby one national regulator has to accept and 
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recognise the solution of another. If the regulatory solution is not of a satisfactory quality, the 
CJEU will find the imposed restriction justified. As such, the CJEU effectively performs some 
sort of quality test of the national regulation of a particular service. The outcome of this test 
could lead to a process of mutual exchange of regulatory solutions. However, in most services 
sectors it would seem unlikely that this mere exchange would lead to sufficient consensus to 
adopt a common solution and would enable an onwards development from negative integration 
to positive integration. Although the negative integration approach – the removals of obstacles 
to free movement – could pave the way for positive integration, which according to Snell and 
Andenas would be the logical next step,49 in fact the political will or legal competence to move to 
positive integration might be absent. This will be discussed later with reference to the healthcare 
sector – in which there is no legal competence to adopt harmonising measures on quality of 
healthcare – and the tourism sector – in which some limited harmonisation has taken place, but 
in which there is limited political consensus to define quality of care issues at the European level. 
The result of this lack of competence or political opposition is that regulatory diversity is 
preferred, and that negative integration will continue to be employed as the main regulatory 
strategy.  
 
In addition to the limited impact on convergence of service regulation in general, the convergent 
impact of Article 56 TFEU in private law has also been minimal. The main reason for this is that 
for a long time Article 56 TFEU has not been applied to private law relationships. Traditionally, 
while Article 56 TFEU could be relied on directly by individuals to challenge restrictions to free 
movement imposed by the State, it was not possible for individuals to challenge restrictions 
imposed by private parties. Article 56 TFEU was not considered to have horizontal direct effect. 
With the judgment of the CJEU in Walrave and Koch50 this traditional position has evolved and the 
conduct of private parties which are involved in collective regulation in the exercise of their legal 
autonomy can now be caught by the free movement provisions. However, this covers still quite a 
limited category of parties. To what extent “simple” contracts between private parties can be 
subject to review by the CJEU remains unclear, but at the moment the impact is minimal.51 It 
could be argued that after Laval it is now clear that Article 56 TFEU now has full horizontal 
direct effect, but such a statement would not do justice to the complicated facts of this case and 
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the role of the Swedish State in the background of the legal dispute.52 Nevertheless, it is clear that 
the suggestion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, who argued in his Opinion in Viking53 that 
it should be the effect of private parties’ actions on the EU internal market rather than the public 
or private status of parties which should determine the applicability of the free movement 
provisions, will have an impact on the development of the case law and will broaden the scope 
of application of the free movement provisions in general. The public or private status of parties 
is no longer decisive for the applicability of the free movement provisions, but rather the impact 
of their actions on the EU internal market.54  
 
The gradual extension of the application of Article 56 TFEU means that the free movement 
provisions might have a more significant impact on the relationship between service providers 
and consumers.55 Nevertheless, this impact will usually be on a case-by-case basis.56 Because the 
main focus of Article 56 TFEU remains on the removal of obstacles to free movement, the 
extent to which it has potential to have a harmonising impact on private law is restricted. 
Convergence through negative integration has its limitations – a further step is required. The 
next question is then whether the adoption of the Services Directive has had more impact on 
private law. 
 
b. The Services Directive 2006 
 
The Services Directive was no doubt one of the most controversial legislative instruments 
adopted by the EU in the last decade. The underlying motivation to propose a legislative 
instrument on the free movement of services was that services play a major role in the European 
economy. However, the internal market for services in the EU was not functioning as well as the 
internal market for goods. The choice was made for a horizontal instrument which would cover 
all services. The initial Bolkestein draft provided that service providers only had to comply with 
the regulatory requirements imposed by their home Member State - the Member State of 
establishment. As such, it introduced the “country of origin” principle – a very strong version of 
mutual recognition. The proposal of the country of origin principle provoked strong opposition, 
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in particular in France.57 After a period of intensive debate,58 the final version of the Services 
Directive contained a much less strong version of mutual recognition – the mere recognition of a 
right to freely provide and receive services in another Member States – with an extensive list of 
justifications for limitations to that right.59  
Moreover, a number of services sectors were removed from the scope of the Directive. 
Healthcare services are no longer covered by the Services Directive.60 As will be discussed in 
more detail below, it was thought that the healthcare sector needed a specific legislative solution 
and was not suitable for a horizontal instrument.61 The solution came five years later, when the 
Directive on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare was finally adopted.62 
This Directive will also be discussed in more detail below. However, it is necessary to briefly 
outline the various sections of the Services Directive and to discuss the possible impact of the 
Services Directive on the regulation of services in private law.  
Essentially, the Services Directive consists of three sections. The first is a section on 
administrative simplification.63 The procedures for service providers who want to provide 
services in another Member State, and for those who want to establish themselves in another 
Member State, have to be simplified. In addition, Member States have to create central “Points 
of single contact” where all relevant information for service providers can easily be obtained.64 
As such, the focus of this section is on the efficient and transparent exchange of information by 
administrative authorities.  
The second section reiterates the rights of service providers who want to establish themselves on 
a permanent basis in another Member State.65 It focusses on authorisation schemes, and the 
conditions for a lawful authorisation scheme, and prohibited requirements, which cannot be 
imposed by national regulators on service providers from other Member States. This section 
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closely followed the CJEU’s case law on the freedom of establishment.66 It was also a relatively 
uncontroversial section of the Services Directive. 
The third and most important section focusses on the right to provide services and receive 
services in another Member State.67 This is where we still find a somewhat diluted version of the 
“country of origin” principle, with a long list of derogations and case-by-case justifications.  
By looking at these three main sections of the Services Directive it would seem that an approach 
of negative integration combined with administrative cooperation remains crucial to the 
regulation of services in the EU. However, there is a fourth section which provides for measures 
on the quality of services. A significant amount is focussed on information requirements 
imposed on service providers.68 The section appears to be a combination of left-overs from the 
other sections. However, from the perspective of convergence through European 
standardisation, Article 26 is of significant importance. 
Article 26 
 
Policy on quality of services 
 
1. Member States shall, in cooperation with the Commission, take accompanying measures to encourage providers 
to take action on a voluntary basis in order to ensure the quality of service provision, in particular through use of 
one of the following methods: 
 
(a) certification or assessment of their activities by independent or accredited bodies; 
(b) drawing up their own quality charter or participation in quality charters or labels drawn up by professional 
bodies at Community level. 
 
2. Member States shall ensure that information on the significance of certain labels and the criteria for applying 
labels and other quality marks relating to services can be easily accessed by providers and recipients. 
 
3. Member States shall, in cooperation with the Commission, take accompanying measures to encourage 
professional bodies, as well as chambers of commerce and craft associations and consumer associations, in their 
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territory to cooperate at Community level in order to promote the quality of service provision, especially by making 
it easier to assess the competence of a provider. 
 
4. Member States shall, in cooperation with the Commission, take accompanying measures to encourage the 
development of independent assessments, notably by consumer associations, in relation to the quality and defects of 
service provision, and, in particular, the development at Community level of comparative trials or testing and the 
communication of the results. 
 
5. Member States, in cooperation with the Commission, shall encourage the development of voluntary European 
standards with the aim of facilitating compatibility between services supplied by providers in different Member 
States, information to the recipient and the quality of service provision. 
 
Unlike the other provisions in the Services Directive, Article 26 is an attempt to encourage 
substantive regulation of the quality of a service at the European level. This would go further 
than the tool of mutual recognition – it would be a development from negative integration 
towards positive integration. The various mechanisms referred to in Article 26 all go some way 
towards defining qualitative criteria for the provision of services.69 The aim would be to make the 
services more compatible and of a higher quality. This would not necessarily result in a reduction 
of the regulatory diversity of services, as the standards would only provide for a minimum level 
of care, but it would mean that there was Europe-wide agreement on the minimum quality 
standards to be expected from service providers. In addition, the measures would be a voluntary 
means of working towards higher quality. As such, the service recipient who is receiving services 
in a cross-border context is better protected and also better informed about the quality of service 
providers in other Member States.  
 
A number of points should be made about Article 26. First of all, all regulatory tools in Article 
26 are voluntary. They focus on soft convergence at the European level. There is no direct legal 
obligation on service providers and Article 26 does not have anything to say about the 
subsequent application of this soft convergence in (private) law. As such, the coordination at the 
European level is really a very soft kind of coordination. Secondly, although the mechanisms 
referred to in Article 26 are voluntary, it appears to impose an obligation on Member States to 
encourage such voluntary initiatives. The question is how far this obligation would go. Could the 
Commission start infringement proceedings if Member States failed to encourage the processes 
                                                          





set out in Article 26? That raises another important question: would the obligation imposed on 
the Member States mean that the European standards were still “voluntary”? This could 
transform the “bottom-up” nature of the standardisation process into something which would 
be closer to “top-down” convergence.  
 
Thirdly, the increased involvement of Member States in the standardisation could transform the 
soft law character of European standards. The development from pure self-regulation towards 
something which looks more like co-regulation could result in a hybrid instrument with more 
legally binding status than a purely self-regulatory standard. This could assist in the subsequent 
application of the standard in private law. However, it could also mean that, again, the 
standardisation process would become more “top-down” in nature and that the standard which 
is finally adopted would look more like legislation than self-regulation. Moreover, it could mean 
that the European standard would play a more prominent role in public law rather than in 
private law. The main question which remains is what role Article 26 of the Services Directive is 
going to play in practice. It is clear that very few Member States have actively implemented 
Article 26.70 Nevertheless, it means that standardisation is now on the list of regulatory strategies 
as one of the tools to increase the compatibility of services and the quality of those services.71  
 
For the impact of the Services Directive on convergence in private law in general, it should be 
noted that the obligations in the Services Directive are primarily imposed on States. This means 
that any questions about the extent to which the Services Directive could have horizontal direct 
effect, and could be applicable to disputes in private law, would be theoretical.72 The obligations 
imposed in the Services Directive mainly have to do with administrative formalities and 
requirements which are imposed on States or quasi-public regulators. In that respect, Article 4(7) 
of the Services Directive copies the formula used in Walrave and Koch to justify the application of 
the Services Directive to professional bodies or organisations which adopt rules.73 Although this 
could result in private law disputes between service providers and these professional bodies, the 
overall impact of the Services Directive on convergence in private law appears to be limited. 
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As a consequence, the role of European standardisation of services, as a third level of service 
regulation which would be additional to, but also interacting with, Article 56 TFEU and the 
Services Directive, should now be discussed.  
 
c. European standardisation of services and its impact on private law 
 
Unlike Article 56 TFEU and the (main parts of) the Services Directive, European standardisation 
would actually make a positive case for what the quality of a particular service should be. It 
would take mutual recognition to the next level – instead of recognising national regulatory 
solutions, a single European regulatory solution would be imposed. Such positive integration 
would mean that the diversity of national regulatory solutions would be replaced by a European 
solution which would prescribe the required standard of care. However, the European standard 
would not be the only acceptable standard. It is important to note that European standardisation 
only aims to introduce minimum quality criteria – it seeks to identify a common set of standards 
with which all service providers should comply. The standards cannot be compared with 
maximum harmonisation. The introduction of a number of similar minimum quality criteria 
should guarantee a minimum level-playing field for services in the EU. This level-playing field 
should increase the safe movement of service recipients within the EU and guarantee a 
minimum standard of care in all 27 Member States. This means that there is no complete 
“equalisation” of the standard of care provided, but simply that providers are required to comply 
with a European minimum standard. Competition and diversity above that minimum standard 
remains possible.  
Roger Brownsword has identified three types of convergence: soft convergence, medium 
convergence and hard convergence.74 Soft convergence would be an optional or default rule, 
medium convergence would be the creation of a mandatory minimum standard and hard 
convergence would a mandatory rule which would also be the maximum. The process of 
convergence in private law through coordination cannot easily be classified as belonging to one 
of these three categories. The standardisation process at the European level could be described 
as soft convergence. The subsequent application of the standard in law could be described as a 
mandatory minimum standard, since a European standard would be given binding effect in law. 
However, the incorporation in law would still be optional – either by the stakeholders through 
incorporation in contracts, or by the judiciary in contract or negligence cases. The fact that the 
standard would acquire binding status as a result of the application in law does not detract from 
                                                          




the fact that it was a voluntary choice to refer to the standard. However, if European standards 
are applied in private law, for example in tort law, they are essentially upgraded from soft 
convergence to medium convergence – after all, a mandatory minimum standard is identified.  
The link from European standardisation of services to private law can more easily be made than 
for Article 56 TFEU and the Services Directive. This is partly because European standardisation 
of services, although it is to some extent embedded in a European legal framework, has not been 
integrated in something like the New Approach for goods. As a consequence, European 
standardisation of services cannot rely directly on EU law to provide binding effect to European 
standards. This means that the role of private law becomes even more important. However, the 
fact that European standards only provide for a minimum standard of care could have a 
detrimental impact on their application in private law. If they are only minimum standards, it 
might be that both the judiciary and stakeholders might be inclined to adopt higher standards of 
care.75 The result of the process of soft convergence at the European level might be lower than 
the traditional national standard, with the result that the national courts and stakeholders would 
continue to enforce national standards. Nevertheless, it would still be helpful in that situation to 
be able to be able to refer to the minimum standard which can be expected from a service 
provider - particularly in cases of clinical negligence. Furthermore, in certain Member States in 
which there are fewer quality standards in particular services sectors, a European standard could 
help to fill gaps. This could be particularly important for the new Member States in Eastern 
Europe, which have significantly fewer standards than the old Member States. At the same time, 
certain Member States might not be used to apply private standards to regulate the expected 
standard of care of service providers – not even in private law. The material scope of self-
regulation of the quality of services, what could be described as the margin of operation of self-
regulation, varies among the EU Member States. As a consequence, the potential for 
convergence in private law through European standardisation will depend on how wide the 
margin of operation of self-regulation is, and to what extent public regulation – and public law – 
leaves a role for private regulation to regulate aspects of the service provision process.76 In 
Member States in which the provision of services is more strictly regulated by public law, the 
potential for European standardisation to have a convergent effect in private law may be more 
limited.  
Furthermore, the extension of the application of Article 56 TFEU to private parties will have an 
impact both on the European standardisation process and on the subsequent application of 
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European standards in private law. It has implications both for standard-making bodies and for 
private parties who apply European standards in private law. Private regulation through contract 
law or through certification can now be challenged under the free movement provisions. This 
means that European standardisation, as a third level of European regulation, would become 
subject of supervision under the first level of regulation. In the recent case of Fra.bo,77 the CJEU 
held that the provision on free movement of goods was applicable to a German private 
certification organisation. Although it could be argued that a decisive factor in this case was the 
fact that German legislation had provided that goods certified by this organisation could be 
lawfully brought on the German market, the judgment opens the door to the application of the 
free movement provisions to certification organisations more generally.  
The judgment of the CJEU in Fra.bo means that standardisation and certification activities can be 
scrutinised under the free movement provisions. Furthermore, there is a close link to the 
relationship between European standardisation and free movement of services. The horizontal 
direct effect of the free movement provisions means that an indirect obligation to comply with 
free movement law is imposed on stakeholders who are participating in European 
standardisation. This will indirectly improve the quality of European standards from the 
perspective of free movement law. If they do not do so, this might mean that private parties are 
less likely to apply the standard in private law relations, as they could be held responsible for 
possible breaches of free movement law in the provisions of the European standard. A 
European standard which contained provisions in breach of the free movement of services 
would not be enforced in private law. As a result, Article 56 TFEU puts indirect pressure on 
parties involved in European standardisation to comply with the free movement provisions. This 
will be discussed in Chapter VI. 
 
iv. A preliminary conclusion 
This chapter has essentially gone through three steps to set the scene for the rest of the thesis. 
Firstly, the theoretical background has been discussed. Secondly, that background has been 
applied to this thesis by introducing the concept of convergence in private law through 
European standardisation. Thirdly, the role of European standardisation of services in the 
broader framework of the regulation of services at the European level has been discussed.  
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At the start, the theoretical frame on the basis of which the thesis has been constructed was set 
out. With the strong criticism of the potential of European harmonisation to bring about a 
convergent effect in the application of a rule in private law, it is realistic and helpful to consider 
alternative strategies for convergence in private law through European processes. European 
standardisation could be such a process. 
The second step was then to define convergence in private law through European 
standardisation. It is a two-stage process – first, the European standardisation process; second, 
the application of the European services standards in private law. The application of European 
services standards will usually be voluntary. It can be done either by a services sector itself, or by 
the judiciary. European standardisation of services and private law are combined to improve the 
internal market for services. At the same, the application in national private law also means that 
the quality of services at the national level is improved, even in the absence of a cross-border 
dimension. The fact that European services standards would set out minimum standards means 
that the convergence would be of a relatively soft nature. It could also mean that the willingness 
of stakeholders and courts to apply European standards at the national level would be less if 
national standards were significantly higher. 
European services standards are adopted in a European legal framework for the regulation of 
services. Services have primarily been regulated through Article 56 TFEU and through the 
Services Directive. In effect, European standardisation could then be described as a third “layer” 
of regulation. It would seem that European standardisation, unlike regulation through Article 56 
TFEU and the Services Directive, has potential to encourage – in a soft way – a development 
from negative integration to positive integration and could also have a real impact on private law. 
At the same time, however, European standardisation interacts with, in particular, Article 56 
TFEU, which means that any European standardisation initiatives have to comply with the free 
movement of services. Whether or not European standardisation of services can have a real 
impact on private law – and have a convergent effect – depends on the extent to which 
European standards are tailored to be applied and enforced in (national) private law.  
Therefore, it is now necessary to look in detail at the European standardisation process for 
services to understand how the process works and how European standardisation is embedded 




II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EUROPEAN 
STANDARDISATION OF SERVICES AND THE ROLE OF 
PRIVATE LAW 
 
i. The European legal framework for standardisation of services 
 
a. The New Approach and Directive 98/34 on Technical Standards 
While the Commission has always been the motor to improve the internal market for goods and 
services within the EU, the CJEU has without a doubt played an equally pivotal role.1 Its 
judgment in Cassis de Dijon2 paved the way for further integration in the field of free movement 
of goods through the principle of mutual recognition. National product requirements came 
under the immediate supervision of the CJEU, which opened up the possibility of regulatory 
intervention at the European level. However, the road towards positive integration remained 
difficult and slow. For that reason, the Commission decided to adopt an alternative strategy to 
increase the free movement of goods, which was called the New Approach.3 With this New 
Approach, the Commission developed a regulatory framework in which legislative instruments 
and European standards, developed through European standardisation, were to interact.4 
European standardisation was not invented for the purposes of the New Approach. The 
European standardisation organisations had already existed for some time, and at the national 
level standardisation had existed for much longer. The Committee Européen de Normalisation 
(“CEN”) was established in Brussels in 1975.5 It became a private non-profit association 
established under Belgian law. It was founded primarily to transpose at the European level 
international standards which had been made through the International Standardisation 
Organisation (“ISO”).6 As such, CEN was dependent on and relying on the national 
standardisation organisations. This situation has not really changed. Although CEN has an 
important function in the communication with the European institutions and in the coordination 
of standardisation initiatives among the national standardisation organisations, CEN is still a 
relatively small organisation compared to some of the national standardisation organisations.  
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The New Approach provided an enormous boost to European standardisation through CEN. It 
was started in parallel with an attempt by the Commission to obtain more insight in national 
standardisation activities and to create greater transparency in the EU internal market. This was 
attempted with the Information Directive,7 which provided that Member States had to notify the 
Commission of any technical specifications, regulations and standards. This Directive resulted in 
a series of cases on the possible horizontal direct effect of directives.8 However, in itself, an 
exchange of information was not sufficient to overcome problems with market integration and 
to encourage a development from negative towards positive integration. As a result, the 
Commission decided to go one step further with the New Approach, which was integrated in the 
legal framework by updating the Information Directive to the new Directive 98/34/EC on 
Technical Standards (“Technical Standards Directive”).9 
The idea behind the New Approach is quite simple – the EU adopts legislation with the 
“essential requirements” with which products have to comply before they can be brought on the 
European market.10 The specific technical requirements are subsequently laid down in European 
standards developed through CEN. CEN has been granted a monopoly to develop these 
standards. It is asked by the Commission to start working on a European standard through the 
issuance of a “mandate”.11 After the European standard has been adopted and has been 
published, a reference to the standard will be published in the Official Journal of the European 
Union (“OJEU”). It is the Commission which is responsible for the publication of the reference 
to the standard in the OJEU. This publication of the reference will trigger a “presumption of 
compliance” – after the publication it is presumed that goods which comply with the 
requirements of the European standard also comply with the essential requirements of a 
particular directive. There is no legal requirement to comply with the European standard – at 
least, not stricto sensu. However, if producers of goods decide to comply with another standard, 
the burden is on them to prove that they also fulfil the essential requirements of the directive. As 
such, European standardisation has been granted a highly advantageous position in the New 
                                                          
7 Council Directive 83/189/EEC laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical 
regulations and standards. 
8 Case C-194/94, CIA Security v Securitel, [1996] ECR I-2201; Case C-226/97, Lemmens, [1998] ECR I-3711; Case C-
443/98, Unilever v Central Food, [2000] ECR I -7535. See S. Weatherill, ‘Compulsory Notification of Draft Technical 
Regulations: The Contribution of Directive 83/189 to the Management of the Internal Market’, (1996) 16 Yearbook 
of European Law 129. 
9 Directive 98/34/EC laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards 
and regulations and of rules on Information Society services. 
10 Council Resolution of 7 May 1985, above n 3, 2-3. 
11 General Guidelines for the Cooperation between CEN, CENELEC and ETSI and the European Commission 





Approach. It should be noted that the complete European standard does not have to be 
published in the OJEU – it is only the reference to the standard which suffices. The copyright of 
the standards remains with the national standardisation organisations which will sell the 
standards as products. The Member States and the Commission can also object to a European 
standard before a Standing Committee set up under the New Approach.12 The ground for 
objection must be that the developed European standard does not satisfy the essential 
requirements as set out in the Directive.13 If the objection procedure is started, this means that 
the publication of the reference to the standard has to be delayed. The Standing Committee then 
has to provide an opinion on the standard. However, it remains the decision of the Commission 
whether or not to finally publish the reference. It has been argued that after the CJEU’s 
judgment in Fra.bo14 European standards are now open to judicial review15 – also for their 
compliance with the essential requirements – which means that the CJEU could start to have a 
more important role in the review of standards in the New Approach.16  
The set-up of the New Approach means that there is a complicated interaction and cooperation 
between the Commission and CEN. How their cooperation should be defined remains unclear. 
Egan has analysed the cooperation under the agency theory.17 However, it has often been argued 
that the cooperation between the Commission and CEN does not fulfil the requirements of the 
Meroni18 doctrine developed by the CJEU.19 This is mainly because of the extent to which the 
Commission actually controls the substance of the work of CEN. It could be argued that, now 
that European standards are starting to come under review of the CJEU,20 this would be a 
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development towards stricter compliance with the Meroni requirements.21 In any event, it is clear 
that the Commission and CEN are highly dependent on each other in the New Approach. 
Because it is always the Commission which issues mandates and initiates the start of European 
standardisation in the New Approach, it has an interest in ensuring that European 
standardisation does not take too long. After all, if European standardisation were to take many 
years the Commission could just as well have chosen the legislative route. However, European 
standardisation is also quite a complicated process, which involves continuous interaction 
between the European and the national level. The European standardisation process will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section. 
Despite the interdependency between the Commission and CEN, the Commission has on 
several occasions complained about the slow pace of CEN’s standardisation activities. The first 
signs of irritation were already visible in 1990, when the Commission published a Green Paper 
with strong criticism of the very nature of the European standardisation process.22 The majority 
of the criticism was not really taken any further by the Commission, but its unease with some of 
fundaments of European standardisation has remained. This will also be clear later on in this 
chapter, when the particular perspective of the Commission on European standardisation of 
services will be discussed. 
Before the reform of European standardisation in 2012, which will be discussed in detail in the 
next sections, the Technical Standards Directive provided the legal framework for European 
standardisation as part of the New Approach. Its key provisions will be briefly summarised. 
Articles 2-4 of the Directive deal with the obligation for national standardisation organisations to 
inform the Commission and the other standardisation organisations of initiatives for a new 
standard.23 The next part establishes a Standing Committee which has to be consulted when the 
European Commission wants to provide a mandate to CEN to start working on a 
standardisation initiative.24 Finally, a standstill obligation is imposed on national standardisation 
organisations when a European standardisation process is started.25 In such cases, all national 
standardisation processes which are in the same area as the European standardisation process, or 
which might be incompatible with the European standardisation process, have to be stopped. 
This standstill obligation is closely related to the agreement between the national standardisation 
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organisations and CEN.26 Once a European standard is adopted, the national standardisation 
organisations are obliged to transpose the standard as a national standard. Furthermore, they are 
required to remove existing national standards which are incompatible with the adopted 
European standard. These obligations do not exist for standards which have been adopted 
through ISO.  
With the New Approach, European standardisation always starts with a mandate from the 
Commission. As such, this type of European standardisation could be described as “top-down” 
European standardisation – after all, it is initiated at the European level. Two different types of 
mandates should be distinguished: “programming mandates”, which invite one of the European 
standardisation organisations to develop a proposal for a European standard in a particular area, 
and “standardisation mandates”, which effectively contain a concrete proposal for a European 
standard. Although it is in theory possible for CEN to refuse to start a European standardisation 
process mandated by the Commission, this has rarely happened.27 CEN’s administration is 
funded almost entirely by the European Commission. The initiation of a European 
standardisation process means that the nationals standardisation organisations have to cooperate 
at the European level to work on the requested European standard. However, there is also a lot 
of European standardisation which takes place outside the scope of the New Approach. It is still 
possible for initiatives for European standardisation projects to be initiated through the national 
standardisation organisations. Such bottom-up European standardisation can be initiated by 
stakeholders at the national level. The majority of European standardisation processes are still 
started in this way.28 Finally, it is also possible that the Commission asks CEN to start working 
on a standard without the standard being used for the New Approach. The Commission could 
then simply see a role for a standard as a supplementary tool to legislation which it is preparing. 
Overall, this means that three categories of European standards should be distinguished: 
(i) European standards mandated by the Commission as part of the New Approach  
(ii) European standards mandated by the Commission in support of a policy or 
legislative instruments outside the New Approach 
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(iii) European standards developed at the request of one of the national standardisation 
organisations 
Various directives have been adopted under the New Approach,29 and although it is clear that 
the New Approach is not without its own problems, it has certainly had a significant impact on 
the free movement of goods within the EU internal market. Free movement of services has 
always remained the less successful younger brother, despite the fact that it is clear that services 
account for around 70% of the GDP.30 The New Approach for goods has not been copied for 
services. This does not exclude the possibility that certain services which are intrinsically tied to 
products could be indirectly covered by the New Approach. However, in general, the New 
Approach has been applied only to products. This means that, in the field of services, only two 
types of European standards can be identified – standards mandated by the Commission in 
support of European legislation and standards initiated by stakeholders through the national 
standardisation organisations. Overall, the number of services standards has been much lower 
than for goods and services standards have only started to be developed from a much later 
date.31  
From the mid-1990s onwards, the Commission has taken an active interest in European 
standardisation of services. Similarly, around that period, CEN started to actively promote its 
activities in various services sectors. However, in the absence of a New Approach for services, 
the role and importance of European services standards remained unclear. Nevertheless, the 
Commission was of the opinion that European standardisation of services could, in principle, 
play an important role in removing obstacles to free movement of services within the EU. 
Therefore, it issued a mandate to CEN in 1996 to start work on a European standard for postal 
services.32 This was quite a specific example of a sector in which European standardisation was 
considered as part of the toolbox to promote and accelerate the liberalisation of postal services 
in the EU. However, standardisation had not expressly been brought in the legal framework of 
European standardisation. Although the Commission claimed to act on the basis of a specific 
directive on postal services, the legal framework for European standardisation did not expressly 
provide for services standardisation. 
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This was still the case in 2003 when the Commission issued a programming mandate to CEN to 
develop a work programme in the field of services.33 This resulted in a report issued by CEN in 
2005, in which it outlined its strategy for services.34 CEN outlined the existing work in the 
services sector and proposed to take a more detailed approach to certain specific topics in the 
services sector which were suitable for European standardisation. CEN’s report was followed by 
a new programming mandate issued by the Commission to CEN in July 2005.35 The focus of this 
mandate was on various aspects of services which could be standardised at the horizontal level – 
i.e. for services in general. CEN produced various feasibility studies on aspects of services 
standardisation in the course of 2007 and 2008.36 These studies finally resulted in the CHESS 
study, which outlined a general strategy for horizontal services standardisation.37 Its main focus 
was on the creation of one horizontal standard which would cover various sub-aspects of the 
service provision process. 
The CHESS study was not very positively received among stakeholders in the various services 
sectors.38 It was generally believed that one horizontal standardisation project would not be 
sufficiently tailored to particular services sectors. As a result, the Commission initiated a period 
of reflection on the purposes and usefulness of European services standardisation. This period 
of reflection has now resulted in a new mandate being issued to CEN in January 2013.39 This 
programming mandate invites CEN to assess the possibility of European standards for a number 
of specific topics related to services. The standards would be separate and would no longer be 
part of one general horizontal services standard. The mandate was already being prepared by the 
Commission before the coming into force of the Standardisation Regulation, which will be 
discussed in detail below. As a result, the Commission relied on Article 26(5) of the Services 
Directive as the legal basis for the mandate.40 Therefore, the role of the Services Directive in 
European standardisation of services should now be discussed. 
b. Services Directive 2006: towards a New Approach for services? 
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As has already been mentioned in the first chapter, the Services Directive has a section on the 
quality of services. Article 26(5) mentions standardisation as a voluntary regulatory tool in the 
services sector. However, there is no clear intention behind the reference to European 
standardisation in Article 26. European standardisation is not embedded in the structure of the 
Services Directive – it does not provide a legal framework in which the adopted services 
standards will play a role. The only thing the reference in Article 26 does is to indicate that 
European standardisation could be one of the tools to improve the quality of services at the 
European level. It is certainly not part of a New Approach for services – there is no reason to 
believe that the standards adopted as a result of Article 26(5) are intended to provide substance 
to essential requirements in directives on services safety. In fact, it cannot even be said that 
European services standards are adopted as a result of, or on the basis of, Article 26(5). 
Although the Commission might have believed otherwise, it does not actually provide a legal 
basis for the Commission to issue mandates to the standardisation organisation. It simply 
provides an obligation on the Member States to encourage voluntary standardisation initiatives 
for services in cooperation with the Commission. This is still some way from a legal basis on 
which mandates for European standardisation can properly be based. Furthermore, it does not 
provide the link from regulation through standardisation to legal regulation. The role which 
European standards will play in the legal regulation of services remains dependent on their 
application in law. This is where private law could and perhaps even has to play an important 
role. 
Furthermore, the obligation imposed on Member States does not seem to be an enforceable 
obligation:41 “Member States, in cooperation with the Commission, shall encourage the 
development of voluntary standards”.42 Is this an obligation which could be enforced through, 
for example, infringement proceedings if Member States systematically failed to encourage 
European standardisation of services? And how far would the “encouragement” have to go? 
Would the Commission normally have to take the initiative or would the cooperation with 
Member States be more horizontal? Overall, for its lack of specificity, Article 26(5) could best be 
described as an expression of policy – a policy tool. This is confirmed by the Commission’s 
Handbook on the Implementation of the Services Directive. According to the Commission, 
“Article 26 provides for a framework for voluntary quality-enhancing measures which will have 
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to be encouraged by Member States in cooperation with the Commission”.43 The obligation in 
Member States is not very strict, because “[t]here are different means for Member States to 
encourage such measures, such as awareness campaigns, organisation of workshops and 
conferences, funding of programmes and projects, etc. The Commission will use its best efforts 
to support such measures and to spread best practice among Member States”.44 As a 
consequence, the Commission appears to interpret the obligation in Article 26(5) as an obligation 
to use best efforts. It does in no way require a result from the Commission or the Member States 
– compliance with the obligation is not tested by counting the number of European services 
standards which have been adopted.  
 
If Article 26(5) did impose an obligation on Member States to encourage the making of 
European services standards, this would have the potential to change the character of European 
standardisation of services. In effect, such an obligation would add a fourth category of 
European standards to the categories set out above – European standards mandated by the 
Member States. This could potentially make European standardisation of services more co-
regulatory. Moreover, it would mean that European standardisation of services would become 
more top-down. However, even if Article 26(5) did impose such an obligation, its significance 
should not be overestimated. It would only mean that there would be a European drive to make 
more services standards. Article 26(5) would not control the process itself – beyond the purpose, 
which should be the improvement of the quality of services – and would certainly not have any 
impact on the role that the standards would play after their adoption. It is silent about the legal 
effect of European standards for services. It has been argued that Article 26(5) does not create 
an enforceable obligation for Member States to encourage the making of European services 
standards, but even if it did its importance would be restricted to the initiation of European 
services standards. 
 
To conclude, the Services Directive 2006 does not integrate European standardisation in the 
European legal framework of services regulation. European standardisation remains somewhat 
on the side line of services regulation, as a possibility to be considered and encouraged by 
Member States and the Commission. Moreover, it does not in any way signify a development 
towards a New Approach for services. As will be seen below, this has no doubt to do with the 
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fact that the Commission has not yet entirely made up its mind about the desirability of 
European standardisation of services. Nevertheless, it is faced with the reality that services 
standards are being made. Therefore, it has decided that services standardisation should at least 
be integrated in the legal framework for European standardisation. The right occasion to do this 
came with the publication of the Standardisation Package in 2011.45 The main element of this 
package was the proposal for a Regulation on standardisation which would amend and/or repeal 
some of the existing Directives and Decisions on European standardisation.46 One of the key 
aims of the Regulation was to bring services standardisation within the scope of these 
instruments. As such, the next section will focus on the extent to which the Standardisation 
Regulation has an impact on European services standardisation. 
 
c. The Standardisation Regulation 2012 
 
The Standardisation Regulation was approved by the European Parliament in September 2012 
and came into force in January 2013.47 A quick look at the Standardisation Regulation 
immediately shows that services have now become fully integrated in the framework for 
standardisation. Article 1 explains that the Regulation provides rules for the cooperation between 
the European and national standardisation organisations in the field of standardisation of 
products and services in support of Union legislation and policies.48 Services are now 
incorporated in the standardisation regime and the Standardisation Regulation thus provides a 
legal basis for mandates for services standards. Such standards can be adopted in support of the 
EU’s policy to improve free movement of services. At the moment, however, there are no EU 
legislative instruments on services which provide a role for European standards. The 
Standardisation Regulation does not change that situation. It remains to be seen whether, in the 
future, the EU will adopt instruments in the field of services which leave the quality 
requirements of that particular service to be regulated by European standards.  
 
The emphasis of the Standardisation Regulation is on transparency and inclusiveness. As such, 
the Commission was clearly concerned that European standardisation under the New Approach 
– which, after all, is something of a quasi-legislative process – would be sufficiently legitimate 
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and transparent. The Standardisation Regulation contains a number of efforts to improve these 
points. The European and national standardisation organisations are required to publish work 
programmes at least once a year, so that it is clear in which areas work is being undertaken at the 
European and national level.49 This should help standardisation organisations to make a realistic 
assessment of the need for and desirability of a particular standardisation project. Furthermore, 
the Standardisation Regulation imposes obligations on the European and national 
standardisation organisations to circulate draft versions of standards among each other. They 
then have to ensure that there is a possibility for all relevant parties to comment on the draft. 
There is also more emphasis on the possibility for relevant stakeholders to participate in 
European standardisation. The European standardisation organisations are obliged to encourage 
and facilitate the appropriate representation of all relevant stakeholders.50 The nature of this 
obligation is again rather soft and difficult to enforce. The same applies to the obligation to 
encourage the participation of SMEs in European standardisation.51 There has been a long and 
on-going discussion about the ability of SMEs to participate in European standardisation.52 
SMEs do not usually have the financial, administrative and technical means to participate 
effectively in European standardisation processes.53 As a result, there is a risk that European 
standardisation is dominated by large businesses which have the means to participate in the 
process. However, while the Standardisation Regulation might seem to improve the situation for 
SMEs, it does not actually give them anything which they did not already have. Standardisation 
organisations are encouraged to apply special rates to SMEs and to publish summaries of 
standards on their website. However, the real core of the problem is not addressed – for 
copyright reasons SMEs are not given free access to participate in European standardisation 
processes and are not given free access to European standards. From the point of view of the 
whole structure of European standardisation, this makes perfect sense, since any changes would 
undermine the solvability of the whole system. It should be noted that the standardisation 
organisations are dependent for their funding on the Commission and on stakeholders who 
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participate in European standardisation. Finally, Member States are also obliged to encourage the 
participation of public authorities in European standardisation of goods under the New 
Approach.54 
The next section of the Standardisation Regulation focusses on the procedure for mandates to 
be issued by the Commission. Here, two key changes should be emphasised. First of all, it is now 
expressly stated that the Commission can only issue mandates for European standardisation in 
areas which come within the competence of the EU.55 This means that, for example, it is not 
possible for the Commission to issue a mandate for healthcare services, as they fall outside the 
competence of the EU. This is something which had been actively lobbied for by certain sectors, 
amongst which the healthcare sector.56 Secondly, the European Parliament has been given the 
possibility to object to a European standard adopted under the New Approach.57 This is clearly 
an attempt to provide more democratic legitimisation to the New Approach. It remains to be 
seen to what extent the European Parliament will actively scrutinise European standards and to 
what extent it will be able to comment on rather technical questions of whether certain product 
standards fulfil the essential requirements of a particular directive.58 
In conclusion, the Commission can now issue mandates for the development of services 
standards on the basis of the Standardisation Regulation. This means that services standards 
mandated by the Commission fall within the scope of the Regulation. However, importantly, 
“bottom-up” initiatives for European services standards, where the initiative comes from 
stakeholders at the national level through one of the national standardisation organisations, 
remain outside the scope of the Standardisation Regulation. As such, they are not adopted in any 
regulatory framework59 and it remains the responsibility of the stakeholders to give a role to the 
standard in the legal regulation of services at the European or national level. The Standardisation 
Regulation has no impact on such projects.  
d. Certification in the New Approach and outside a European framework 
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European standardisation under the New Approach is closely linked to certification. The New 
Approach is not just structured around the standard-making process. It includes a system which 
organises the enforcement of compliance with the European standard. As has been explained 
above, once a European standard has been adopted and its reference has been published in the 
OJEU, it is presumed that producers whose goods comply with the requirements of the 
European standard also comply with the relevant directive. The starting point of the New 
Approach is that the producers of the goods have to declare that their goods comply with the 
European standard. This can be done by affixing the “CE mark” on their products. For certain 
categories of products, this is essentially a formalised kind of self-certification. The producer is 
required to complete a dossier and to sign a declaration stating that the goods comply with the 
relevant directive. For such products there is no involvement of external parties. For potentially 
more dangerous products the involvement of an external party, which has to check that the 
goods comply with the European standard, is required. This procedure is called a conformity 
assessment procedure. It is again a kind of certification, which has to be done by a “notified 
body”, a certification organisation which has been notified to the Commission by the Member 
State in which it is established. Except for the most dangerous types of products, it does not 
normally require an inspection of the products. The conformity assessment procedure is 
primarily based on an inspection of the paper work which has to indicate how and from what 
material the products are made. 
Most of the notified bodies are private certification organisations, but some of them are public 
bodies.60 If the goods are found to be in conformity with the European standard they will be 
allowed to carry the CE marking. Notified bodies must have been accredited themselves and 
Member States are responsible for ensuring that notified bodies are sufficiently qualified to 
perform conformity assessments.61 Once products with a CE mark have been placed on the 
market, market surveillance is carried out by national public supervisory agencies.62 Despite the 
involvement of a third party in the form of a notified body, it remains a fundamental tenet of the 
New Approach that producers themselves bear individual responsibility for ensuring that their 
goods comply with the European directives. This has resulted in difficulties with liability issues if 
goods are found to be defective. More in particular, it is unclear to what extent notified bodies, 
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whose “stamp of approval” is necessary for producers to place goods on the market, can be held 
liable if products which have passed the conformity assessment procedure turn out to be 
defective.63 The key issue is that, with the New Approach, the EU has regulated the ex ante 
aspects of the marketization of goods in the EU, while liability issues as a result of a failure to 
comply with the legal requirements imposed by the New Approach have not been regulated at 
the European level.64 The Product Liability Directive65 could assist to a certain extent, but it only 
provides for liability of the producer or importer.66 This makes it difficult for claimants to decide 
against whom to bring a case in circumstances where it is not possible to bring a case against the 
producer.67 The complicated interaction between private and public parties in the New Approach 
has made it difficult for victims of defective products to decide who to hold responsible for 
production failures. This has become particularly evident after the PIP breast implants scandal, 
which will be discussed in detail in the next chapters.  
Certification on the basis of European standards is not limited to the New Approach. European 
services standards, which have necessarily been adopted outside the New Approach, can also be 
used for certification. In fact, many European standards for services are made with a view to 
facilitate some kind of certification. For example, tourist guides could get certification to certify 
that they comply with the European standard for Tourist Guide Training.68 Often, European 
standards are used to set the entry level for providers who want to offer services. Certification 
with European standards fulfils an ex ante regulatory function – in order to be allowed to join the 
club, one has to pass the examinations based on the requirements of the European standard.69 In 
some cases, these associations have themselves been certified, which means that there is third-
party certification. In other cases, there is no certification or accreditation of the examining 
body.70 As a consequence, there is no control on the professional associations to control to what 
extent they actually comply with the European standards in their examination activities. The 
scope of the use for European services standards for certification activities is not very broad. 
More importantly, there is very limited external involvement from the standard-making to the 
certification. The European standards are effectively made by the same organisations which are 
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applying the standards for the purposes of certification, and which are also doing the 
certification themselves 
It is important to note that such certification does not take place in the context of a legal 
framework which has been established by the EU. Unlike certification under the New Approach, 
which has made certification a legal requirement before goods can be distributed across the EU, 
this kind of certification is entirely voluntary from the EU’s perspective. This means that the EU 
has not provided any legal effect to the certification. Its main function is to improve the 
marketization of products or services. In general, the fact that a product or service provider has 
been certified does not create any enforceable legal rights between service provider and 
consumer on the basis of which consumers can require a particular kind of service or product.71 
As a result, its impact on private law, and the possibility of convergence in private law, is also 
limited. This will be discussed in more detail when the PIP breast implants case study is 
discussed in the next chapters. 
ii. European standardisation of services and private law 
 
a. Standardising goods and services: similar or not? 
 
After having discussed the legal framework in which European standardisation of services takes 
place, this section will now discuss in detail how the European standardisation process works. 
One preliminary issue has to be addressed first. This is the question to what extent 
standardisation of goods and standardisation of services can be considered to be similar 
activities. Two dimensions will be highlighted – the substantive and the legal dimension. 
 
From a substantive point of view, services standards address a different concern from product 
standards. With standardisation of goods, the main focus is on the compatibility of the technical 
requirements for products. This is a quasi-scientific exercise which is of a very technical nature72. 
For product standards adopted under the New Approach, these technical requirements have to 
be in accordance with the essential requirements laid down in the Directive. The result is that the 
standards which are adopted look very technical and are focussed on the sizes and materials of a 
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particular product.73 The issues that have to be dealt with in the standardisation process are 
restricted by what is required to provide substance to the essential requirements which have 
already been laid down in legislation. As a consequence, the set-up of the New Approach 
restricts the margin of operation of stakeholders to the more technical and scientific questions. 
Although an agreement on these issues requires a common opinion about the required quality of 
products, the discussion remains at a very technical level.  This is different from standardisation 
of services. Although the aim of services standardisation will also be compatibility, this 
compatibility is achieved not so much by defining sizes and materials of products, but rather by 
agreeing on a common definition of the quality of a service. It involves standardisation of the 
social interaction between service provider and customer.74 This requires a discussion which is 
much more dominated by cultural and personal preferences, and which is also significantly less 
scientific than product standardisation. It means that it might be more difficult to agree on a 
common definition of what quality means at the European level. Furthermore, in the absence of 
scientific evidence as a basis for standardisation of services, the discussion on the standards is 
inevitably less technical and more politicised.75 As a result, it is more difficult to agree on 
European standards for services.  
 
The Commission is not convinced about this difference. In the preambles of the Standardisation 
Regulation, it is stated that “the delineation between goods and services is becoming less relevant 
in the reality of the internal market”.76 As a result, “it is not always possible to clearly distinguish 
standards for products from standards for services”.77 The reason why the distinction is not 
deemed to be very important might be that it is foreseen that many services standards will 
contain significant parts which are focussed on products.78 According to the preambles, they 
“should primarily focus on services linked to products and processes”.79 As a consequence, it 
would seem that the standardisation of services mandated under the Standardisation Regulation 
would be very much restricted to a particular kind of services, namely those for which products 
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play a key role or which are closely linked to the provision of products. A simple and common 
example would be the tying of installation or maintenance services linked to the sale of machine. 
In such cases, there would be a combination of a product and services and the standardisation 
would aim at standardising both aspects of the entire “package”. 
 
Secondly, the legal dimension should be discussed. Here, the most significant difference is 
between standards mandated under the New Approach and non-mandated standards. The legal 
role of standards mandated under the New Approach is clear. They are intended to provide the 
technical standards which are necessary to specify the essential requirements. Compliance with 
the standard raises a presumption of compliance. As such, the European product standard has a 
clear role in the legal regulation of products. These mandated standards could also play a role in 
private law. The New Approach does not have a direct impact on the role that mandated 
standards should play in national private law. In that respect, there does not seem to be a 
significant difference with European standards which have been adopted outside the New 
Approach. However, it is important to realise that European standards adopted under the New 
Approach have been given a clear public law mandate. The fact that they are a product of a 
European regulatory framework means that they have been given a stamp of approval by the 
EU. This is likely to have an impact on their application in private law at the national level. There 
can be no doubt that European standards adopted under the New Approach represent the 
technical standards with which products have to comply. The whole regulatory framework is 
constructed in such a way that European standards adopted through CEN represent the 
technical standards for products. For services standards, there is no such European regulatory 
framework. There has not been a similar legitimisation by the EU of the standardisation process 
and the standards have not been produced in a regulatory framework which is directed and 
controlled by the EU. As a result, it is likely that national courts will be stricter in their scrutiny 
of non-mandated standards. This is something which will have to be investigated further in the 
chapters on the application of European standards in private law.  
 
Moreover, the fact that standardisation of services regulates social interaction means that services 
standards are more likely to interact with legal regulation than product standards.80 For example, 
European services standards will have an impact on and will interact with (European) legislation 
on qualifications, facilities or information requirements. If tourist guide associations want to 
adopt a European standard on the training requirements for tourist guides in Europe, they have 
                                                          




to think about how this standard would interact with the Professional Qualifications Directive 
2005.81 If medical associations want to adopt a European standard for Aesthetic Surgery 
Services, which frequently involves the provision of cross-border healthcare, they have to make 
sure that the European standard is compatible with the information requirements which are 
imposed by the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive 2011.82 European standardisation of services 
does not only result in a politicisation of the standardisation process, it similarly results in what 
could be described as a process of legalisation of European standardisation. Standardisation of 
services does not take place in a narrowly defined vacuum – it constantly interacts with existing 
legislation. This imposes quite a burden on stakeholders involved in standardisation – they have 
to be aware of the legal framework in which they are operating and they have to take it into 
account in the standardisation process. A failure to do so would mean that the European 
standards would not be compatible with existing European legislation. This would make their 
application in private law less likely and less successful.  
 
In conclusion, it can be said that there are significant differences between European 
standardisation of goods and services. These differences have a particular impact on the 
interaction between European standards and the legal framework in which they are adopted. As 
such, the extent to which they can play a role in private law is also likely to be affected by their 
status as mandated or non-mandated standards. Before the role of European services standards 
in private law can be discussed, it is necessary to look at the standardisation process in more 
detail.  
 
b. The interaction between the European and the national level in European 
standardisation  
 
The European standardisation processes involves a complicated interaction between the 
European level and the national level. How does a European standardisation process begin? For 
standards mandated by the Commission, the mandate will be received at the European level by 
CEN. With mandates, the procedure remains more at the European level than with non-
mandated standards. CEN is required to consult stakeholders and after a period of consultation 
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the mandate is sent to CEN’s Technical Board for a decision.83 The Technical Board is CEN’s 
main management body. It consists of the President and/or Vice President of CEN as well as 
representatives of each of its members. CEN currently has 33 members – the 28 EU Member 
States, Turkey, Macedonia and the three EEA members (Switzerland, Norway and Iceland). 
After it has received the mandate, taking into account the position of the stakeholders and CEN, 
the Technical Board will take a decision on whether or not to accept the mandate. 
 
The procedure is slightly more complicated for non-mandated standards.84 For such 
standardisation projects, the proposal will have to be submitted through one of the national 
standardisation organisations. This is irrespective of the question whether the proposal is 
submitted by a national stakeholder or a European stakeholder, such as an association of 
companies or professionals. It is not necessary to submit a proposal through the standardisation 
organisation in the country where the stakeholder is based – they have the option to choose 
which standardisation organisation they would like to use to submit the proposal. This is an 
important tactical decision, because if the proposal is accepted the national standardisation 
organisation which submitted it will act as secretariat to the standardisation process.85 Various 
standardisation organisations have developed expertise in particular areas. For example, the 
Austrian standardisation organisation ASI is very active in the healthcare sector, while the 
German standardisation organisation DIN has developed particular expertise in the tourism 
sector. This is often because these sectors are considered to be successful at the national level. 
Austria is proud of its healthcare system and believes that its knowledge and expertise could also 
be used at the European level.86 European standardisation is then seen as a strategy to extend 
that success to the European level. It is also closely connected to what employees of the national 
standardisation organisations believe will be useful projects for European standardisation.87  
 
When a proposal has been submitted to CEN by a national standardisation organisation, CEN 
will consult its members. This means that the proposal is sent to all national standardisation 
organisations, which then have to consult with the relevant stakeholders. This period of 
consultation has to be concluded within three months of the submission of the proposal. This 
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usually means that national standardisation organisations have to organise a meeting where 
stakeholders can provide comments on the proposal. They are completely free to decide who to 
invite to this meeting, but they are bound by the WTO Code of Good Practice.88 As a result, 
they are obliged to do their best to consult as widely as possible among all (potentially) relevant 
stakeholders. However, in the end, they have very little influence on who turns up at the 
consultation meetings.89 Although there is an obligation to consult as broadly as possible, there is 
no obligation that certain parties must actually have sat around the table to provide their views 
on the proposal, or that certain parties must participate in the standardisation process. During 
the national consultation meeting a decision will be taken whether or not the proposal should be 
supported, and whether or not the national standardisation organisation would be willing to 
actively participate in the standardisation process.  
 
After the period of consultation, all national standardisation organisations have to vote at the 
European level. For a proposal to be accepted, two-thirds of the votes casted – it is possible to 
abstain – have to be in favour of the proposal. Moreover, at least five of the members have to 
commit to actively participate in the standardisation process.90 As such, a European 
standardisation process can start with only five national members actively participating in the 
process. If a national standardisation organisation casts a negative vote, it is expected to provide 
reasons or comments. It is also possible to express “fundamental disagreement” with a proposal. 
If one of the members expresses fundamental disagreement, this always means that the proposal 
has to go to the Technical Board of CEN for a final decision. Otherwise, the proposal is 
accepted and the work on a European standard can start. 
 
To start the European standardisation process, a Technical Committee (“TC”) will be created. 
Each of the national standardisation organisations which are willing to participate have to create 
“mirror committees” which closely scrutinise the European process and send representatives to 
the TC. Membership of the mirror committees is open to parties who are interested to 
participate and who are willing to pay the costs of participation. Again, there are no formal rules 
on which parties should definitely participate in the mirror committees. The national 
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standardisation organisations are dependent on the fees of participants to be able to survive 
financially.91 Although they may apply lower fees for non-profit organisations or research 
institutes, the basic principle is that the members of the mirror committees have to collectively 
bear the costs of the European standardisation process. There are no separate costs for the 
involvement of CEN, which is funded almost exclusively by the European Commission.  
 
The TC will be chaired by a chairperson who is usually nominated by the standardisation 
organisation which is responsible for the secretariat. The structure of the standardisation process 
means that European standardisation is not a very supranational process. There is a constant 
interaction between the national and the European level. Certain members of the TC might not 
be able to take decisions at the European level due to disagreement among the members of the 
national mirror committee. This might act as an obstacle to effective decision-making at the 
European level. It also means that it is difficult for members of the TC to “rise above” national 
interests which have an impact on the European standardisation process. When work on a 
European standard has been started, national standardisation organisations are no longer allowed 
to initiate new standardisation projects on the subject of the standard and they also have to stop 
national standardisation processes on the subject.92 This is called the “standstill obligation”, 
already referred to above.  
 
The standardisation process is completely confidential. This means that all the documents related 
to the standardisation process, as well as the names of those participating in the process, remain 
confidential. The TC will have to agree on the draft content of the European standard. This is 
the only moment when the process opens its doors to the public. After agreement has been 
reached on the draft standard, the “CEN Enquiry” will be started. This means that the draft 
standard is sent to the national standardisation organisations, which have to publish it on their 
website. Interested parties are able to submit comments, which have to be taken into account by 
the TC. After the CEN Enquiry, the TC will work on the final version of the standard. There 
will then be a weighted vote – a qualified majority of 71% of the votes is required.93 The 
complete standardisation process usually takes three to four years. Once a European standard 
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has been adopted, it will have to be implemented by the national standardisation organisations as 
a national standard – very much like with directives. Any inconsistent national standards have to 
be removed. This obligation to implement European standards does not exist for international 
standards which have been developed through ISO. The final standard will be published through 
the national standardisation organisations, which own the copyright in the standard. This is the 
same both for standards mandated under the New Approach and non-mandated standards. 
Standards have to be paid for – the price depends on the number of pages. This is because the 
national standardisation organisations are dependent on the revenues of the sales of standards. It 
means that the standardisation remains slightly confidential after the adoption of the standard – 
although the standard is accessible to everyone, it is not freely available. This can cause particular 
problems if standards are being referred to in legislative instruments. It has led to litigation in a 
number of Member States.94  
 
c.  Consensus-based decision-making and voting in European standardisation 
 
Formally, decisions within the TCs are made on the basis of consensus. The precise definition of 
consensus-based decision-making remains unclear.95 It would seem to indicate that serious 
attempts are made to reach decisions by unanimity and that only as a last resort TCs use the 
possibility of voting. Whilst this sounds convincing in theory, in practice voting plays an 
important role in the European standardisation process.  
 
There are two formal moments when votes are being taken in the European standardisation 
process. The first is when a proposal for a European standard has been submitted to CEN. The 
national standardisation organisations have to vote on whether or not the proposal should be 
accepted. The second moment is when the national standardisation organisations have to vote 
on the final draft of the European standard. On both occasions, significant reliance is placed on 
the national level. The decision on the votes will be highly dependent on the position of the 
various stakeholders at the national level. As such, it is easily possible for stakeholders which 
enjoy a particular dominance at the national level to extend their dominance to the European 
level. A good example is provided by the case study on the proposal for a European standard on 
Cleft Lip Surgery, which will be discussed in the next chapter. As a result, it is somewhat artificial 
to construe the European standardisation process as based on consensus. A compromise would 
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be a better term to describe the process. Furthermore, it is clear that votes are also taken during 
the standardisation process. One of the interviewees described how within his TC votes were 
needed on every decision whether or not a particular element should be included in the 
European standard.96 The result was a painfully slow process, which had very little to do with 
consensus. The whole standardisation process was dominated by getting a majority in order to 
get a particular part included in the standard. It is difficult to reconcile this approach with the 
principle of consensus.  
 
iii. European standardisation and legitimacy 
 
a. The distinction between mandated and non-mandated standards 
When the legitimacy of European standardisation is discussed, the European standardisation 
process is usually compared with the European legislative process. In the general debate about 
the legitimacy of law-making in Europe, terms which are commonly used are representation, 
transparency and accessibility. These principles are crucial to democratic law-making processes. 
It is important that these governance aspects are complied with, because the end result will be a 
binding instrument with which European citizens will have to comply. When a European 
directive is adopted, this instrument becomes applicable in all Member States. Although it will 
not directly impose obligations on national citizens, this will be the final result once the directive 
has been transposed in national law. As such, citizens are going to be bound directly by the 
provisions of the directive. As a consequence, the binding nature of the harmonisation process 
means that the interests of citizens should be closely safeguarded and taken into account in the 
law-making procedure.97 
The situation is different for European standardisation. European standards do not obtain any 
automatic binding effect in law. However, the effect of European standards adopted under the 
New Approach is quasi-automatic and quasi-binding. In fact, the impact of these standards is 
such that their binding effect in law approaches that of European legislation.98 As a result, it is 
important to make a distinction between European standards adopted under the New Approach 
on the one hand, and European standards adopted outside the New Approach on the other 
hand. Technical standards adopted under the New Approach acquire an immediate legal status 
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after their adoption – or more precisely, after the publication of their reference in the OJEU. As 
a result, the binding nature of the instrument requires sufficient democratic input in the 
standardisation process – even if this input is likely to be of a very technical nature. Other 
European standards, such as European services standards, do not obtain an immediate binding 
status in law. Their subsequent status in the regulation of services is dependent on the 
application of a standard in a particular sector. This distinction between New Approach 
standards and standards adopted outside the New Approach has been recognised by Raymund 
Werle and Eric Iversen. They have distinguished between “regulative” standards – which would 
include standards adopted under the New Approach – and “coordinative” standards.99 In their 
approach, legitimacy is more important for regulative standards, since they will become de facto 
binding in law. A more relaxed approach can be adopted towards coordinative standards, since 
these standards could be “indirectly promulgated by governments or courts referencing them in 
legal regulations or judicial decisions”.100 However, they have also warned for possible network 
effects and the possibility of a standard “locking in” – which would mean that businesses are 
effectively compelled by market forces to comply with a standard even though it has no formal 
binding force.101 This section will now assess European standardisation of services from the 
perspective of representation, transparency and accessibility. 
b. Representation  
The standardisation process is open to all parties interested and concerned. As such, there are no 
formal limitations on participation. Everyone willing to participate can do so. When a proposal 
for a European standard has been submitted to CEN, the national standardisation organisations 
are obliged to consult all parties which might possibly have something to say about whether or 
not there should be a European standard, and who might possibly be interested in participating 
in the making of a European standard.102 The practical limitations, however, are numerous. First 
of all, a fee has to be paid to be able to participate. Secondly, participation in the standardisation 
process is time-consuming. The result is that larger businesses are more easily able to participate 
in the standardisation process. The standardisation process then becomes an easy route for larger 
companies to dictate their standards on SMEs. Even the fact that there are no formal limitations 
might cause difficulties – sometimes standardisation processes end up with a very small group of 
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participants who are in no way representative of the various stakeholders in the sector.103 There 
is very little national standardisation organisations can do about this. The standardisation process 
then becomes a way for an unrepresentative minority to impose its ideas on the silent majority. 
The extent to which the silent majority could be blamed for remaining silent depends on their 
practical and financial ability to participate in European standardisation. Furthermore, it should 
be noted that standardisation organisations have an interest in European standards being made. 
The financial sustainability of both the European and national standardisation organisations is 
dependent on the making of European standards.104 As a result, although they have to ensure 
that initiatives for European standards comply with the formal requirements, it cannot be really 
be expected from the standardisation organisations that they perform an adequate representation 
test before a European standardisation process is started.105  
The case studies which are discussed in the next chapters show that the concerns about the 
ability of European standardisation to ensure a sufficiently broad representation of stakeholders 
are not merely hypothetical. In the healthcare sector, European associations of medical doctors 
have complained that the European standardisation process for Aesthetic Surgery Services 
constitutes an attempt by a group of medical professionals, who have been unsuccessful in their 
standardisation attempts through the European associations of doctors, to restrict the market for 
aesthetic surgery services and to impose their ideas about who should be able to offer aesthetic 
surgery services on the entire medical profession through CEN.106 The position of the European 
associations is that they have complained on numerous occasions to CEN that the parties who 
are making this standard are not representative of the sector. However, CEN has not taken any 
action in response to the complaints. In the tourism sector, the standard for Tourist Guide 
Training has become controversial since it has been made by a group of stakeholders who 
represent only a part of the sector for tourist guide services, namely local tourist guides.107 Again, 
there is a clear view of other parties in the market – primarily tour operators – that the 
Europeans standard developed through CEN attempts to impose one particular definition of the 
profession of tourist guide on the entire market. 
c. Transparency 
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From the perspective of transparency, the European standardisation process is not a very open 
process.108 Throughout the European standardisation process, the European Technical 
Committees and the national mirror committees meet in private. The names of the participations 
in the standardisation process are confidential – except for the chairman of the European 
committee and the person responsible for the secretariat. This is normally an employee of the 
national standardisation organisation which runs the secretariat. The documents which form the 
basis of their discussion and deliberation are not publicly available. The only exception to the 
general rule is when the draft standard is published. The draft is available for a period of a few 
months. It is published on the websites of the national standardisation organisations. The 
standardisation organisations will also send out invitations to comment to the same group of 
people who they had initially identified as interested in participating in the standardisation 
process.109 In order to be able to comment on the proposal, parties usually have to register with 
the national standardisation organisation. As such, there are a few obstacles to overcome before 
one can comment on the proposal. Moreover, very few people – in particular from those groups 
which are not sufficiently represented in the standardisation process – find their way to the 
websites of the national standardisation organisations. 
d. Accessibility 
From the perspective of accessibility, once a European standard has been formally adopted, it is 
accessible to everyone. However, it has become a product which has to be bought from one of 
the national standardisation organisations. The copyright in the European standard is owned by 
the national standardisation organisations – it is not owned by CEN.110 The price depends on the 
number of pages of the standard. It does not always have to be very expensive – the average 
standard costs between 30 and 50 euros. However, when a number of standards exist in a 
particular sector, it might be quite expensive for a business to get access to all standards it has to 
comply with. Again, we see that larger businesses have significant advantages compared to 
SMEs. The accessibility problem has given rise to litigation in the Netherlands.111 However, this 
was in the context of a European standard which had been referred to in a legislative instrument. 
As such, it is different from the application of a standard in private law.  The problem arose 
because the Dutch legislature had decided to refer to a NEN standard in a public regulation. 
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This had the effect of giving binding status to the standard. However, the standard did not 
become publicly available in the sector – it remained for the stakeholders in the sector to buy the 
standards themselves. This legislative practice was challenged in the Dutch courts and it was 
claimed that the reference in public legislation meant that the standards had to be made freely 
available. Therefore, the issue in the case became whether standards obtained the status of 
legislation and whether the standards should be free of any copyright. The Dutch Supreme Court 
finally held that the standard did not obtain the status of legislation as a result of the reference 
and that, consequently, the standards could remain protected by copyright. 
The accessibility problems remain important for standards which do not immediately obtain de 
facto binding status. Services standards will obtain their status through the subsequent application 
by the stakeholders in a sector. If these stakeholders have to spend a lot of money on getting 
access to the standards, they might decide not to buy them and to adopt different standards. 
Similarly, the fact that the standard is a product might act as an obstacle for stakeholders to get 
to know a standard and comply with its provisions. From the perspective of service recipients, if 
they are thinking about going to another Member State to receive services, they might very well 
want to be able to know what sort of standards are used in that Member State. If a European 
standard has been adopted, but this standard is not freely available, this effectively prevents 
service recipients from getting to know an instrument which has attempted to increase the 
convergence in the regulation of a particular service in the various Member States. If service 
recipients had known about the existence of the standard and its provisions, they could have 
been more inclined to travel abroad. It is highly unlikely that individual consumers or service 
recipients will spend money on buying European standards. Moreover, the fact that consumers 
are unlikely to know about the existence of a European standard will have an impact on the 
willingness of courts to apply the standard in private law. This will be discussed in Chapter V. 





As one of the main European standardisation organisations, CEN has always been the facilitator 
of European standardisation projects. It is usually dependent on either the Commission or 
national stakeholders to come forward with proposals for European standardisation. As a result, 




However, CEN is primarily a passive organisation – it has to be approached by other parties 
with proposals.112 Subsequently, it will facilitate the standardisation process at the European 
level, but the main part of the work will be undertaken by the national standardisation 
organisations. CEN’s focus on facilitation is clear from its offices in Brussels, which are much 
smaller than those of some of the national standardisation organisations. Furthermore, most of 
the rooms are meetings rooms for TCs to work on European standardisation projects. 
 
As an organisation CEN has been very keen to expand its work programme in the field of 
services. From the 2000s onwards, when it started to increase its focus on services, it has 
commissioned a number of studies on the benefits of European standardisation of services.113 It 
seems that the intention to expand to the services sector has instigated an evolutionary process 
within CEN. Where it used to wait for people to approach the organisation before, CEN has 
now taken a more outward-looking approach and has started to actively approach services 
sectors to offer its standardisation services.114 This shows that CEN is not purely a facilitator, but 
that it has its own independent strategy as an organisation. This could have a number of 
consequences for European standardisation. First of all, there is a possibility that CEN could 
come in conflict with services sectors in which it would like European standardisation to take 
place. Secondly, the bottom-up nature of European standardisation could be at risk, if CEN 
independently decided that there was a need for standardisation in a particular services sector. 
This would have an impact on the issue of ownership of standardisation in certain sectors – 
would it still remain a self-regulatory activity or would it actually become much more like a top-
down activity imposed from above? Thirdly, it becomes important that CEN investigates to 
what extent European standardisation as a regulatory tool is compatible with the existing legal 
regulatory framework for specific services sectors. Although a number of studies have been 
commissioned on the usefulness of European standardisation of services, these studies have only 
to a limited extent engaged with the regulatory frameworks in which the European standards 
would be received. Therefore, there is a risk that the European services standards would not be 
sufficiently matched to the legal framework in which they are to play a role.115 
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Another important factor in CEN’s strategy for European standardisation of services is that it is 
dependent on services sectors which are capable of bearing the costs of European 
standardisation.116 It means that CEN has to look for stakeholders who have sufficient financial 
means to get involved in European standardisation, and that CEN is operating in a market. For 
example, CEN has expressed an interest in getting more work in the healthcare sector.117 
However, the healthcare sector is primarily publicly funded and would not seem to have a lot of 
money available for European standardisation. The result could then be that European 
standardisation would focus solely on those areas of healthcare services which have already been 
subjected to privatisation and market forces.  
Finally, focussing specifically on the effects of European standardisation on consumers, it seems 
that CEN does not intend to make any changes to the confidential nature of the European 
standardisation process and to the fact that parties have to buy European standards. No changes 
can be made to the “business model”, as it is called, without putting at risk the very fundaments 
of European standardisation.118 It has to be accepted that European standards contain a lot of 
expensive information for which customers have to pay. This approach is difficult to reconcile 
with CEN’s position that European standardisation could be a realistic alternative for 
legislation,119 particularly in areas in which the EU has no competence. If standardisation was 
supposed to supplement or even replace legislation, CEN would also have to work on its 
transparency and accessibility. Its refusal to consider changes to the model of European 
standardisation is likely to have a negative impact on the ability to expand to sectors in which 
European standardisation is not very well known. 
b. ANEC 
The European Association for the Co-ordination of Consumer Representation in 
Standardisation (“ANEC”) was established as a non-profit organisation under Belgian law in 
1995. Its secretariat is based in Brussels. The main aim of ANEC is to represent consumers in 
the European standardisation process – to provide “the European consumer voice in 
standardisation”. Although it is not expressly mentioned, ANEC receives its funding on the basis 
of the Standardisation Regulation 2012.120 The Regulation continuously emphasises the need for 
consumer protection interests to be taken into account in European standardisation. In order to 
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be able to do this, ANEC is funded by the Commission121 and participates in certain selected 
European standardisation processes. Furthermore, ANEC will provide comments or input for 
European standardisation processes in which it is not able to participate. ANEC is a small 
organisation – much smaller than CEN. Its secretariat has only eight employees. Most of the 
work of ANEC is done through coordination and cooperation with national consumer 
protection organisations. ANEC has created Working Groups for the main areas in which it is 
working.122 These Working Groups consist of national representatives with particular expertise in 
a certain area – again, they will often be working for one of the national consumer organisations. 
ANEC will also frequently be represented by national delegates in European standardisation 
processes. 
In European standardisation, ANEC’s key focus is on the safety of services – quality is of 
secondary concern.123 Although ANEC is actively participating in European standardisation of 
services, it does so “under protest”. It is lobbying for a horizontal legislative framework for 
services safety. In fact, its position is that the New Approach for goods should be followed for 
services. This means that for ANEC the difference between goods and services is not such that 
the approach which has been adopted at the European level for goods could not be copied for 
services.124 Furthermore, it strongly objects to the argument that the diversity of the services 
sector would be eliminated through European standardisation.125 This is an argument which has 
been relied on by the tourism sector to object to European standardisation. According to 
ANEC, although standardisation should not eliminate diversity, there are certain core safety 
requirements which have to be complied with regardless of the specificities of a particular 
services sector.126 
As an organisation, ANEC is extremely dependent on national input. In fact, it is so dependent 
on this input that it is not even in a position to impose certain proportionality or minimum 
requirements on the representation of different Member States in the working groups.127 Certain 
Member States are not represented in the working groups. This means that, as an organisation, 
ANEC is vulnerable and open to abuse by particular national interests which are overrepresented 
in the working groups. The other side of the coin is that ANEC might fail to represent the 
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interests of consumers in the particular Member States which are not participating in the working 
groups. While this does not have to be fatal to ANEC’s effectiveness in representing consumer 
interests, it also highlights another important problem for ANEC, which is its lack of knowledge 
and experience. As an organisation representing the consumer interests in European 
standardisation, ANEC has to cooperate with the industry, which has much more technical 
knowledge and experience.128 It is not just that ANEC itself is quite a small organisation. This 
also applies to the national representatives of consumer organisations who represent ANEC in 
the European committees which are working on European standards. In terms of knowledge 
and experience, these representatives cannot really compete with the industry. This is likely to 
have a negative impact on the ability of ANEC to influence the European standardisation 
process.  
With its lack of expertise, it is interesting to note which aspects ANEC finds important in the 
European standardisation process. It seems that ANEC focusses on information requirements 
and protection of vulnerable consumers. For example, in the European standardisation project 
for Aesthetic Surgery Services, one of ANEC’s main targets was to get a provision in the 
standard which provided which treatments could be offered to minors.129 From the perspective 
of the stakeholders involved in standardisation, these issues might not always have to be the 
most important issues which have to be addressed in the standardisation process. From that 
perspective, then, ANEC’s achievements might occur “in the margin” of the European 
standardisation process.130 However, the strategy of ANEC to focus on a limited number of 
consumer protection issues could explained by its lack of (human) resources and by its lack of 
technical expertise. 
c. European Commission 
Most work on European standardisation within the Commission is done by DG Enterprise and 
Industry. It has a special Standardisation Unit, which is responsible for drafting the mandates for 
standardisation processes. Because most mandates are issued under the New Approach for 
goods, the Standardisation Unit is not too involved in European standardisation of services. 
Mandates for services standardisation have previously been issued by DG MARKT, where a 
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number of people within the Business-to-Business team work on European standardisation of 
services. Furthermore, for some of the specific services sectors other DGs get involved. For 
example, DG SANCO has done some work in the field of services standardisation.131 DG 
Enterprise and Industry itself has supervised standardisation activities in the tourism sector. 
In January 2013, the Commission issued a new programming mandate to CEN for the 
development of a number of horizontal services standards.132 It was the result of a long period of 
interaction between the Commission and CEN which was concluded with the CHESSS report in 
2008. With the new mandate, which was accepted by CEN in March 2013, it seems that the 
Commission is attempting to restore the institutional balance between CEN and the 
Commission. The relationship is turned from horizontal cooperation into more hierarchical 
supervision. The Commission has changed its position on the desirability of one horizontal 
services standard. Its initial position, encouraged by the CHESSS study, was that it would be 
desirable to have one big horizontal standard covering all services and all aspects of services.133 
Such a big standard is no longer desirable, since the Commission has discovered, after 
consultation with the stakeholders, that this is not actually desired by the market.134 Therefore, 
the Commission is clearly taking the side of the stakeholders. It does not trust that the views 
which CEN presents necessarily represent the views of the stakeholders. The implicit claim is 
that CEN’s CHESSS study did not sufficiently take the requirements of stakeholders into 
account. With the new mandate, the Commission is asking CEN to develop a number of options 
for horizontal services standards. These options have to focus on aspects of the service 
provision process. For example, one could think about information requirements on service 
providers, billing or complaint and redress mechanisms.135 After these options have been 
presented, the Commission reserves the right to select, together with the stakeholders, a number 
of options for further development through CEN.136 Consequently, the Commission is again 
keeping control of the process. Although CEN will now have to work out in detail how and to 
what extent the various plans of the Commission can be brought into practice, the scope and 
boundaries of the programme are clearly within the control of the Commission – the 
Commission is pulling the strings. The cooperation with CEN takes place on the terms of the 
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Commission. As such, the Commission has given a clear message that CEN should reconsider 
and reflect on its strategy for services.  
The mandate of the Commission foresees an important role for the stakeholders – for the 
market.137 Apparently, it is still necessary for the Commission to get an idea of what exactly is 
required, desired and needed by the market. Again, this is implied criticism of the previous 
studies of CEN. The new initial assessment would then determine the next stage of the mandate. 
As such, the Commission is giving a clear message to the market: we are interested in what you 
want and need, and we are concerned that European services standardisation is compatible with 
your needs and wishes.138 Consequently, the mandate would not really be top-down European 
standardisation, but the mandate itself would be constituted on the basis of the bottom-up 
wishes of the market. This is an important difference with mandates issued by the Commission 
where they would like to see European services standardisation as a supplementary tool to EU 
legislation. 
The reason which lies at the heart of the Commission’s desire to receive more input from the 
stakeholders is uncertainty about the benefits of European standardisation of services. 
Uncertainty caused by the limited number of services standards; uncertainty caused by the 
apparent resistance of the stakeholders.139 The Commission strongly feels that this resistance 
should be further investigated before further steps are taken in the field of services 
standardisation. This stakeholder-focussed perspective is different from CEN’s perspective, 
which has determined itself, more independently from the stakeholders, that services 
standardisation through CEN would be a desirable activity. For the Commission, the debate 
should not just be limited to the “how” of services standardisation – horizontal or vertical – but 
it should also focus on the “why” of services standardisation. 
This focus on the “why” of European services standardisation is also caused by the 
Commission’s role in the EU internal market. The Commission, as guardian of the Treaties, is 
concerned that free movement of services, goods and persons should be facilitated in the 
internal market.140 This is where the Commission’s interests might be different from those of the 
stakeholders, who might be more concerned about the quality of services. One of its primary 
concerns is that European standardisation of services could actually act as an obstacle to free 








movement.141 The Commission finds it important that these concerns are further investigated 
before it invests more time and resources in European standardisation of services. There is a 
concern that without any intervention of the Commission European services standardisation 
could develop into the wrong direction. It is clear that the Commission has received concrete 
signals that European services standards might be barriers to the functioning of the internal 
market.142 They have made the alarms bells ring and further investigation by the Commission is 
required. 
What does the Commission think about the possibility of a New Approach for services? This 
would require the Commission to initiate proposals for directives on the safety of services. These 
directives would then rely on European services standards to specify the detailed requirements 
with which services would have to comply. Since the Commission is currently adopting quite a 
cautious approach towards European standardisation of services, it is not really anticipating any 
developments towards a New Approach for services.143 First of all, what is needed is further 
research and reflection on the usefulness of services standardisation for stakeholders and its 
interaction with the free movement provisions. 
v. A preliminary conclusion  
 To conclude, this chapter has highlighted three main aspects of European standardisation of 
services. 
First of all, European standardisation of services cannot be considered similar to European 
standardisation of goods. There are important differences both in terms of substance and in 
terms of the legal framework in which European standards are received and applied. 
Standardisation of services has more social dimensions than standardisation of goods. This 
means that the standardisation process becomes less scientific. It raises the question to what 
extent services should or can realistically be standardised. It is a question which has not really 
been discussed by those involved in European standardisation of services. Furthermore, since 
services standards are adopted outside the New Approach, they remain somewhat isolated in 
comparison with European product standards adopted under the New Approach. This lack of 
public law endorsement of European services standards is likely to have an impact on the 
application of the standards at the national level.  
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Secondly, the European legal framework for services standardisation is fragmented. Although the 
Standardisation Regulation has been an important step to bring services standardisation within 
the European framework for standardisation, it does not constitute a development towards a 
New Approach for services. The simple inclusion of services standardisation in the 
Standardisation Regulation 2012 seems insufficient for European services standards to start to 
play a more significant role in the regulation of services at the European level. This is also likely 
to have an impact on the role that these standards will play at the national level. The fragmented 
approach is visible in the Services Directive, which contains a soft obligation on the Commission 
and the Member States to encourage European standardisation of services. The role of Article 
26(5) in the overall framework of the Services Directive remains unclear. 
Thirdly, the fragmented framework might be explained by the positions of the various actors 
involved in European standardisation of services. A tension has been identified between CEN 
and the Commission. While CEN has proactively and enthusiastically sought to promote 
European standardisation of services, the Commission has adopted a more cautious approach. 
This caution is the result of indications that European standardisation of services might actually 
be used for market protection purposes rather than for market integration purposes. Moreover, 
the Commission appreciates that there is uncertainty among stakeholders about the benefits and 
usefulness of European standardisation of services. A similarly cautious approach is adopted by 
ANEC, which is supportive of services standardisation, but which would like to see it placed in a 
broader framework of a New Approach for services. The approach of ANEC also highlights the 
tension between quality, safety and diversity of services. 
Finally, what impact do these three conclusions have on the role of European standardisation of 
services in private law? It is clear that they pose a challenge. The fact that there is no New 
Approach for services does not necessarily have a direct impact on the application of the 
standards in private law. However, the lack of European endorsement of services standards, and 
the EU’s ambiguous approach to services standardisation, could have a detrimental impact on 
the willingness of both stakeholders and the judiciary to apply European services standards at the 
national level. At the same time, the application of services standards in national private law 
becomes crucial for their effectiveness in law. This leaves private law in something of a limbo, 
because if these standards are to play a role in the legal regulation of services it is private law 
which will have to do the main job – although it remains possible that European services 




of the application of the free movement provisions to private parties,144 the application of 
European services in private law does not mean that they can escape review under the free 
movement provisions. Therefore, it becomes essential that European standardisation of services 
takes the requirements imposed by free movement law into account. There are concerns, 
particularly by the Commission, that this is not currently the case. As a result, closer supervision 
by the Commission might be necessary. 
                                                          




III. EUROPEAN STANDARDISATION OF HEALTHCARE 
SERVICES 
 
i. The interaction between EU law and healthcare services 
 
a. The lack of EU competence to regulate healthcare services 
After the discussion of the legal framework for European standardisation of services, this 
chapter will focus on European standardisation in the healthcare sector. The extent to which 
European standardisation can play a role in the regulation of healthcare services and how it 
would interact with existing regulation in public and private law will be analysed. In order to 
understand the potential of European standardisation of healthcare services to play a role in 
private law, the regulatory framework for healthcare services – both at the European and at the 
national level – has to be set out. 
Healthcare is not one of the traditional competences of the EU. The healthcare systems of the 
various EU Member States are all very different in nature and are based on different cultural 
perceptions of how healthcare should be delivered and regulated. From a political point of view, 
it was considered undesirable for the EU to intervene in these national systems. The organisation 
of the healthcare systems was too closely linked to the national identity of the Member States, 
which strongly opposed any direct influence of the EU. Furthermore, healthcare services were 
traditionally local, in that patients would go to the general practitioner or hospital in their 
neighbourhood. Until relatively recently, the cross-border dimension which could possibly justify 
regulatory intervention by the EU was missing.  
Despite the absence of an express legal basis for the EU to regulate healthcare services, there are 
various areas of EU law which have had an impact on healthcare systems. For example, the 
Working Time Directive1 has had a profound impact on the organisation of healthcare at the 
national level.2 As a result, stakeholders in the healthcare sector are well aware of the possible 
impact of EU regulation on the delivery of healthcare services. Furthermore, various aspects of 
EU regulation touch on health or public health issues. From the 1970s onwards, several 
measures had been adopted which could be considered to have improvement of public health as 
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(one of) their main aims. The legal bases of these measures were uncertain or disputed.3 For that 
reason and for reasons of transparency, it was decided that the EU should be given a 
complementary competence in the field of public health. This competence was introduced by the 
Treaty of Maastricht. It provided that “the Community shall contribute towards a high level of 
human health protection by encouraging cooperation between Member States, and, if necessary, 
lending support to their action”.4 After the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, it is now expressly 
stated that the protection of a high level of human health is one of the areas in which the EU 
only has a complementary competence.5 Harmonisation of legislation is expressly excluded. Wolf 
Sauter has argued that this express recognition makes it clear that the EU intends to comply with 
the principle of subsidiarity and that it is recognised that this is an area of national competence.6 
The complementary competence itself is now found in Article 168 TFEU. First of all, it provides 
that “a high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and 
implementation of all Union policies and activities”.7 As to the substance of the competence, the 
provision is now significantly more detailed than before. Article 168(1) provides that “Union 
action, which shall complement national policies, shall be directed towards improving public 
health, preventing physical and mental illness and diseases, and obviating sources of danger to 
physical and mental health”. This is then followed by some examples of possible action by the 
Union. In addition to this, Article 168(2) provides that the EU shall encourage cooperation 
between the Member States on these issues.  
 
From the late 1990s and early 2000s, various cases have reached the CJEU which dealt with the 
possibility of reimbursement for patients of the costs of healthcare services which they had 
received in another Member State.8 The impact of these cases will be discussed below. Most 
cases were brought on the basis of the right of service recipients to freely receive services in 
another Member State. The CJEU decided that healthcare services were not excluded from the 
scope of application of the right to free movement of services. Therefore, in theory, it became 
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possible for the EU to adopt legislation on the basis of its internal market competence. 
However, the relationship between the internal market competence and the complementary 
competence in health was uncertain. The extent to which the internal market competence would 
provide an adequate and correct legal basis for harmonisation of healthcare services was 
debated.9 This debate was well illustrated by the opposition to the inclusion of healthcare 
services in the Services Directive.10 In the end, it was decided that healthcare services required a 
special solution. This solution came with the adoption of the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive 
in 2011.11 The adoption of the Directive was based both on Article 114 TFEU – the internal 
market competence – and Article 168 TFEU. The focus of this Directive is on the 
reimbursement of healthcare services which have been received outside a patient’s home 
Member State. As such, it remains very close to the CJEU’s case law and could be regarded as 
codification of its case law.12 However, the Directive goes further in that it also includes a 
number of information rights which are granted to patients who receive healthcare abroad. This 
means that the EU has chosen to complement the reimbursement rights with a number of 
traditional consumer rights. The cross-border patient is also considered to be a consumer. This 
seems to be very much in line with the arguments of Gareth Davies, who has argued that it 
would be preferable to realise changes in national healthcare systems through granting individual 
private law rights to patients rather than to harmonise at the European level aspects of the 
delivery of healthcare services.13 Such a consumer-based approach would rely on the individual 
to challenge obstacles encountered in national healthcare systems and, through individual 
litigation, to bring about a more outward-looking perspective of national healthcare systems. 
 
Overall, the fact remains that the EU has not intervened in the standards or the quality of 
healthcare provided to patients at the national level. The Cross-Border Healthcare Directive 
provides that high-quality treatment shall be provided, but the meaning of high-quality is not 
further defined in the Directive. There is also a reference to good quality healthcare in the 
Directive.14 It is difficult to interpret these standards as autonomous European standards, since it 
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is expressly provided in the Directive that the standards of care remain national.15 This is 
important from the perspective of convergence. While Member States will be required to 
reimburse healthcare received in another Member State, they have to do so on the basis of the 
treatment which would have been provided in the home Member State.16 One could wonder to 
what extent such reimbursement could lead to mutual recognition. This is an interesting 
question, perhaps more of theoretical than of practical importance, which has not been discussed 
in the literature. Member States have to compensate patients for treatment in another Member 
State, but only up to the level which the patient would have received if he had stayed at home. 
This arrangement does not imply any mutual recognition of the regulatory choices made by the 
other Member States – the national treatment remains the basis of compensation. It would have 
been different if the Member States had to reimburse the full rate of treatment – whatever the 
costs of the treatment in the other Member State. Furthermore, reimbursement does not 
necessarily imply that the regulatory standards are similar.  
The question then remains whether the EU would be able to harmonise standards of healthcare 
on the basis of its internal market competence. Derrick Wyatt has argued that the EU could 
circumvent the presumed lack of legal competence through the internal market competence.17 
This would allow the EU to adopt measures which could remove obstacles to free movement or 
distortions of competition. The various differences in the standards and quality of healthcare 
services in the 28 Member States could amount to an obstacle to the free movement of 
healthcare service recipients. Wyatt realistically accepts that “the proposition that lack of 
consumer confidence in the minimum guaranteed standards for the supply of goods and services 
in other Member States should be regarded in itself justifying harmonisation is one of which the 
present author is sceptical”.18 However, at the same time, he argues that “different standards of 
care resulting from disparities between national rules or administrative action in the various 
Member States could lead to distortion in the conditions of competition”.19 This argument 
appears to be quite formalistic from a legal point of view. Furthermore, it does not face up to the 
political reality that Member States do not want to limit their own sovereignty in the healthcare 
sector. Overall, it can be concluded that the EU internal market competence is unlikely to be 
used to harmonise the standards of healthcare provided at the national level. The decision to 
argue that the internal market competence is sufficient to start harmonising the delivery of 
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healthcare services is highly political and unlikely to be made in the near future. However, this 
does not mean that internal market law cannot have an indirect impact on the way in which 
national healthcare systems are regulated.  
b. The impact of the case law on free movement of services on the regulation of 
healthcare services 
 
From the cases of Kohl20 and Decker21 on, the CJEU has been forced to discuss a number of cases 
in which patients wanted to move across national borders to receive healthcare services. In 
general, the distinctive nature of these cases, which distinguished them from cases brought under 
the Social Security Regulation,22 was that the sole purpose of the cross-border movement was to 
receive healthcare services in another Member State. The CJEU included the right to receive 
healthcare services within the scope of the free movement of services, which is now found in 
Article 56 TFEU.23 The CJEU’s case law has been extensively discussed elsewhere and it is not 
necessary to repeat these discussions in this section.24 However, from the specific perspective of 
convergence, it is interesting to note the extent to which the case law has had a convergent effect 
on the national regulation of healthcare services. Therefore, a number of areas will be discussed 
on which the CJEU’s case law has had a particular impact.  
(i) Procedural requirements for prior authorisation of healthcare abroad 
On the basis of the case law it is, in principle, possible for Member States to impose a system 
of prior authorisation for patients who seek hospital treatment in another Member State, if 
the treatment requires hospitalisation.25 This could have an impact on private law, if patients 
have to obtain prior authorisation from the health insurer with which they hold their 
insurance policy. The exact definition of hospitalisation was never provided by the CJEU, 
but it was clear that prior authorisation of non-hospital care would never be permissible. 
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Furthermore, the CJEU has made it clear that Member States must have transparent 
procedures for cases in which authorisation can be required. Decisions of the decision-
making body must be open to judicial review or some sort of quasi-judicial review 
proceedings, and they must be taken within a reasonable time-frame.26 
(ii) Substantive requirements for prior authorisation of healthcare abroad 
As a result of the case law of the CJEU, the substantive criteria which Member States use in 
deciding whether or not to authorise treatment in another Member State have become more 
converged. The CJEU held in Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms that the Dutch criterion of whether 
a treatment was “normal in the professional circles concerned” had to be interpreted from an 
international perspective – treatment sufficiently tried and tested by international science.27 
Relevant (international) scientific literature had to be taken into account. This means that 
Member States, in dealing with requests for prior authorisation, must look at treatments from 
an international point of view. They are not allowed to focus solely on national medical 
practice if this is unduly restrictive. The consequence is that the pallet of treatment options 
available to patients becomes broader and has to be interpreted from an international (and 
possibly European) perspective. This means that for out-going patients, at least, Member 
States are required to look at possible treatments in other Member States.  
Secondly, in Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, the criterion that treatment abroad was a medical 
necessity - which in practice meant that the treatment could not be offered without undue 
delay in the home Member State – was justified as long as the decision-making body took all 
the specific circumstances of the case into account.28 Consequently, Member States are no 
longer justified in referring to the acceptable lengths of national waiting lists as an outright 
justification to refuse authorisation to receive healthcare abroad. They must always make an 
individual assessment based on the current and individual circumstances of the patient. 
The result of these substantive criteria for prior authorisation is that Member States are 
obliged to make an individual assessment of patients who would like to receive medical 
treatment abroad and that Member States are obliged to take international medical practice 
into account. This implies that Member States – at least at the level of prior authorisation – 
can no longer close their eyes for medical practice in other Member States. It also applies to 
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courts if they review decisions to refuse prior authorisation to patients who would like to 
receive healthcare services abroad. 
(iii) Waiting lists 
The individual assessment of the undue delay criterion (or medical necessity) has also had an 
impact on how Member States manage their waiting lists. It is no longer appropriate to 
refuse treatment abroad on the basis that the length of the waiting lists is acceptable. Each 
case requires an individual assessment of the circumstances of the patient.29 This has obliged 
Member States to introduce a certain flexibility in their management of waiting lists, and 
where necessary to pro-actively seek cross-border treatment options. The Watts case is a very 
clear example of the impact of EU free movement law on the management of waiting lists.30 
The result of that case is that the UK’s National Health Service (“NHS”) now regularly sends 
patients to other Member States for treatment.31 
(iv) Transparency of costs of treatment 
Finally, the fact that non-hospital care has to be reimbursed and that prior authorisation can 
never be justified for those cases means that healthcare systems such as the NHS have to 
make the costs of the specific treatments transparent. Otherwise, it would be difficult or 
impossible to know to what extent treatment abroad will be reimbursed. The result is that 
Member States must make the costs of treatments accessible to patients. This is the case 
even if patients normally never see the prices of treatments, since they receive healthcare 
without having to pay for it.32 
Overall, the case law has mainly focussed on the proceduralisation of the right of patients to 
receive healthcare abroad. However, there is one procedural area which might result in 
substantive convergence. This is the result of the judgment in Geraets-Smits. Member States must 
take international science into account in deciding whether or not to grant prior authorisation. 
The result is that an obligation is imposed on Member States to analyse international scientific 
evidence which is available in a particular field and to assess to what extent the national 
healthcare system is able to provide healthcare services in accordance with this international 
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evidence.33 It is an implicit recognition that research in medicine has become significantly 
internationalised.34 However, in practice, it has proved to be difficult for patients to base their 
claims on international scientific evidence, primarily because Member States retain a degree of 
discretion in deciding to what extent such international science is evidence-based.35  
Nevertheless, the result of such an evaluation could be that a Member State has to reimburse 
treatment which is not available in the home Member State, but which could be brought in a 
broader category of treatment which is compensated by the home Member State. That is what 
happened in Elchinov.36 In effect, the CJEU imposed a duty of consistent interpretation on 
national courts – if it is at all possible to bring a foreign treatment within a category of treatments 
which are reimbursed in the home Member State, the national court should do so.37 Although no 
reference was made to fundamental rights, the aim of this approach is to provide substance to 
the right of patients to have access to healthcare.38 However, the danger is that it could 
encourage Member States to restrict the list of treatments at the national level by providing a 
very clear, but restrictive, list with treatments available at the national level. This could become a 
particular problem for patients in the new Member States.39 If Member States were to adopt such 
an approach, this could be in breach of the requirement of high-quality or good quality 
healthcare which is imposed by the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive 2011. Moreover, in 
Stamatelaki,40 the CJEU held that private healthcare received in another Member State cannot 
simply be excluded from reimbursement on the basis of its private nature, when private 
healthcare is not reimbursed in the home Member State. As a consequence, Member States are 
required to look at the substance of the treatment – not the status of its provider. 
Finally, one can wonder to what extent the case law has had an impact on private law and on the 
possibility of convergence in private law. Here, it should be noted that this impact is very much 
dependent on how healthcare services are regulated at the national level. However, in general, 
the series of free movement cases has had a limited impact on private law relations. Because of 
the focus on reimbursement and prior authorisation, the cases have intervened in the 
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relationship between patient and the body which is responsible for reimbursing healthcare 
services. In most Member States, this is a public law relationship. In some Member States, such 
as in the Netherlands, the case law has had an impact on the relationship between health insurer 
and patient, which would in principle be a private law relationship. However, health insurers 
operate in a regulatory framework which is tightly controlled by public law. Although the case 
law has an impact on the contractual relationship between insurer and patient, the content of the 
contract has to a significant extent been decided by public bodies. Despite this limited effect on 
the relationship between insurer and patient, it is clear that the case law has not had an impact on 
the private law relationship between doctor and patient – whether this relationship is considered 
to be contractual or in tort. All the cases have dealt with the rights of patients vis-à-vis the body 
which is responsible for paying for healthcare services. The case law under Article 56 TFEU has 
not had an effect on what patients can claim from their doctor. The next step is then to analyse 
to what extent the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive 2011 will go beyond the case law on the 
free movement of services. 
c. The impact of the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive 2011 on the regulation of 
healthcare services 
It is generally agreed that the adoption of the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive was primarily a 
codification exercise.41 The Directive codifies the CJEU’s case law on the free movement of 
patients. The articles on reimbursement of healthcare received in another Member State from the 
one in which the patient is affiliated to the healthcare system closely follow the rules laid down 
by the CJEU.42 The same is true for the rules on prior authorisation. The situations in which 
cross-border healthcare can be subject to prior authorisation are exhaustively listed.43 They 
include hospital treatment. However, an interesting difference – or clarification – with the case 
law is that the definition of hospital treatment which can be subject to prior authorisation is 
healthcare which involves overnight accommodation in hospital.44 As a consequence, it appears 
that out-patient treatment in hospital can no longer be subject to prior authorisation. 
In a number of areas, the Directive goes further than the case law. As such, it attempts to realise 
convergence of national healthcare regulation through harmonisation in a limited number of 
areas. The competence on which these harmonisation aspects are based is the same as that of the 
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overall Directive – the competence to regulate the internal market.45 It should be noted that the 
Directive has only been adopted in early 2011 and that the deadline for transposition in national 
law was 25th October 2013. Therefore, the actual effect of the Directive in practice cannot really 
be measured yet. However, it is clear there are significant differences in how and to what extent 
Member States have implemented the Directive.46 These difficulties can be explained by some of 
the new concepts introduced in the Directive and the need for Member States to adapt the 
requirements of the Directive to their national health systems. We can see a number of areas in 
which the Directive adds something to the case law of the CJEU.  
(i) Quality standards 
The Directive obliges Member States to provide cross-border healthcare in accordance with 
standards and guidelines laid down by the Member State of treatment.47 This does not 
directly encourage any convergence of standards, let alone the creation of European 
standards, but it does mean that Member States must have standards in place. Member States 
which have insufficient or no quality standards will be required to adopt such standards for 
the purpose of cross-border healthcare. If national standards are not available, Member 
States could decide to adopt international or European standards. It is unlikely that the effect 
of these standards would be limited to healthcare provided to patients coming from other 
Member States. Article 4(1) of the Directive also provides that Member States must take the 
principles of universality, access to good quality care, equity and solidarity into account in 
providing cross-border healthcare.48 This could mean that Member States are required to 
provide healthcare of a certain minimum level of quality, and could even be required in 
certain circumstances to amend their quality standards to provide healthcare of a higher 
standard. 
(ii) Accessibility of quality standards 
In addition to having standards in place, these standards must also be accessible to patients 
from other Member States.49 Member States must establish information points which can 
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provide patients in other Member States with relevant information on the standards and 
guidelines which are in place in the Member State of treatment.  
(iii) Information requirements 
The Directive goes quite far in the information requirements which are imposed on 
healthcare providers. Article 4(2)(b) obliges healthcare providers to help patients to make an 
informed choice.50 This includes information on: 
(a) Treatment options 
(b) Availability of healthcare 
(c) Quality and safety of healthcare 
(d) Prices and invoices 
(e) Registration status and insurance of healthcare professionals 
These criteria all go some way towards providing a basis for informed consent. 
Consequently, the Directive protects patients who are considering cross-border healthcare by 
granting them a number of information rights. As such, the protection focusses on the 
service recipient – the patient in this case – and aims as much as possible to make the patient 
a well-informed consumer.51 In principle, these requirements are imposed on healthcare 
providers in the context of cross-border healthcare. However, the practical effect is that 
domestic patients will also receive this information. It is unlikely that Member States will 
create different information obligations depending on the origin of the patient. Such a 
distinction could realistically only be made in respect of language requirements. In this way, 
the Directive might also improve the provision of information to patients who remain within 
their home Member State.52 
(iv) Complaints and insurance 
Finally, the 2011 Directive obliges Member States to have transparent complaints 
mechanisms in place for patients.53 Furthermore, the Member State is required to have a 
system of professional liability insurance in place.54 
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Unlike the case law of the CJEU, the Directive seems to have a direct impact on the patient-
doctor relationship. This would mainly be through the information requirements. However, it is 
clear from the wording and the structure of the Directive that the obligations are imposed on the 
Member States, and not directly on healthcare providers. It seems very unlikely that the 
obligations in Article 4 would have direct effect in a dispute between a healthcare provider and a 
patient. Nevertheless, it is clear that by granting a number of consumer-like rights, the Cross-
Border Healthcare Directive has more of an impact on the private law aspects of the patient-
doctor relationship. However, its main focus is still procedural rather than substantive. This 
opens up the possibility for European standardisation to intervene directly in the patient-doctor 
relationship by regulating substantive aspects of the patient’s treatment. 
d. The role of European standardisation in the regulation of healthcare services  
On the basis of the discussion above, it is clear that both the case law on the free movement of 
patients and the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive have realised some convergence in the 
regulation of healthcare services in the Member States. The Directive has codified the case law, 
but has also imposed a number of additional information obligations on both Member States 
and service providers. This means that the standards of care become more accessible and 
transparent. However, because of the EU’s lack of legal competence to regulate quality of 
healthcare directly, both the case law and the Directive are still based on the presumption that 
the standards for healthcare services are defined at the national level. They do not directly 
interfere with the national definition of quality of care. Member States are merely encouraged to 
exchange national standards. 
In a European internal market for healthcare services, such an exchange could eventually result 
in a need for a European definition of quality of care. This could be in areas in which there is a 
significant amount of cross-border movement of patients, or in areas in which the regulation of 
(private) healthcare services is very different in the various Member States. Member States are 
allowed under certain conditions to refuse prior authorisation of healthcare abroad.55 One of 
them is Article 8(6)(c) of the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive, which provides that concerns 
about the quality of the healthcare providers are one of the legitimate reasons to refuse prior 
authorisation.56 Again, therefore, there is an incentive in the Directive for quality to be regulated 
at the European level.  
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In this broader framework, standardisation would then become one of the options to regulate 
quality of care issues at the European level. European standardisation would intervene directly in 
the patient-doctor relationship by regulating aspects of the treatment. The standards in a 
European standard could be used directly in contractual disputes between healthcare providers 
and patients, or as a benchmark to determine the standard of care in contract or tort cases. A 
European standard would provide substantive rights as a supplement to the procedural rights 
provided in the Directive. 
The next step is to see in which areas European standardisation processes have been started and 
what the underlying reasons were to initiate standardisation at the European level. However, 
before this can be done, it is necessary to describe in a little more detail how healthcare services 
are regulated at the national level, how public law and private law interact in the regulation of 
healthcare services and how European standardisation would fit in the national regulatory 
frameworks.  
ii. The regulation of healthcare services at the national level and the role of 
private law 
 
a. The transformation of the character of healthcare services 
This section will outline two developments which have taken place in the healthcare sector in the 
last few decades. The first has been on the macro level and has affected the way in which 
Member States have organised the delivery of healthcare services at the national level. The 
second development, which has partly been caused by the first development, has taken place at 
the level of the relationship between doctor and patient. 
Traditionally, healthcare services have been strictly public and have been organised exclusively by 
the State. It was considered to be the ultimate responsibility of the State to ensure that its citizens 
would receive proper healthcare. This position has not really changed, but what we can see in the 
last decades is that Member States have introduced elements of competition and privatisation in 
their healthcare systems.57 The result is that the public law character of the healthcare sector has 
diminished. One of the contributing factors to this development has been the project of the EU 
to liberalise services of public interest. Although this project has not had a direct impact on 
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healthcare, it is clear that it has encouraged Member States to transform the healthcare sector in 
such a way that it also incorporates elements of competition.58 This creation of a market for 
healthcare services also means that several provisions of EU law – such as competition law and 
free movement law – become applicable to the healthcare sector. The extent to which these 
market elements have been introduced differs among the Member States. What they have in 
common in a significant number of Member States is that the bodies which – under public 
legislation – have been given responsibility to ensure the provision of healthcare services to their 
citizens or customers – which can be public bodies or health insurers – have to encourage 
competition among healthcare providers. They have a choice where to buy healthcare services, 
which means that healthcare providers have to compete for patients. The tool which is 
commonly used is a private law tool – contracts are concluded between healthcare buyers and 
healthcare providers. This has introduced market dynamics in the healthcare sector, in that 
healthcare providers become more focussed on profit-making.59 Furthermore, it often means 
that public and private healthcare providers will compete for the provision of healthcare services. 
It is no longer guaranteed that contracts will go to public hospitals. As such, private healthcare 
has been given a more significant role in the healthcare system. The scope of private healthcare 
providers has been broadened, in that private healthcare is no longer considered to be exclusively 
for the rich and the privileged. In addition to this, it has become more common for patients to 
seek private healthcare. The existence of private healthcare providers which provide 
supplementary services in addition to the public healthcare system means that patient choice is 
enhanced. Furthermore, for private healthcare which has been sought outside the public 
healthcare system the relationship between patient and healthcare provider is contractual. Again, 
this means that private law will have more of an impact on the regulation of healthcare services. 
Moreover, the significant increase of private healthcare providers means that it is necessary for 
supervisory agencies to expand their work to the private sector. Often, it is difficult for them to 
get a full picture of what is going on in the private sector.60 In general, both the limited 
liberalisation and privatisation have had an impact on the regulation of healthcare regulation and 
have created more of a role for private law, or quasi-private law, in the regulation of healthcare 
services. 
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The liberalisation and privatisation of healthcare services has not just had an impact on how the 
healthcare sector has been organised. They have also had an impact on the relationship between 
doctor and patient. Just like the bodies which are responsible for buying healthcare services have 
been given more choice, patients have also been given more choice – even within the public 
healthcare systems of the Member States. Historically, patients go to local hospitals to see a 
doctor. Healthcare has a strong territorial element. This is not surprising – patients do not want 
to travel long distances for medical care, they like to build up a relationship with their doctor and 
they prefer to have quick access to medical care. This local, territorial element of healthcare has 
not disappeared. However, the various developments in the healthcare sector have resulted in a 
new “type” of patient. This process could be described as the “consumerisation” of the patient.61 
The consumerisation of patients means that patients are becoming more and more like 
consumers. This implies an element of choice, and an element of “shopping for healthcare”. 
This choice is granted by the co-existence of public and private healthcare providers and, as has 
already been said, by the possibility of choice within the public healthcare system. It can no 
longer be assumed that patients will go to the hospital next door – if there is a hospital a few 
hours away which offers specialist care of a higher quality they will often opt for that hospital. 
This means that healthcare services are, to a certain extent, being removed from their territorial 
basis. Furthermore, patients have more access to information about the contents, the risks and 
the consequences of medical treatment. The number of internet fora and patient websites with 
medical information has increased enormously in the last couple of years – sometimes to the 
detriment of the accuracy of the information. The result of the increase in information is that 
patients have become more demanding towards doctors and will not hesitate to ask for a second 
opinion if they are not pleased with the diagnosis or proposal for treatment. Again, this could 
mean that patients will travel some distance to obtain a second opinion. Cross-border healthcare 
becomes a more realistic option. This consumerisation of the patient is also reflected in the 
Cross-Border Healthcare Directive itself. In addition to the right to reimbursement of cross-
border healthcare, the focus of the Directive is very much on ensuring that patients are provided 
with adequate information.62   
b. The interaction between public law and private law in the regulation of healthcare 
services at the national level 
                                                          
61 See M. Hall and C. Schneider, ‘Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New Medical Marketplace’, 
(2008) 106 Michigan Law Review 643. 




Because of its public nature, it is not surprising that healthcare is heavily regulated by public law 
at the national level. This section is not intended to provide a detailed overview of the legal 
regulation of healthcare services and providers at the national level. It will not engage in a 
detailed discussion of national systems. Rather, it will sketch out the landscape of public law and 
private law interaction in the healthcare sector in general. Inevitably, this means that certain 
generalisations are made about national healthcare systems, which are usually highly specific. The 
same applies to national legal regulation of healthcare systems. However, it is still hoped that the 
picture of the landscape will provide an idea of the issues which are relevant to the ability of 
European standardisation to have an impact in the healthcare sector at the national level. The 
focus is on the interaction between public law and private law in the regulation of healthcare 
services and providers. Moreover, a distinction will be drawn between ex ante and ex post 
regulation. 
Healthcare services would not be provided without medical professionals. Medical professionals 
need certain qualifications before they are allowed to practise medicine. The training 
requirements for doctors – as well as a number of other medical professionals – have been 
harmonised at the European level.63 This has enabled the EU to adopt the Professional 
Qualifications Directive,64 which provides that doctors who are qualified in one Member State 
should be allowed to offer their services in another Member States and should be admitted to 
the profession if they want to practise in another Member State on a permanent basis. It should 
be noted that this harmonisation has primarily been of a quantitative nature – recognition is 
based on the number of years of training. This is clear from the Directive itself.65 The 
quantitative aspect of the harmonisation is supplemented with a more qualitative description of 
the substance of the training of medical practitioners. For medical specialists, the Union 
Européenne de Médicins Spécialists (“UEMS”) is responsible for making the syllabi which 
contain the requirements for training for medical specialists.66 This involves the bringing together 
of medical specialists of all Member States to decide on the required standards. As such, UEMS 
is essentially engaged in a form of European standardisation. But all of this takes place at the 
European level. At the national level, access to the medical profession is mainly regulated 
through public or administrative law. The bodies which are responsible for the registration might 
be of a quasi-public nature, but there is little direct involvement of private law.  
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The same applies to healthcare providers. Institutions which wish to provide healthcare services 
usually have to obtain some sort of license. Again, this is a public law requirement. The 
requirements which have to be fulfilled before licenses are awarded are laid down in legislation. 
Most Member States have supervisory agencies which monitor whether healthcare providers are 
complying with these requirements. In case of non-compliance, the agencies have powers under 
public law to (temporarily) close institutions or to order them to restrict their activities. The same 
applies to medical practitioners, who are also supervised and can be required to stop working in 
case of non-compliance. Whether the healthcare system is based on insurance or on universal 
provision of healthcare to all citizens, agreements will have to be made between the healthcare 
buyers and healthcare providers. In that respect, private law plays a role since, depending on the 
nature of the healthcare system, these agreements can be of a contractual nature. This is perhaps 
the sole example of private law fulfilling a function of ex ante regulation. In the agreement, it can 
be agreed under what conditions the healthcare services are delivered and with what standards 
they have to comply. However, the extent to which these agreements regulate standards and 
quality of care is unclear.67  
When the doctor and patient meet, in the public healthcare system, they establish a relationship 
which is essentially of a private law character. In some Member States, this relationship creates 
both a contractual relationship and a relationship in tort, while in other Member States the 
private law character is solely expressed through the imposition of a duty of care in tort. 
However, in practice, this does not make a great difference, as the standard of care is usually 
similar in contract and in tort. Obviously, in private healthcare, the relationship between doctor 
and patient is contractual. The contract is then usually concluded with the clinic in which the 
treatment is provided. This also means that the substance of the contract, which has to be 
expressly concluded, becomes more important. Despite the private law character of the 
relationship between doctor and patient, public law still imposes certain duties on medical 
practitioners. These duties will often evolve around a duty to provide reasonable care – which is 
not too different from the duty imposed in contract or tort.  
In general, it could be said that public law is mostly concerned with ex ante regulation of 
healthcare services. Private law, on the other hand, becomes relevant when something has gone 
wrong in the relationship between doctor and patient. The patient can then sue the doctor or 
healthcare provider in contract or in tort. Similarly, disciplinary law – which is difficult to place 
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on the public law-private law spectrum – can also intervene ex post. While disciplinary 
proceedings are often started with a complaint from a patient, the character of the proceedings is 
less private in that the reputation of the medical profession as a whole is taken into account – 
just like the position of the society is taken into account in criminal law. Moreover, disciplinary 
proceedings are usually heavily regulated by public law. Certain Member States, such as 
Germany, have out-of-court dispute settlement procedures where liability disputes between 
medical practitioners and patients can be resolved without having to go through the court 
systems.68 
What both public law and private law have in common in the healthcare sector is that they 
usually impose very broad and general obligations and duties on medical professionals and 
healthcare providers. These duties subsequently have to be defined more precisely. This 
specification of the duty of care of medical professionals – whether in public law or in private 
law – can be done ex post through judicial or disciplinary proceedings. A court will then be 
required to define the required standard of care. Alternatively, the required standard of care can 
be defined ex ante through some sort of standardisation. The healthcare sector is full of 
guidelines, standards and protocols. Some of these standards have been adopted at the 
international level, while others will be national. It is clear that, especially for scientific standards, 
there has been a process of internationalisation, which has frequently been encouraged by the 
United States.69 This has also been recognised in the case law of the CJEU discussed above.70 In 
many cases, the parties who are making medical standards draw from the same international 
scientific evidence. However, there is still a broad margin of appreciation in the interpretation of 
this evidence which can result in the adoption of different standards at the national level.71 Such 
standards can apply to hospitals or to individual medical specialists. They will have a different 
status in medical practice, but in general they are not directly binding in law. They are used to 
define and specify the requirements imposed on healthcare service providers in public as well as 
private law.  
c. European standardisation in national regulation of healthcare services 
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The link from national healthcare standardisation to European standardisation through CEN is 
then easily made. European standardisation could be one way of specifying the required duty of 
care of medical professionals in public or private law. However, this is where some caution is 
required. The way in which the Member States have organised medical standardisation differs 
significantly. Because of a lack of expertise of the public administration, it is understandable that 
medical professionals have to be closely involved in the standardisation process. However, the 
extent to which they are autonomous in the standard-setting process depends on the Member 
State in question. In some Member States, such as the United Kingdom, medical standardisation 
is quite strictly controlled by the State.72 Although it will always be doctors who define the 
standards, they are brought to work in a standardisation framework which is strictly publicly 
supervised. This means that such standardisation is not really private regulation, but more co-
regulation under public supervision. The intention behind this is that self-regulation cannot 
exclusively be relied on to produce outcomes which are beneficial to the public good.73 There has 
to be public accountability and control.74 To that aim, the State is in control of the organisation 
of the process and of the incorporation and application of the standards in the healthcare sector. 
Public supervisory agencies act on the basis of these standards, or even on the basis of standards 
which they have made themselves.75 This public responsibility for medical standardisation cannot 
be seen in all Member States. For example, in the Netherlands, much more reliance is placed on 
the medical profession itself, without too much supervision or hierarchy. It is strongly believed 
that the medical profession itself is responsible for the making of standards in the healthcare 
sector.76 Public supervisory agencies will adopt these standards in their supervisory activities, but 
they exercise no influence on the making of them. As a consequence, the Dutch system clearly 
recognises the autonomy of the medical profession in deciding when, how and which standards 
have to be set. However, it has also become clear that the profession itself cannot be entirely 
relied on to make sufficient and adequate medical standards. Therefore, the Netherlands has now 
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introduced a Quality Institute for Healthcare.77 This institute will not get involved in the actual 
standard-making process, but it will set out how medical standards should be made and it will 
provide a public stamp of approval to standards which have complied with their requirements. 
Moreover, the institute has been granted the power to force the medical profession to start 
working on a standard if it considers it necessary that a standard be developed.78 As such, the 
institute could issue a “top-down” mandate to the profession, which would be a similar to 
Commission mandates in the New Approach. However, it should still be emphasised that the 
institute would not get involved in the actual substance for the standard – this would remain 
within the control of the medical profession.79 If the Dutch system is compared with the UK 
system, it is clear that there is a difference in professional autonomy in the two countries. In the 
UK, the standardisation process itself is tightly controlled and supervised by public authorities 
which are also involved in the standardisation process. This means that the medical standards 
which are developed will take more interests into account than just the purely medical scientific 
issues. This is not necessarily the case in the Netherlands, where medical standardisation remains 
primarily a scientific evidence-based exercise. The subsequent policy questions which have an 
inevitable impact on medical practice are not directly dealt with in the standardisation process. 
Overall, the lesson which should be learnt from the national systems is that there are significant 
differences in the extent to which Member States allow private regulation to play a role in the 
regulation of healthcare services. This is not the same as the scope of private law – private law 
will always have a role to play through contract and tort law. However, certain Member States 
have created very public structures of medical standardisation. This might mean that European 
standardisation of healthcare services, which remains primarily private regulation – although 
public authorities could and are likely to get involved –, might not easily be accepted in these 
Member States. As a result, one has to look at the scope of private regulation at the national 
level. If the scope of private regulation is limited, this could result in Member States objecting to 
European standardisation. This would be likely to have an impact on whether or not they 
approve European standardisation projects. Consequently, it would be more likely to have an 
impact on the making of European standards than on their application. However, this would 
also depend on the question to what extent public authorities get involved in (blocking) 
European standardisation initiatives in the healthcare sector. This is something which will be 
discussed in the next section.  
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iii. Three case studies on European standardisation of healthcare services 
 
a. Aesthetic Surgery Services 
In April 2010, a European standardisation project for Aesthetic Surgery Services was started 
through CEN. The initiative had been submitted by a number of Austrian plastic surgeons to the 
Austrian Standards Institute (“ASI”), which was also to act as secretariat to the standardisation 
process.80 Two key reasons for the standardisation project can be identified. First of all, aesthetic 
surgery has become a highly profitable market. This is also clear from the PIP breast implants 
case, which will be discussed below. Aesthetic surgery is usually provided by private healthcare 
providers outside the public healthcare system. There is a significant amount of advertisement; 
treatments are voluntary and easy to obtain. This means that the patient is not really a patient but 
more of a consumer.81 This consumer is prepared to travel across borders for treatment. As a 
result, it is possible to say that aesthetic surgery takes place in a market, which is somewhat 
removed from the traditional public healthcare systems. Furthermore, the market is truly 
European, or even international. Secondly, the medical professionals which operate on this 
market have very different qualifications. Various medical specialties perform treatments which 
could be described as aesthetic surgery. Plastic surgeons are the main specialty which has entered 
the aesthetic surgery market, but dermatologists, ENT-surgeons and even general practitioners 
also operate on the market.82 Moreover, it is possible for doctors with basic training to be 
involved in aesthetic surgery, and in some Member States it is even possible for nurses to 
perform aesthetic surgery.83 This means that the market is full with different service providers. 
Some do not have a fixed location and travel from one Member State to another with their 
products and materials.84 Some of them have decided to call themselves cosmetic surgeons, 
which in many Member States is not a protected title.85 This could create confusion for patients, 
as the use of the term surgeon would imply specialist training as a surgeon. This is just one 
example of a lack of regulation of aesthetic surgery services at the national level. The only 
Member State which has a very clear regulatory framework is France, in which it is provided by 
law that all aesthetic surgery treatments have to be performed under the supervision of a plastic 
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surgeon.86 In Denmark, medical professionals who want to get involved in aesthetic surgery first 
have to receive certification.87 Following the PIP breast implants scandal, the cosmetic surgery 
sector has come under the attention of national regulatory agencies which, in cooperation with 
the EU, are working to fill regulatory gaps and to tighten the regulation of the aesthetic surgery 
sector.88 The European standardisation process also seeks to play a role in this regulatory 
framework. One could wonder to what extent the European standardisation initiative has been 
overtaken by legislative initiatives at the national level, such as in the UK.89  
 
Although the standardisation process covers the complete doctor-patient relationship – 
including, for example, issues as consent – its main focus is twofold. First, the European 
standard intends to regulate which medical professionals can perform which treatments. It 
introduces a number of competences which medical professionals must have obtained before 
they can perform certain treatments.90 The standard has a list with treatments which have been 
given a certain risk factor. Treatments with a higher risk factor can only be performed by medical 
professionals with more advanced training and experience. Second, the standard sets out what 
facilities a medical professional must have before certain treatments can be performed.91 A 
distinction is made between made treatments which can be performed in a treatment room and 
treatments which require an operating theatre. As such, the standard would prevent doctors 
from treating consumers at their home. Treatment would have to be provided at a location with 
a certain minimum of facilities. Overall, the focus of the European standard is on the “by 
whom” and “where” of aesthetic surgery services. The standard does not directly deal with the 
“how” of aesthetic surgery.92 As a result, those who are involved in the standardisation process 
seek to distinguish this standard from evidence-based medical standards which would set out 
how specific treatments have to be performed on the basis of scientific evidence.93 According to 
them, a distinction should be made between standardising the medical procedure and the 
medical process.94 This standard only deals with the process. This does not mean that the 
standard should not be based on sound medical evidence – however, it is different in nature 
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from evidence-based medical standards. Those who oppose European standardisation argue that 
the very inclusion of certain aesthetic surgery treatments in the standard already requires 
scientific evidence and that the standard might appear to justify certain treatments for which 
there is no legitimate basis in scientific evidence.95 
 
Twenty-two Member States are involved in the standardisation process.96 They all have created 
national mirror committees to be able to represent the national positions at the European level. 
In addition, a number of international and European organisations are participating with liaison 
status. This means that they participate in the meetings, but have no active voting rights. Certain 
sections of UEMS – committees representing a particular medical specialty – also participated in 
the meetings. However, they did so without the explicit support of UEMS and, after the draft 
standard had been published in May 2012, it became clear that UEMS would withdraw any 
(implicit) support of the standardisation process.97 It also asked CEN to refrain from referring to 
UEMS syllabi or other documents in the European standard.98 This was the first public 
opposition to the standard. However, it is clear that there had already been significant tensions in 
the standardisation process. They were mainly caused by the different positions of the 
stakeholders in the various Member States – both of the medical profession and the various 
public bodies involved in the supervision of the healthcare sector. These positions were highly 
dependent on the national regulatory frameworks. Because France already has legislation in place 
which provides that only plastic surgeons can provide aesthetic surgery services, the French 
position in the standardisation process has been to protect the French legislation.99 This has 
primarily been done by ensuring a significant amount of a-deviations, which clarify which aspects 
of the European standard might not comply with the French legislation.100 This is a 
fundamentally different position from ensuring that aesthetic surgery services are adequately 
regulated by creating a good quality standard. A similar position has been taken by Denmark and 
Germany.101 The UK, the Netherlands and Austria have been the main supporters of the 
standard and have provided most of its input.102 
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A draft standard was published in early 2012.103 After the various comments had been received, it 
became clear in September 2012 that the standard would not have sufficient support – the 
required 71% of the votes – to be adopted.104 A period of reflection was started. It was decided 
to make a distinction between aesthetic surgery services and non-surgical aesthetic services. This 
could even result in two separate standards being published. A new draft standard was published 
in December 2012,105 which required a new CEN enquiry which took place until May 2013. The 
new comments were resolved in September 2013. However, it was not until October 2014 when 
the final vote took place. The standard was formally adopted in December 2014 and is now 
available through the national standardisation organisations. 
 
From the start European medical associations have been vehemently opposed to the 
standardisation process. Their opposition is based on, on the one hand, criticism of the 
suitability of European standardisation through CEN as a regulatory tool in the healthcare sector 
and, on the other hand, on specific concerns about the standardisation process for aesthetic 
surgery services.106 In early 2011 the President of the Comité Permanent de Médicins Européens 
(“CPME”) visited CEN to express the strong view of his organisation that CEN should not 
enter the healthcare sector.107 He considered it undesirable for CEN to enter a field which should 
remain in control of the medical profession. In September 2012 a common position was adopted 
by a number of European medical associations which rejected the possibility of standardisation 
through CEN in the healthcare sector.108 The concerns were three-fold.109 Firstly, the 
standardisation process of CEN was fundamentally incompatible with the traditional structures 
of medical standardisation based on scientific evidence. It would open up the possibility of non-
medical concerns having an impact on the standardisation process, which would not result in 
optimum medical care. Such standardisation would endanger the autonomy of the medical 
profession. Secondly, it would not be compatible with the principle of subsidiarity. Thirdly, it 
would be in breach of the explicit rejection of EU competence to regulate healthcare services in 
Article 168 TFEU. The latter two objections do not appear to be legally correct, as they are 
based on a misunderstanding of CEN’s role at the European level and the legal status of 
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standardisation. However, the medical associations would argue that there is a strong top-down 
element to the standardisation process and that it would be likely that the European standard 
would be made legally binding in one way or another. 
 
These general concerns were supplemented by specific concerns about the standardisation 
process for Aesthetic Surgery Services. The first concern was that the standardisation process 
had insufficient procedural safeguards to ensure that the standards which would be agreed would 
be based on sound scientific evidence.110 This meant that the European standardisation process 
could be abused to provide a sense of medical legitimacy to aesthetic surgery treatments which 
were not in fact evidence-based.111 Furthermore, the standardisation process and its revision 
process were too slow to ensure that the standard would always be based on up-to-date medical 
evidence. The second concern was that the standardisation process would be used to establish 
aesthetic surgery as a separate medical specialty.112 This had previously been tried through 
UEMS, but UEMS had resisted and refused to recognise aesthetic surgery as a separate 
specialty.113 The result of this could be that European standardisation would now be used to 
achieve the same result and essentially to engage in some sort of market protection and 
restriction of the market by reserving treatments to this new quasi-specialty. It would provide a 
route to a small group of medical doctors to restrict the aesthetic surgery market to a limited 
group of doctors.114  
 
b. Cleft Lip Surgery Services 
 
In December 2010, BDS, the Bulgarian standardisation organisation, submitted a proposal to 
CEN for a European standard on Cleft Lip Surgery.115 The initiative was submitted to BDS by 
the European Cleft Organisation (“ECO”), a European patient organisation which seeks to 
promote high-quality medical care for babies born with cleft lips throughout Europe. It had 
specifically chosen BDS as the standardisation organisation to administer the process, since this 
would help to raise awareness for the standardisation process in the new Member States.116 
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ECO is a European organisation for cleft patients throughout Europe. The organisation is run 
by a group of cleft patients and medical doctors. Its main aim is to ensure that there are 
minimum standards for cleft lip treatment in all EU Member States. It recognises that standards 
of care are widely divergent in the EU, but argues that all EU citizens should be entitled to a 
minimum level of care.117 Its position is that this minimum level of care is not provided in all EU 
Member States.118 It is dissatisfied with the quality of care provided in certain Member States, in 
particular Bulgaria and Romania. To remedy this, ECO is involved in the training of medical 
specialists and nursing personnel in a number of new Member States.119 It has developed and 
coordinated training programmes. There are very few standards on cleft lip treatment in these 
Member States and the level of research is much less advanced than in some of the older 
Member States. For these reasons, ECO believed that it would be good to have a European 
standard which would set out the minimum level of care required for patients with cleft lips.120 
Cross-border movement of patients is not a realistic possibility for babies born with clefts. 
Because of a lack of financial resources, patients in the new Members are not able to travel to the 
old Member States for treatment.121 In addition, babies born with clefts need a series of 
treatments which would make cross-border movement for treatment difficult, if not impossible. 
For that reason, the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive 2011 is not of much practical help. A 
European standard could help to raise the overall level of care throughout the EU. Furthermore, 
it would empower patients to require a certain level of care from the doctors in their home 
Member State. 
The aims of the standardisation initiative were clearly put in the proposal submitted to CEN in 
December 2010: 
“The benefits of standardisation in this field will be the establishment of a clear and accurate specification of the 
healthcare management process for infants born with clefts. A European Standard will help to reduce the health 
inequalities in the EU countries and support patients’ safety”122 
For some time, ECO had thought about which route could best be taken to develop such a 
standard. As a patient organisation, it was in a more difficult position than associations of 
medical doctors, which have traditionally been involved in the making of their own evidence-
based standards for medical treatment. The route which a patient organisation had to take if it 










wanted to initiate a standard on cleft lip treatment was not immediately clear. One of the 
members of ECO’s board was a surgeon in the United Kingdom who had previously been 
involved in the creation of standards for medical devices through CEN.123 As a result, the 
attention of ECO was drawn to CEN. In the end, ECO decided that a standardisation process 
through CEN would be a suitable means to achieve its aim of realising a minimum level of care 
in all EU Member States.124 
ECO was very much aware that this was an experimental process, but for three reasons it 
considered a standardisation process through CEN to be particularly worthwhile. Firstly, the 
standardisation process would bring together the various stakeholders involved in cleft care at 
the European level. The standard would derive a sense of authority from this consensus-based 
process.125 At the time of the initiative there were too many standards throughout Europe, none 
of which had particular authority over other standards. CEN would provide a mechanism to 
develop a standard which would potentially be authoritative in all Member States. Secondly, the 
standard would help to create a degree of consistency. Although ECO would never claim that 
there should be one uniform treatment process provided to all cleft patients, there should at least 
be consensus about the minimum level of care which has to be provided to all patients.126 
Thirdly, and finally, ECO recognised that a CEN standard would not override national 
legislation. As such, the fact that national legislation would be very different in the various 
Member States would not cause any direct difficulties.127  
The care of babies born with cleft lips is not a market. Unlike aesthetic surgery, cleft lip care is 
still very much provided by public hospitals as part of public healthcare systems. Therefore, it 
could be expected that cleft care can more easily be exclusively regulated by the medical 
profession through the traditional structures of medical standardisation based on scientific 
medical evidence. However, it is apparent from this initiative that, from the perspective of a 
European patient organisation, there are significant differences in knowledge and expertise 
within the Member States. The proposal for a European standard involved the linking of 
national structures of medical standardisation through opening up national medical 
standardisation to a European market. CEN would be used as a catalyst for this process. 
                                                          








After the submission of the proposal to CEN, national standardisation organisations had to 
consult with their stakeholders. These meetings took place in early 2011 and in April 2011 all 
national standardisation organisations voted on the proposal.128 Five Member States voted 
against the proposal, while fifteen Member States voted in favour. Eleven Member States 
abstained. Because of CEN’s weighted voting procedures the proposal was rejected. The 
Member States which voted against the proposal were Finland, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Spain.129 Broadly speaking, three categories of objections can be identified: (i) 
healthcare services provided in public healthcare systems should be regulated by the State 
without interference of private regulation; (ii) European standards would lower the level of care 
provided in some of the old Member States; (iii) European standardisation would not be the 
right mechanism to create standards for healthcare services. These objections will be discussed 
below. 
After the negative vote, ECO organised a number of meetings in France and Spain to increase 
the support for a European standardisation process in late 2011 and early 2012.130 In May 2012 it 
became clear that, after some additional meetings with national stakeholders, there would still 
not be sufficient support to start a European standardisation process.131 ECO then considered 
the possibility of creating a Workshop Agreement through CEN. This would not have the same 
status as a European standard, but could potentially be a first step towards a European standard. 
However, even the possibility of a Workshop Agreement was (informally) rejected by a number 
of standardisation organisations.132 As an alternative, ECO decided to develop a Technical 
Specification through CEN, using ASI as the secretariat.133 The first meeting was held in Vienna 
in September 2013. A Technical Specification does not have the same status as a European 
standard – it is even softer than a European standard –, but it can still be used to lay down 
standards for services. 
c. PIP breast implants134 
The third case study in this chapter is the PIP breast implants scandal. It is not directly 
concerned with European standardisation of healthcare services. Breast implants are considered 
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medical devices and come within the scope of the New Approach. However, because they are 
closely linked to aesthetic surgery services and form an important part of the next chapters, an 
introduction to the role of European standardisation in the PIP breast implants scandal will be 
provided in this chapter. 
In the last decades, breast implants have become a very popular product for women throughout 
the world. The PIP factory, located in France, was one of the main producers of breast implants 
in Europe, and possibly even in the world. It started producing breast implants in the early 
1990s. At some point in the early 2000s, PIP started having financial difficulties and decided to 
develop an ingenious strategy to cut costs. Instead of filling the breast implants with the required 
medical silicone gel, PIP started to use industrial sub-standard industrial silicone gel in the 
production process. This was obviously significantly cheaper. Unfortunately, it is still unclear 
how systematic the use of sub-standard industrial silicone gel was – it seems that certain badges 
of PIP implants contained only the required medical gel, while others contained a mix or only 
industrial gel. The randomness of the production process has made it much more difficult to 
identify risks and has led to significant delay in taking action against PIP.  
In any event, sub-standard PIP breast implants were distributed throughout the EU for a 
significant period of time. In 2009, the first concerns that the breast implants might be defective 
were raised in France.135 However, it was not until 2011 that the French public supervisory 
agency responsible for medical devices, AFSSAPS,136 issued a warning and that PIP breast 
implants were taken off the market. By that time, many thousands of women had already 
received PIP breast implants. They were faced with great uncertainty – there was no way for 
them to find out whether or not the breast implants that they had received were sub-standard. 
Sometimes it was not even possible for them to be sure whether or not their implants had been 
produced by PIP.137 Furthermore, a number of medical reports, one of which had been produced 
at the request of the European Commission, stated that although the PIP breast implants might 
have a higher risk of rupture, it could not be proved that there were any particular health risks 
associated with the higher risk of rupture (such as a higher risk of cancer).138 Faced with this 
uncertainty, many women decided to have the PIP breast implants removed. In some situations, 
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the removal of the breast implants was covered by their health insurance. However, most of the 
time, health insurers – whether public or private – refused to pay the removal costs if the original 
decision to have breast implants was based purely on aesthetic reasons and not on a medical 
indication.139 Some cosmetic surgery clinics offered to remove the breast implants at cost price or 
even for free. However, they would still require women to pay for the costs of new breast 
implants. As a consequence, many women had to pay a significant amount of money as a result 
of having received, or possibly having received, defective breast implants. Moreover, there was a 
possibility of psychological harm. For all of these reasons, it is understandable that women 
wanted to seek legal redress. 
To be able to understand the various litigation strategies which have been pursued after the PIP 
breast implants scandal, it is important to understand the regulatory framework in which the 
breast implants were marketed and distributed. The regulatory framework of the New Approach 
has been introduced in the previous chapter. Breast implants are considered medical devices and, 
as such, come within the New Approach.140 This means that the Medical Devices Directive141 
lays down the essential requirements which breast implants have to fulfil,142 while the specific 
technical requirements have been laid down in a European standard adopted through CEN.143 
Before medical devices can be placed on the market, the manufacturer must attach the CE 
marking to goods and issue a declaration of conformity, declaring that the goods comply with 
the provisions of the Directive – and, necessarily, of the European standard.144 A notified body 
then has to inspect the manufacturer’s quality system and design dossier.145 Each Member State 
has to notify to the European Commission which bodies can fulfil this role in their country – 
hence the term “notified body”. Once a notified body has approved the quality system and 
design dossier the product can be placed on the market. The notified body will then continue to 
undertake regular surveillance of the quality system.146 In the case of PIP, the notified body was 
TÜV Rheinland, a large German certification organisation. It is not necessary for a manufacturer 
to obtain the approval of a notified body in their own Member State – it is possible to choose a 
notified body in another Member State. The conformity assessment by the notified body 
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focusses solely on the quality system and the design of the product. This means that there is no 
direct control of whether or not the medical devices actually comply with the specific provisions 
of the European standard – the assessment focusses exclusively on the quality system and the 
design dossier in place. In addition to the role of notified bodies, an important function is 
performed by the national supervisory agencies, which are responsible for surveillance of the 
market.147 The role of notified bodies in the enforcement of European standards and their 
potential liability is discussed in the next chapter. 
In this regulatory framework, there are a number of parties which could be sued in a case like the 
PIP case. The most probable defendant would be the PIP factory or its management. However, 
rather unsurprisingly, the PIP factory had gone into liquidation in 2010. Furthermore, the 
owners of the factory did not have any traceable assets and criminal proceedings were brought 
against the management of the factory before the Tribunal de Grand Instance in Marseille. In 
December 2013, the main owner of the factory, Jean Claude Mas, was sentenced to four years’ 
imprisonment.148 Therefore, bringing a case against the management also had little chance of 
success. Many victims joined the criminal proceedings as victims, which meant that they were 
able to claim compensation from a criminal compensation scheme developed by the French 
State.149 Although compensation by this scheme is limited to 3000 euros, it meant that the 
victims would obtain at least some redress.  
In light of the difficulties in suing PIP or its management, different litigation strategies have been 
pursued in various Member States. The Austrian consumer organisation VKI has brought 
proceedings against Allianz, a German insurer with which PIP had obtained insurance.150 As the 
insurance contract was concluded with the French subsidiary of Allianz, the proceedings have 
been brought in Paris by a French lawyer who is instructed by VKI. The claim has been brought 
on behalf of around 70 Austrian victims. A number of legal issues have to be decided first by the 
French court.151 First of all, it is uncertain whether a valid insurance contract has been concluded 
between Allianz and PIP. Allianz submits they it has been deceived by PIP as to the nature of 
the product and the production process.152 As a consequence, the insurance contract would be 
void. Secondly, Allianz claims that there is a clause in the contract which excludes residents 
outside France from the scope of the insurance contract. This would mean that the damage 
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incurred by the Austrian victims would not be covered by the insurance contract.153 The Paris 
court still has to decide these preliminary issues. In a separate judgment in 2012, the Tribunal de 
Commerce in Toulon held that the deceit by PIP did not invalidate the insurance contract 
between Allianz and PIP and that there was a valid insurance contract in place. However, it is 
clear that the case against Allianz remains complicated. An alternative strategy has been to sue 
TÜV Rheinland, the German certification company. A group of victims have brought 
proceedings against TÜV for its alleged failure to carry out the required surveillance and 
inspections at the PIP factory. The case has been brought in tort – it is claimed that TÜV has 
breached the duty of care which it owed to the women who received PIP breast implants. In the 
UK, claimants have started group litigation against a number of clinics and individual surgeons 
who had provided PIP breast implants to them. The litigation is based on the contract between 
the patients and the clinics in which they received the breast implants. It is claimed that the 
breast implants were not of satisfactory quality. Overall, it is clear that different strategies have 
been pursued in the various Member States. Both the cases against TÜV and the group litigation 
in the UK will be discussed in Chapter V. 
iv. An analysis of the interaction between European standardisation and 
healthcare services 
 
a. Traditional evidence-based medical standardisation and European 
standardisation through CEN 
 
Medicine and standardisation is not a natural combination. Medical doctors are one of the 
traditional professions.154 This means that there is a very strong emphasis on the autonomy and 
integrity of the profession. Medical knowledge is made, maintained and developed within the 
medical profession, which has created its own structures to communicate and protect this 
knowledge.155 External interference with these structures of knowledge is deemed to be an attack 
on the integrity of the profession. In addition, doctors place strong reliance on the individual 
nature of the relationship between doctor and patient. They have sworn the Hippocratic Oath, 
which means that they must always act in the best interests of the individual patient. This is one 
of the founding pillars of medical practice. The primary “standard” among medical doctors is 
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that the interests of the individual patient should always prevail over existing standards or 
guidelines. 
These two principles – professional autonomy and individualism – could appear to be 
fundamentally inconsistent with any kind of attempt to standardise medical practice. At the same 
time, doctors also recognise that it is in the interests of patients to share medical knowledge and 
to create medical standards with guidelines on best practice.156 However, these standardisation 
activities are a special kind of standardisation and are based on two fundamental pillars.157 Firstly, 
the development of medical standards should be in the exclusive control of the medical 
profession itself. The creation of medical standards is an evidence-based medical science for 
which only the medical profession has the necessary knowledge and experience. The inclusion of 
other, non-medical interests in the creation of medical standards would not be in the best 
interests of patients and would not result in the provision of optimum medical care.158 Secondly, 
the standards developed by the medical profession should not obtain strict binding force. This is 
because they are always inferior to the primary standard among doctors – that the individual 
patient should be treated as an individual case and in their best interests. As a consequence, a 
doctor must always be able to reject a standard and to depart from a standard in the best 
interests of the individual patient.159 The medical profession has developed a principle for this: 
the “comply or explain” principle. This means that doctors are in principle expected to comply 
with existing medical standards. There is a presumption of compliance. At the same time, it must 
always be possible for doctors to refuse to follow a particular standard in an individual case. 
However, in such a case, there is a professional burden on the doctor to explain why the 
standard was not followed in the circumstances of an individual patient.160 
In the Cleft Lip Surgery example, the key problem is that there are many medical standards 
which deal with aspects of the treatment of babies born with cleft lips. There are both 
international, European and national standards for cleft lip treatment. This is the direct result of 
the fact that there is very little consensus about how babies with cleft lips should be treated. In 
Member States with less medical expertise, such as in Eastern Europe, this could lead to 
uncertainty about which guidelines should be applied and a preference for minimum standards 
which would reduce costs. Furthermore, there are simply fewer guidelines in the new Member 
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States. Therefore, the European standardisation process through CEN is used as a facilitator to 
bring some order in the existing medical standards and to assist the new Member States with 
adopting a coherent and good quality guideline. CEN could help to provide substance to the 
concept of international scientific evidence developed by the CJEU.161 However, at the same 
time, the process has shown that if there is insufficient agreement about the status of 
international science European standardisation is unlikely to be successful. Although Bulgaria 
and Romania would benefit from more international input in medical standardisation, there are 
insufficient incentives for medical professionals in other Member States to export their 
international science to the new Member States. Furthermore, they do not believe that European 
standardisation through CEN would be the right way to do this, since the standardisation 
process through CEN does not have sufficient safeguards to guarantee that the standards which 
are produced are evidence-based.  
The situation is different for the Aesthetic Surgery Services project. The problem there is that 
aesthetic surgery has emerged as a new field of medicine. Practitioners in this new sector do not 
feel bound by existing medical standards because they do not cover their new specialty. The 
medical professional associations deny that there is a lacuna because they do not consider 
aesthetic surgery as a separate specialty – the sector is already sufficiently covered by medical 
standards for, by way of example, plastic surgery, ENT surgery and dermatology. From that 
perspective, European standardisation through CEN would be unnecessary and a threat to 
existing medical standards. At the same time, those in favour of the standardisation process 
argue that market forces have resulted in dangerous practices in the aesthetic surgery sector and 
that, with the traditional medical standardisation routes being blocked by the professional 
associations, European standardisation through CEN has become the only realistic alternative to 
impose some regulation on a sector which has de facto become self-standing. 
With respect to methodology, most Member States or associations of medical professionals have 
developed methods to ensure that any medical standards are based on sound medical evidence.162 
This methodology has been adopted from institutes in the United States, which were 
frontrunners in the field of evidence-based medicine. 163  The medical standardisation process will 
start with a thorough search of the available medical literature on the topic of the standardisation 
process. After the search for literature, the participants in the standardisation process have to 
make a qualitative analysis of the literature. They have to decide, on the basis of their 
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professional judgment, which studies are relevant and which studies are not relevant, and they 
have to decide which studies provide sufficient medical and scientific basis to serve as inspiration 
for the standardisation process.164 It is expected that throughout the standard references are 
made to the relevant literature. Furthermore, the standard has to explain how the literature 
supports the guidance, or why a particular study or strand of the literature has not been followed 
in the standard.165 All of this means that scientific evidence plays a key role in medical 
standardisation. The parties which are involved in medical standardisation still need to reach 
consensus on the basis of the literature, and they are also expected to use their professional 
judgment to decide on the weight of the literature, but the consensus has to be based on 
scientific evidence. No such requirements exist for European standardisation through CEN. 
Although medical literature will play a role in the process, the process is inherently less scientific. 
The safeguards which exist in traditional medical standardisation do not exist in European 
standardisation.  
 
This is readily acknowledged by participants in European standardisation processes in the 
healthcare sector – the evidence-based nature of the European standard for Aesthetic Surgery 
Services is rather slim.166 Their response to any criticism is that European standardisation 
through CEN is a different kind of medical standardisation which does not focus on the medical 
procedure, but more on the entire process of the doctor-patient relationship.167 The standards 
would not be about how the doctor should treat the patient, but more about the entire 
relationship between patient and doctor. This relationship involves many issues which are not 
scientific and which do not have to be evidence-based. The question what information should be 
provided to patients and what facilities should be offered to patients does not (always) have to be 
evidence-based. Such European standards would then be supplementary, or additional, to 
evidence-based medical standards. However, the medical profession claims that it is never 
entirely possible to distinguish between procedure and process. Furthermore, such process-based 
standards have a direct impact on the medical procedure. There is a real risk that European 
standardisation could be used to circumvent traditional medical standardisation and to impose 
standards which could not realistically be made through traditional medical standardisation.168 
This is confirmed by some other recent European standardisation initiatives in the healthcare 
                                                          
164 P. Shekelle, above n 160. See also J. van Everdingen et al. (eds.), above n 159, 145-157.  
165 J. van Everdingen et al. (eds.), above n 159, 158-171. 
166 Interview with Chairman of Dutch Mirror Committee for Aesthetic Surgery Services (Goes) on 29 December 
2012 and Interview with ASI (Vienna) on 12 November 2012. 
167 Ibid. 




sector. The chiropractors were the first profession to make a healthcare services standard 
through CEN and the osteopaths are now following.169 For these professions, European 
standardisation is considered to be a route to provide a sense of professional legitimacy to 
healthcare services which are not evidence-based.170 While this should not be a direct problem 
for the medical profession, it becomes more of a problem when the medical profession itself 
directly engages in European standardisation, such as in the Aesthetic Surgery Services project. 
 
Another element of traditional medical standardisation which cannot be accommodated in the 
European standardisation process is authorisation. For evidence-based medical standards, 
authorisation, or verification, by the appropriate medical associations is a key requirement to the 
standard obtaining a status as the relevant professional standard.171 This is both from the 
professional as well as from the legal point of view.172 The standard must have been accepted by 
the profession as the appropriate standard before it comes into force in the sector. There is no 
such requirement for European standardisation. In fact, in the examples discussed above, the 
interaction between the European standardisation and the relevant medical associations was 
extremely tense. It would be highly unlikely that authorisation would take place after the strong 
objections from within the profession. Therefore, this makes it less likely that the European 
standard will be applied in the regulation of healthcare services at the national level. 
 
b. European standardisation and de-professionalisation of the medical profession 
 
Closely linked to the discussion of the non-evidence-based nature of European standardisation is 
the argument that European standardisation would lead to de-professionalisation of the medical 
profession. This has become evident in the standardisation process for Aesthetic Surgery 
Services. There is a real fear among the medical profession that European standardisation would 
be used as a tool for anti-competitive protectionism. This is particularly caused by the fact that 
aesthetic surgery services are provided in a market. Such protectionism would very much reduce 
medicine to all other services which are exposed to market forces. It would very much place 
medicine on the same level as those services regulated by the Services Directive 2006.173 
However, for parties like UEMS and CPME, this is no justification to allow aesthetic surgery to 
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escape the traditional structures of medical standardisation. This is because the treatments will 
still be provided by medical doctors who should be bound by professional and ethical 
obligations.174 Professionalisation requires that doctors acting on a market should not abandon 
their professional hat and simply change it for a business hat. The fact that the treatments might 
be subject to market forces is not sufficient to allow them to use European standardisation.  
The nature of the European standardisation process facilitates de-professionalisation, not only 
because of the lack of scientific evidence, but also because all interested parties can freely 
participate. This has resulted in a difficult paradox in the European standardisation process for 
Aesthetic Surgery Services. The process has been started to regulate the competence of medical 
professionals on the market and to increase transparency in a market in which many providers 
with different qualifications are operating. The Chairman of the Dutch mirror committee for 
aesthetic surgery services described this situation as a market with “good guys and bad guys”.175 
Traditional medical standardisation has been unable to deal with this situation.176 As a 
consequence, it became legitimate to escape the structures of medical standardisation to attempt 
to find a solution through external mechanisms such as CEN. This has to be done in order to be 
able to protect the integrity of the medical profession itself. At the same time, in order to do this, 
they have to surrender part of their professionalisation by sitting around the table with 
practitioners who are acting as pure market players and who are also able to participate in the 
European standardisation process. Sometimes these practitioners are not even medical 
professionals – they often do not have the necessary qualifications to do what they are doing and 
they do not feel bound by professional or ethical obligations. In order to reach agreement with 
these practitioners, the more traditional medical professionals have to abandon some of their 
own professionalisation. At the same time, the dialogue with the market players is used to 
attempt to impose a process of professionalisation on them. That could again be considered as 
an ultimate indication of professionalism. It would mean that “the bad guys” would no longer be 
able to perform certain treatments, or at least that the standard would reject the possibility of 
these treatments being performed by them. This professional starting point will always result in a 
compromise, but at least the underlying intention has been to approach professionalisation as 
closely as possible. 
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c. The role of public authorities and the protection of national legislation in 
European standardisation 
 
Another important aspect of European standardisation in the healthcare sector is to what extent 
public authorities play a role in it, and to what extent European standardisation is regarded as a 
threat to national regulatory frameworks for medical standardisation, which are under strict 
public control in a number of Member States. It has already been noted that these national 
regulatory frameworks are starting to open up to the market, which also means that European 
standardisation through CEN could become a more realistic possibility. Public authorities have 
to respond to this. The role of public authorities in the standardisation process for Aesthetic 
Surgery Services is important. In particular, the French position was very much based on 
protection of the national legislation.177 The position of national public authorities was even 
more obvious in the Cleft Lip Surgery process. Here, the French Ministry of Health directly 
intervened to object to the standardisation process.178 This position has been made more explicit 
in some of the comments which were made when the national standardisation organisations 
voted on the proposal for a Cleft Lip Surgery standard. In particular, the French position should 
be noted: 
 
“Such a topic is considered as a very sensitive one linked to the patient safety. This is why in France the 
management of cleft lip and palate falls within the remit of the public authorities in charge of the health system, 
organised by dedicated regulations. Moreover, the production of recommendations for good practices that contribute 
to the continuous improvement of quality and safety of care is in the competence of an administrative and 
independent scientific authority (the Haute Autorité de Santé)”179 
 
This comment illustrates a “competence justification” used by Member States – also by Spain 
and Finland for the Cleft Lip Surgery proposal – to refuse to engage with European 
standardisation. There is no engagement with the substantive provisions of the proposed 
European standard. The simple existence of national regulatory competence is sufficient to reject 
the possibility of European standardisation. In this particular example, the invoked clash is also 
framed as a clash between private regulation and public legislation. In that respect, it is important 
that France has in a way “publicised” traditional medical standardisation by creating an authority 
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and a public regulatory framework through which medical standards are made. As a result, it 
could be claimed that in France the medical profession has already surrendered some of its 
professional autonomy.  
The Haute Autorité de Santé (“HAS”) is responsible for the supervision of the quality of 
healthcare services in France.180 Although it is not strictly speaking a Government body, it is a 
public body on which the French State exercises significant influence. The French State appoints 
delegates to the Board of HAS. The majority of the budget of HAS comes from licence fees for 
the advertisement of medication, grants from health insurers and from the French State. HAS is 
responsible for the supervision and certification of hospitals, individual doctors and for the 
development of scientific healthcare standards. These standards are being developed within the 
organisational structure of HAS. The initiative for a standard can be taken by the Ministry of 
Health, scientific organisations or HAS itself. HAS can decide to outsource the making of a 
particular standard, but it will always remain fully responsible for the final instrument. Medical 
doctors are brought within the organisation to work in committees within HAS to develop 
standards. They will usually be joined by public officials and health economists. As a result, it can 
reasonably be concluded that the medical profession has surrendered at least some of its 
autonomy. At the same time, it should be noted that the medical profession has never been 
completely autonomous vis-à-vis the State and that the medical aspects of the standardisation 
process are likely to remain within the exclusive control of the medical profession. 
The French comments provide evidence that the French State is able to impose its views on 
AFNOR, the French standardisation organisation. In an indirect way, this has an impact at the 
European level. It shows that an initiative for European regulation of a private nature does not 
take away the competence of the State to control regulation in the healthcare sector. If the 
cooperation between public and private parties in medical standardisation at the national level is 
hierarchical, this hierarchy will effectively be transplanted to the European level. This might be 
specific for the regulation of healthcare services, for which the State is still assuming the main 
responsibility at the national level. However, the French and Spanish reactions clearly show that 
if the regulation of a particular service is still vertically, or hierarchically, controlled by the State at 
the national level, this position can be effectively enforced at the European level too. Essentially, 
what this means is that the CEN standardisation process is not sufficiently transnational to take 
matters out of the control of the State. The State is able to “infiltrate” in the standardisation 
process and protect the hierarchical nature of national regulation. This is not the same for all 
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Member States. For example, in the UK and in the Netherlands, the State, public bodies or 
agencies do not have the same influence on national standardisation organisations.181 
 
d. European healthcare standards vis-à-vis national healthcare standards  
 
Finally, a common objection to European standardisation in the healthcare sector is the 
argument that European standards would be unnecessary or undesirable because there are 
already sufficient and adequate national standards. With the Cleft Lip Surgery proposal, some 
Member States took the position that there was no need for a European standard, since they 
already had national standards which were perfectly capable of guaranteeing good quality 
healthcare.182 The creation of European standards would be a risk to these national standards, as 
it could result in the lowest common denominator. If there are Member States which feel a need 
for higher medical standards, these Member States would be happy to share their national 
standards with them. This position has been taken by Germany and the Netherlands.  
The comments of the Netherlands were very clear: 
“European standardization of healthcare services across Europe is unrealistic. Healthcare services for cleft lip and 
or palate in the Netherlands is aiming for optimal healthcare. Optimal healthcare might not be realistic 
(financially) for all individual countries. European standardization would most likely aim for an average level of 
healthcare. It is not of the interest of the Netherlands neither to develop nor to contribute to such a standard”183 
 
This statement clearly expresses the fear that European standards would result in a lowering of 
national standards. A response to this objection could be that a European minimum standard 
would not mean that a higher national standard could no longer be used. The European standard 
would only provide the required minimum level of care. However, it would then be useless for 
Dutch stakeholders to participate and to contribute financially to the standardisation process. 
Moreover, the objection was based on a fear that public authorities, or health insurers, would 
“jump on” European standards to make them legally binding in their contact with healthcare 
providers.184 A lower European standard would mean a reduction in costs. The use of European 
standards would then result in a lower level of care than the level of care provided on the basis 
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of national standards. This would not be in the best interests of patients. An additional 
complication is that in many Member States there are not even national medical standards for 
certain treatments. For example, although the Netherlands has managed to adopt a national 
standard for certain aspects of cleft care, most care is still provided on the basis of regional 
protocols.185 Europeanisation of such standards would be in conflict with the principle of 
subsidiarity in healthcare and would threaten the individual or local nature of healthcare 
provision.   
 
v. A preliminary conclusion  
 
From the first two sections of this chapter, it is clear that, in theory, the European regulatory 
framework for healthcare services provides scope for European standardisation. In particular, 
the emphasis on information requirements in the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive means that 
European standardisation could regulate aspects of the doctor-patient relationship at the national 
level. However, this European regulatory framework does not necessarily match with national 
regulatory frameworks. It defers to national standards for medical treatment. With the various 
national differences in how these standards are made, it is unlikely that a European standard 
would play a uniform role in the regulation of healthcare services at the national level. This is 
primarily because the extent to which private regulation is allowed to play a role in the regulation 
of healthcare services is widely divergent across the EU. This is not something European 
standardisation could necessarily have an impact on. On the contrary, national cultures of public 
standardisation could act as obstacles to European standardisation. This would be purely on the 
level of the standard-making, and not necessarily on the level of their application. It would not 
necessarily mean that European healthcare standards would not be applied in private law. 
However, the public law dominance in the making of healthcare standards is also likely to have a 
negative impact on the use of the standards in private law, because it limits its scope of 
application. Finally, the fact that there is limited scope for private regulation of healthcare 
services at the national level will result in very few private European standards being adopted. 
This is because Member States are likely to defend and reinforce their public dominance in 
medical standardisation at the European level. 
 
Overall, two main problems with European standardisation of healthcare services can be 
identified. First of all, the European standardisation process is incompatible with evidence-based 





medical standardisation. Although it might be possible to incorporate elements of evidence-
based standardisation in the process, the standardisation process through CEN is significantly 
more political than traditional medical standardisation. Decisions are taken on the basis of 
consensus among the various European participants. There is no guarantee in the process that 
this consensus reflects medical scientific evidence. Participants in European standardisation 
would argue that they are working on a different, and additional, type of healthcare standards. 
However, this argument is not accepted by a majority of the medical profession. Moreover, there 
is a fear that European standardisation is used by outsiders – or even medical professionals 
themselves – as a justification to cut on funding, or as a tool to protect and restrict the market 
for certain treatments. In addition, European standardisation could become an escape route to 
doctors or to pseudo-medical professions to provide a sense of public legitimacy to what they 
are doing. Whether or not this strong criticism of European standardisation by the medical 
profession is justified does not really matter. What matters is that it is a genuine concern which 
means that the medical profession is strongly opposed to European standardisation. Without the 
support of the medical profession and the various European medical associations, it is unlikely 
that European standardisation will become more prominent in the healthcare sector. 
 
Secondly, European standardisation faces strong opposition from public authorities in the 
Member States. This is particularly the case in those Member States in which public authorities 
are in strict control of medical standardisation. This hierarchical relationship between public and 
private regulation is subsequently protected at the European level. The result is that these 
Member States are likely to vote against European standardisation projects in the healthcare 
sector. Moreover, if a project is started, they will send representatives of the public authorities 
whose primary purpose is to protect national legislation or regulation. As a result, the 
participation of these Member States is not constructive. Moreover, there is a serious concern in 
the old Member States that any standards which are adopted through European standardisation 
will be lower than existing national standards. This is again a reason to refuse to engage in 
European standardisation of healthcare services. Although the European standard would not 
obtain binding force after its adoption, it would be useless for Member States and for 
stakeholders to participate in the creation of a standard which would be lower than their existing 
standard. The Cleft Lip Surgery proposal shows that European standardisation is not accepted as 
a tool for development aid for the new Member States. One of the reasons is that the funding of 





In conclusion, there are a number of serious obstacles to European standardisation of healthcare 
services. They are also reflected in today’s reality – very few standards have been adopted, those 
standards which are in the process of being made face strong opposition both at the national and 
at the European level, and there are no indications that European standardisation is likely to 
become more prominent in the healthcare sector in the future. On that basis, it can be concluded 




































IV. EUROPEAN STANDARDISATION OF TOURISM SERVICES 
 
i. The interaction between EU law and tourism services 
 
a. EU competences in tourism and EU tourism policy 
The focus of this chapter is on tourists once they have arrived at the destination of their holiday. 
Since tourists normally have to travel some distance to their holiday destination, transport is an 
important element of tourism services. Since the EU is well aware of the implications of these 
activities for free movement, it has created an elaborated legal framework for transport services,1 
in particular for air transport.2 This framework has been based on the specific competences of 
the EU in transport.3 The standards of care expected from transport providers and the level of 
protection provided to travellers have been almost exhaustively laid down in European 
legislation. Because the legal framework is so well-developed at the European level, there is very 
limited scope and need for European standardisation. This is not the case for other core services 
related to tourism, such as hotel services or restaurant services. Here, the EU has for a long time 
not enjoyed any specific competence and most of the legal regulation of tourism services has 
been introduced at the national level by the Member States. 
However, it should immediately be emphasised that, unlike patients in the previous chapter, 
tourists have always been likely to get involved in cross-border activity. This is simply based on 
the nature of tourism services. Although many tourists will travel to destinations within their 
own Member States, other tourists, especially in the smaller Member States, will travel across 
borders to their destinations. This means that tourism services are likely to engage issues of free 
movement of services between the EU Member States.4 As a consequence, the EU’s competence 
to improve and regulate the internal market becomes applicable. It also means that it is possible 
for the Commission to issue mandates for European standardisation projects on tourism 
services. Although there has, until the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, not been any specific 
EU competence in tourism, its internal market competence has been used to regulate aspects of 
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tourism services. The primary example is the Package Travel Directive,5 which will be discussed 
in detail below. Furthermore, if a comparison with healthcare services is made, the national 
regulation of tourism services is not so different and complicated that regulatory intervention by 
the EU is deemed undesirable. However, at the same time, tourism services are very context-
specific and very diverse. In fact, diversity is one of the very reasons why tourists move across 
borders. As a consequence, it becomes extremely important for the EU to respect subsidiarity 
and proportionality in the adoption of legislative or policy instruments. Although subsidiarity 
concerns would seem to be of minor importance to the transport sector, hotels and restaurants 
strive to distinguish themselves on the basis of national or even regional characteristics.6 Cross-
border movement in tourism takes place not because tourists expect to find similar standards or 
characteristics at their holiday destination – on the contrary, the attraction of tourism services is 
the differences between the various holiday destinations. Furthermore, the Internet has made the 
tourism sector a much more transparent market in which customers are able to make informed 
choices.7 From that perspective, regulatory intervention at the European level becomes less 
desirable. However, at the same time, it should be emphasised that diversity should not serve as 
an excuse to refuse to regulate safety aspects of tourism services. Consumer protection 
organisations claim that there should be a minimum safety level across the EU which all service 
providers should respect.8 The tension between harmonisation, diversity and safety is one with 
which the EU and stakeholders in the tourism sector have, so far, struggled. 
In addition to the inherent cross-border dimension of tourism services, it is also clear that the 
tourist is a consumer. Again, this is a difference with patients, who for a long time were not 
considered to be consumers. Tourists will pay for services at the destination of their holiday, or 
they might have bought a holiday package in their home Member State. In addition to the 
Package Travel Directive, which is very much an instrument to improve consumer protection, 
the Unfair Contract Terms Directive9 and the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive10 might 
also be applicable to tourism services. As such, the tourist as a consumer is quite well-protected 
in the EU. However, it should be noted that this protection is primarily focussed on information 
requirements and remedies in case of non-compliance. Their primary focus is on the pre-
contractual and post-contractual stage. This means that the EU instruments do not really deal 
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with the standards of care applicable at the destination of the holiday. As will be discussed 
below, the Package Travel Directive, for example, only provides that the organiser or retailer 
should be liable to customers for the proper performance of the contract.11 The standards of 
care which are expected with respect to performance are not defined.12 Here, European 
standardisation could play a role. 
Finally, the Lisbon Treaty has introduced a specific complementary competence in the field of 
tourism. In the same article as the one where we find the EU competence in the field of public 
health, the EU is granted a competence to “carry out actions to support, coordinate or 
supplement the actions of the Member States”.13 Article 195 TFEU then provides that “the 
Union shall complement the action in the tourism sector, in particular by promoting the 
competitiveness of Union undertakings in that sector”.14 This will be done by “encouraging the 
creation of a favourable environment for the development of undertakings in this sector”15 and 
by “promoting cooperation between the Member States, particularly by the exchange of good 
practice”.16 As a result, Article 195 TFEU encourages the adoption of soft law in the tourism 
sector which, although it does not amount to full legal harmonisation, increases the convergence 
in the regulation of tourism services at the national level.17 The last part of Article 195 TFEU 
could be linked to the obligation imposed on the Commission in Article 26(5) of the Services 
Directive to improve the quality and compatibility of services through European standardisation. 
European standardisation could be one way to promote cooperation between Member States 
and to decide on good practice. 
The specific EU competence in the field of tourism focusses primarily on tourism services from 
a macro-perspective. The emphasis is put on competitiveness, which is a rather general term. 
There is no indication that, through this specific competence, the EU will intervene in the 
private law relationship between tourism service providers and customers. Such private law 
intervention will be realised through its internal market or consumer law competences. As a 
result, the impact of the competence in Article 6 TFEU on private law would seem to be limited. 
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This is confirmed by the Commission’s Communication in 2010, in which it outlined the role of 
the EU in tourism policy.18 Its aim is to ensure that Europe will remain “the world’s No. 1 
tourist destination”.19 To this end, it focusses on the development of a European heritage label, 
on more innovation in the field of ICT, on more coordination of information, and on 
introducing mechanisms to measure consumer satisfaction.20 Moreover, significant emphasis is 
placed on making European tourism more sustainable and ecologically friendly.21 With the 
exception of the consumer satisfaction mechanisms, these measures do not appear to be 
focussed on the private law dimension of tourism services. 
b. The impact of the case law on free movement of services on the regulation of 
tourism services 
As regards the impact of primary EU law on the regulation of tourism services, a distinction 
should be made between the impact on tourists and the impact on tourism services providers. 
In the early years of the European Community, it was not clear whether tourists came with the 
scope of the free movement provisions. This was because it was uncertain whether tourists could 
be considered as economically active, which was a necessary requirement to benefit from the free 
movement rights.22 After all, moving to another Member State as a tourist is quite a different 
matter from moving to another Member State to take up employment there. The CJEU ruled on 
this question in the seminal case of Luisi and Carbone,23 in which it held that tourists were 
recipients of services and came within the scope of the free movement provisions. In this case, 
Italian legislation provided for a cap on the amount of foreign currency which could be exported 
by individuals from Italy. The CJEU held that this constituted a restriction to the right of Italian 
tourists to enjoy tourism services abroad.24 In both cases, the amounts of money which had been 
taken would have been used for travel purposes. Being able to take cash while abroad was 
considered as a necessary pre-condition for being able to exercise the right to freely receive 
services in another Member State. 
After tourists had been brought within the scope of the free movement provisions, the next 
question was exactly what rights they would enjoy. It is clear tourists should be allowed to enter 
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another Member State – and, by analogy, to leave their own Member State – to receive tourism 
services there (right of entry) and that they should not be discriminated against on the ground of 
their nationality (right to non-discrimination).25 The right to entry is now almost exhaustively 
regulated by the Citizen Rights Directive 2004,26 which provides that EU citizens have an 
unqualified right to enter and to stay in another Member State for up to three months. Tourists 
will usually be covered by that provision. Therefore, the convergent effect of the Citizens Rights 
Directive is on the conditions for EU citizens to enter and to reside in another Member State. 
The provisions are primarily, if not exclusively, directed at the public authorities of the Member 
States which are responsible for immigration matters and border controls. As a result, they are 
unlikely to have an impact on convergence in private law.  
With respect to the right to non-discrimination, it is clear that tourists are protected against 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality by public authorities.27 However, it is another matter 
whether they are also protected against discrimination by tourism service providers. This would 
depend on the extent to which the actions of private parties are caught by the free movement 
provisions. If their actions are caught, this would be likely to have an impact on the contractual 
relationship between tourism service providers and tourists. On the basis of the CJEU’s case law 
following Walrave and Koch,28 it is likely that decisions or campaigns of associations or federations 
of tourism service providers are likely to come within the scope of the free movement 
provisions. From the perspective of convergence, it is important to note that the convergent 
effect of regulation through a right to non-discrimination is minimal. It is mainly concerned with 
negative integration through the prohibition of discriminatory conduct or discriminatory 
legislative prohibitions. However, it does not make a positive case for the standards of care 
which tourists can expect – the only guarantee is that they can expect to be treated equally to 
other EU citizens. From that point of view, there might be a role to play for European 
standardisation. 
The case law on the right to free movement of services has also had an impact on the 
qualifications of tourism service providers. The main example is a series of cases which were 
brought by the Commission against a number of Member States in the late 1980s.29 In these 
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cases, the Commission challenged the legality of national legislation which provided for specific 
requirements with which tourist guides had to comply if they wanted to offer their services to 
tourists in a particular Member States. In most of the cases, Member States required tourist 
guides to have passed a national exam or to have obtained a national licence. It was quite 
common for tourist guides to travel with a group of tourists from their own Member State to 
another Member State to provide guided tours at the holiday destination. A requirement to sit a 
national exam to obtain a particular national licence in the Member State of destination was a 
clear obstacle to the right of tourist guides to provide services in another Member State. The 
Member States attempted to justify this restriction to free movement by the need to ensure “the 
proper appreciation of places and things of historical interest and the widest possible 
dissemination of knowledge of the artistic and cultural heritage of a country”.30 While the CJEU 
accepted that this could, in principle, be a legitimate justification, it was found to be 
disproportionate in all cases. The disproportionality was based on the fact that the requirements 
would be much more likely to be fulfilled by local tourist guides, who would enjoy a competitive 
disadvantage.31 As such, a licence or an exam would not be a suitable means to achieve the 
legitimate aim. Moreover, the CJEU held that, since the tourism market was highly competitive, 
the pressure from the competition in the market would be sufficient incentive for tour operators 
to ensure that tourist guides were adequately qualified to provide their services.32 On that basis, 
strict legal requirements for qualifications were not necessary.  
This series of cases essentially resulted in a liberalisation of the tourist guide profession. It 
provoked a counter-reaction from associations of tourist guides.33 They decided to create a 
European standard for Tourist Guide Training through CEN, which will be discussed as a case 
study below. The standardisation project could be seen as a response to the negative integration 
through the CJEU’s law. The case law of the CJEU has now to a significant extent been 
superseded by the adoption of the Professional Qualifications Directive 2005.34 Tourist guides 
are covered by the Directive. It provides that if a profession is regulated in the host Member 
State – where the tourist guide is offering their services – but not in the home Member State, the 
host Member State may not prevent professionals from offering their services if they have at 
least two years of prior experience in the previous ten years.35 This prior experience cannot be 
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tested by the host Member State – the only thing it can do is to ask the service provider to 
submit a declaration to that effect.36 The tourist guide profession is regulated in thirteen Member 
States and most of these Member States have adopted such a requirement.37 The interaction 
between the Professional Qualifications Directive, the right to freely provide services in another 
Member State and the European standard adopted through standardisation will be discussed in 
detail in the case study below. For now, it should be noted that the case law of the CJEU 
resulted in negative integration, which was followed up by an approach based on mutual 
recognition in the Professional Qualifications Directive. Any possible European standardisation 
would interact with, and come within the scope of, that regulatory framework. 
c. The impact of the Package Travel Directive 1990 on the regulation of tourism 
services 
Up to about ten years ago, most tourists would make their travel arrangements through a travel 
agency. The travel agency would organise a combined package of travel and accommodation, 
sometimes even combined with specific services at the holiday destination (such as excursions). 
National legislation on package travel was widely divergent. As this was a truly European market, 
the regulatory divergence led to distortions of competition as well as obstacles to the right of 
tourist to enjoy services in other Member States. This was hugely detrimental to consumers, who 
were insufficiently protected. Therefore, already in the late 1980s, the Commission took the 
initiative for a Package Travel Directive, which would provide adequate protection to consumers 
who bought package holidays.38 Since the regulatory diversity at the national level was considered 
to distort competition across the EU, the Package Travel Directive was eventually adopted on 
the basis of the EU’s internal market competence.39 It covered a broad range of aspects related 
to the buying and enjoying of package holidays. It was clearly an instrument of positive 
integration, which provided in detail the rights which consumers enjoyed vis-à-vis the retailer of 
the package holidays or the organiser. As such, it intervened directly in the private law 
relationship between consumer and retailer or organiser. At the same time, the Package Travel 
Directive only constituted minimum harmonisation.40 This means that it was possible for the 
Member States to go over and beyond the minimum rights which had to be guaranteed under 
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the Directive. Research by the Commission has shown that this is in fact what most Member 
States have done.41 
In effect, the Package Travel Directive was one of the first instruments to improve consumer 
protection adopted by the EU. It was later followed by the Unfair Contract Terms Directive and 
the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. Both these Directives are also applicable to tourism 
services, but the Package Travel Directive is of course sector specific. However, as it was 
adopted in 1990, it does not really reflect the reality of the tourism market anymore. With the 
rise of the Internet, tourists are no longer using travel agencies as frequently as they used to do.42 
Furthermore, various new types of packages have been created which do not come within the 
scope of the current Package Travel Directive.43 For example, a number of airlines offer the 
possibility of adding accommodation or car hire to a flight ticket. Such customised holidays, also 
called combined travel arrangements, are not covered by the Package Travel Directive.44 Many 
tourists mistakenly believe that they are covered by the protection of the Directive. Moreover, 
there is a significant amount of legal uncertainty as to which combinations are covered by the 
Directive and which are not. For that reason, the Commission issued a proposal for a new 
Package Travel Directive, which would also cover combined travel arrangements, in July 2013.45 
In addition to including the new customised holidays, the proposed Directive abolishes the 
requirement of a printed brochure.46 Moreover, it provides that in cases of non-performance, it is 
only the organiser which is liable.47 This should be easier for the tourist. If the organiser is 
located outside the EU, it is still possible for tourists to hold the retailer liable. 
In comparison with the discussion of the relationship between the case law under Article 56 
TFEU and the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive, the Package Travel Directive is much more 
of a self-standing directive.48 It did not constitute codification of case law. As has already been 
emphasised above, it constitutes positive integration in that it provides for a set of rights which 
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can be enforced by consumers in their private law relationship with tourism service providers. 
Therefore, the Directive has resulted in convergence in private law for a number of aspects. 
(i) Information requirements 
The Directive provides in detail what information has to be provided in a holiday brochure, if 
one is made available to the consumer.49 The precise characteristics of the organised transport, 
the prices, the type of accommodation and any visa or passport requirements have to be set 
out.50 The information provided is binding on the organiser and/or retailer. In addition to the 
general information, once a consumer has booked a package holiday, he is entitled to receive the 
same information – but then specifically for his own holiday – in writing or by other appropriate 
means. The terms of the contract have to be comprehensible and accessible. 
(ii) Amendments and cancellation 
The consumer is given the right to transfer his booking to another person on giving reasonable 
notice to the retailer.51 Prices shall not be changed before departure unless the contract expressly 
provides for this possibility. And even if the contract provides for such a possibility, variations 
are only possible for a number of elements of the package holiday. If the organiser is aware 
before the departure that he will have to make significant changes to any of the essential terms of 
the contract, he is under an obligation to inform the consumer, who is given the possibility to 
withdraw from the contract. In the case of withdrawal, except in certain unforeseen 
circumstances, the organiser shall provide the consumer with adequate compensation or 
reasonable alternatives.52   
(iii) Emergency assistance 
If, during the performance of the contract, a significant amount of the services which have been 
provided for in the contract cannot be performed, the organiser is obliged to make suitable 
alternative arrangements or to reimburse the consumer.53 If, after the departure, it is impossible 
to make such arrangements, the organiser shall be responsible to provide transport back to the 
place of departure. The organiser does not have to offer compensation or alternative 
arrangements if the number of persons who have bought the package holiday has not reached a 
certain number of which consumers have been informed in advance, or if the non-performance 
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was due to force majeure.54 The CJEU made it clear in Blödel-Pawlik that the insolvency of a tour 
operator due to its own fraudulent conduct did not constitute a legitimate ground for a travel 
insurer to refuse to compensate tourists who had been a victim of the fraud.55 
(iv) Liability 
The Directive provides that the organiser shall be liable to the consumer for non-performance of 
the contract.56 This means that the organiser is also liable for the acts of suppliers of services 
which are part of the package. As such, the Directive has a convergent effect on the scope of 
liability of organisers. The possibility of contractual liability on the part of the organiser must be 
provided for. Furthermore, the extent of the liability has to some extent been harmonised, in that 
the Directive provides that no damages are due if the fault is attributable to the consumer, to a 
third party unconnected with the contract (provided the failure was unforeseeable and 
unavoidable), or to force majeure (again, which was unforeseeable and could not have been 
avoided).57 With these three exceptions the Directive provides a limited number of defences. If a 
case does not come within any of these defences, there would appear to be a presumption that 
the organiser is liable. 
(v) Damages 
The Directive prohibits unreasonable limitation or exclusion of damages.58 Personal injury and 
damage to property were always likely to be covered as they were mentioned in the Directive. 
However, it was unclear whether non-material damage was also covered by the Directive. This 
question was resolved by the CJEU in Leitner.59 In that case, a family had booked a package 
holiday, but unfortunately their daughter fell ill due to food poisoning at the holiday destination. 
As a result, she was unable to enjoy a significant part of the holiday. The Austrian legislation 
which implemented the Package Travel Directive did not allow for compensation for non-
material damages. The CJEU held that this constituted an incorrect transposition of the 
Directive, and that Member States had to provide for the possibility of compensation for non-
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material damages.60 As a consequence, the scope of damages available under the Directive has 
also been harmonised. 
Overall, it can be said that the Directive focusses on the pre-contractual and post-contractual 
stages of package travel. Its focus is on making sure that consumers make a choice on the basis 
of sufficient and accurate information, and that they are adequately protected in case of non-
compliance with the promised performance of the contract. However, it says nothing about what 
that performance should be like. From the perspective of quality and consumer expectations, 
this is not surprising at all. The expectations of tourists depend on the price they have paid and 
the destination of their holiday. It might depend, for example, on what they have been promised 
in the brochure of their choice. If these aspects were harmonised at the European level, there 
would be no more need for tourism as the expectations of tourists would be similar in all 
Member States. Tourism would have become a unified concept and there would hardly be any 
need to travel. As a result, it is understandable that the EU does not wish to get involved in the 
harmonisation of quality of tourism. Quality is to be left to the market. This is also related to the 
transparency of the market, which has been increased not only by the Package Travel Directive, 
but also by new technologies which have made it possible to share experiences and reviews of 
tourism services very quickly and easily at the European, or even the international level.61 
At the same time, and in addition to quality issues, there is also the safety aspect of package 
travel. Article 5(1) of the Package Travel Directive provides a very broad duty on organisers and 
retailers, which makes them responsible for the conduct of all service providers involved in the 
package travel.62 However, two important problems have arisen. First of all, it is not clear 
whether liability for non-performance of the contract is strict or fault-based.63 Although certain 
defences are provided for in Article 5(2) of the Package Travel Directive, the Directive could be 
interpreted as imposing strict liability on organisers and retailers.64 For example, if a tour 
operator has been cautious in the selection of service providers connected to package travel, 
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would that be sufficient to be protected from liability? What level of control is required from 
organisers of package travel? National courts have struggled with these questions. Secondly, 
national courts have struggled with the question which safety standards a consumer can expect.65 
Should organisers be expected to comply with safety standards of the Member State in which 
they are based and have bought the package holiday, or those of the Member State of destination 
in which the services are delivered? Here, most Member States have held that local safety 
standards are applicable, which means that an English tourist in Greece can only expect that 
service providers comply with Greek safety standards.66 For tour operators and other organisers 
of package travel which operate at the European level, ensuring compliance with national 
standards is a burdensome exercise. As a consequence, this is an area in which there would be 
scope for European harmonisation or standardisation. To illustrate these problems, some of the 
most important cases in Germany and in the UK will be discussed. 
In Germany, the most famous case is the Balcony Fall case, decided by the Bundesgerichtshof 
(“BGH”) in 1988.67 A tourist had fallen of the balcony of his hotel because the bars of the 
balcony had not been properly fixed. The question was whether the tour operator was liable for 
safety defects in the hotel. The BGH held that a tour operator was under an obligation to 
regularly check the safety of the hotels with which it had contracted. In the case in question, 
there had been no such checks and the tour operator was held liable. The judgment left the 
precise standard of care relatively open, which resulted in a significant amount of case law. 
Clarifications were necessary.68 For example, tour operators cannot be expected to export 
national safety standards to holiday destinations through their duty of care – local standards are 
applicable. The BGH itself provided clarity in the Water Chutes case.69 It held that tour operators 
owed a duty of care to their customers to check the safety of all the facilities of a hotel, even if 
the hotel charged for admission to these facilities.  With this judgment, the extent of the 
obligation imposed on tour operators was broadened. As a result of this series of cases, the 
Deutsche ReiseVerband decided to create a check list for tour operators to enable them to show 
that they have complied with the duty of care imposed on them after the Balcony Fall and Water 
Chutes cases.70 It should be noted that the EU has adopted a non-binding instrument on fire 
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safety in hotels.71 However, the impact of this standard in practice has been minimal.72 The 
Commission proposed an update in 2012 which should be developed by HOTREC, the 
European association of hotel owners. Fire safety in hotels has also been one of focus points of 
ANEC, which argues that there is a need for European legislation on hotel fire safety.73  
In the UK, courts have struggled in a similar way. In Hone v Going Places Leisure Travel Ltd,74 the 
Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that a tour operator’s duty did not go further than to 
exercise reasonable care and skill in the selection of the service providers with which it would 
contract.75 This duty had been well established from the case of Wilson v Best Travel,76 in which 
Phillips J had held that tour operators were under an obligation “to exercise reasonable care to 
exclude from the accommodation offered any hotel the characteristics of which were such that 
guests could not spend a holiday there in reasonable safety”.77 More specifically, he held that 
“[t]he duty of care of a tour operator is likely to extend to checking that local safety regulations 
are complied with”.78 Furthermore, the Wilson case is considered as authority for the fact that 
tour operators have to ensure compliance with local safety standards, not with higher standards 
which might be applicable in the UK.79 More recently, in Evans v Kosmar,80 the Court of Appeal 
held that a tour operator was under no duty to protect tourists against obvious risks.81 A drunken 
tourist had dived into the shallow end of a swimming pool whilst on a holiday in Crete. 
However, in Griffin v My Travel UK Ltd,82 a case from Northern Ireland, a tour operator was held 
liable on the basis that it, or its suppliers, should have checked the fastening mechanisms of a 
bed which had collapsed on the foot of a tourist who was about to go to bed. The bed had not 
been checked for three years. On that basis, it found that the tour operator had breached its duty 
of care.  
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To conclude, it has proved difficult for national courts to define the exact scope of the duty of 
care for which a breach might give rise to liability under Article 5(1) of the Package Travel 
Directive. Without specific standards, cases will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis. This 
will be a very time-consuming process. Moreover, it means that there is a significant amount of 
uncertainty both for tour operators and consumers. 
 
d. The role of European standardisation in the regulation of tourism services 
The discussion above has shown that the impact of Article 56 TFEU on the regulation of 
tourism services has been quite different from the impact of the Package Travel Directive.  
With regards to Article 56 TFEU, it has been argued that the harmonising impact of the case law 
has been limited. While the right of entry and non-discrimination have now been well established 
and to a significant extent been harmonised and converged, these rights are unlikely to have an 
impact on the private law relationship between tourism service providers and tourists. The most 
important impact of the case law has been on qualifications of tourism service providers, in 
particular of tourist guides. Here, it is clear that Article 56 TFEU has been employed by the 
Commission to facilitate free movement of tourist guides through de-regulation of the 
profession. The level of control which can be exercised by Member States in regulating incoming 
tourist guides from other Member States has been decreased. The result has been a significant 
liberalisation of the tourist guide profession. European standardisation could then be initiated by 
way of reaction to such a process of liberalisation to re-regulate qualification requirements 
through self-regulation. The European standard would fill a gap which was left after the 
judgments of the CJEU. As will be discussed below, this is exactly what happened with the 
European standard for Tourist Guide Training.83 It aims to regulate the duration and contents of 
the training which tourist guides should have had before they can offer tourist guide services. 
Moreover, it provides guidance on the required language skills for tourist guides. Since this 
standard was a counter-reaction to the case law under Article 56 TFEU, it is not surprising that 
its compatibility with Article 56 TFEU will have to be closely scrutinised.84 Moreover, the 
standard interacts with the Professional Qualifications Directive 2005, which came into force 
around the same time as the adoption of the European standard. This Directive provides a clear 
framework for the recognition of qualifications in which the European standard could play a 
role. However, it does not exclude the possibility of Article 56 TFEU being invoked as a means 
                                                          





of reviewing qualification requirements which are outside the scope of the Professional 
Qualifications Directive. 
The relationship between European standardisation and the Package Travel Directive would be 
different. Although there are at the moment no European standards which are specifically linked 
to the Package Travel Directive, European standardisation could be used to specify and 
supplement the duties of care imposed by the Directive. It would be more of a supplementary 
function to existing secondary EU law. Such supplementary standards would necessarily also 
have to comply with Article 56 TFEU. Their focus would be on safety aspects related to package 
travel. From the analysis of cases in Germany and in the UK, it has become clear that courts 
have struggled to clarify the precise standards of care and of liability in package travel cases. This 
has resulted in uncertainty both for tour operators and tourists, which could be taken away by a 
common European standard.85 This standard could set out the supervision requirements 
expected from tour operators, in particular the intensity and frequency of such safety checks. 
Such standardisation would not take away the need for local safety standards, but would help to 
clarify to what extent tour operators, which operate more often than not in a cross-border 
context, would be required to check and inspect facilities of their contractors in other Member 
States. 
ii. The regulation of tourism services at the national level and the role of private 
law 
 
a. The interaction between public law and private law in the regulation of tourism 
services 
It is likely that the relationship between tourist and tourism service provider is of a contractual 
nature. Unlike in the healthcare sector, which was discussed in the previous chapter, in the 
tourism sector contracts have an important role to play. From the moment tourists buy a 
package holiday to the moment they open the door of their home again on their return, they will 
have entered into a number of different contractual relationships. The importance of contracts in 
tourism is also emphasised by the adoption of the Package Travel Directive. Here, the distinction 
between ex ante and ex post regulation is relevant. In combination with the Unfair Terms 
Directive and the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, the importance of contracts in the 
tourism sector allows a significant emphasis on ex ante regulation. It provides for the means to 
enforce certain standards in the process leading towards the conclusion of the contract. As a 
                                                          




consequence, unlike in the relationship between doctor and patient, private law has more of an 
ex ante regulatory function in the relationship between tourist and tourism service provider. 
Furthermore, the Package Travel Directive provides for the possibility of ex post regulation with 
its Article 5 on liability. However, that provision is significantly less detailed in comparison with 
its ex ante provisions. The role of tort law in tourism is less prominent, since the relationship 
between tourist and tourism service provider is often of a contractual nature. In such cases, there 
is no need to bring a case in tort. Many national cases brought on the basis of the Package Travel 
Directive do not actually make clear whether the case is brought in contract or in tort. Often, 
this is not relevant, because the determination of the appropriate standard of care is similar in 
contract and tort.86 With its ex post focus, tort law is perhaps less suitable to adequately regulate 
tourism services.87 Moreover, it is often the case that disputes about tourism services are about 
relatively small amounts of money. This could make legal action, whether in contract or in tort, 
quite a burdensome activity. As a result, it is not surprising that in a number of Member States 
mediation or arbitration-like mechanisms have been introduced to deal with complaints of 
tourists. It is in these fora that claims about the alleged non-performance can be dealt with.  
As has already been emphasised above, the tourism sector is a real market. While performance 
on the market is primarily regulated through private law, public law has a role to play in the 
regulation of the entry to the market. The importance of administrative law regulation in the 
tourism sector differs across the EU. As a result, the role of the State in the regulation of tourism 
services is more important in some Member States than in others.88 By way of illustration, most 
Member States impose some specific licence requirements on tourism providers, for example on 
hotels. Through such licencing requirements, public authorities are able to enforce health and 
safety standards, or other legal requirements. There is relatively limited impact on the private law 
relationship between tourist and tourism service provider. Similarly, some Member States have 
licencing requirements for certain professions in the tourism sector, such as tourist guides or ski 
instructors.  
Another important area in which some Member States have adopted private regulation – while 
others rely on public regulation – is the classification of hotels. To enable tourists to distinguish 
between the quality of hotels, many Member States have introduced classification systems for 
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hotels.89 Usually, such classification systems award stars to hotels – if a hotel has five starts 
tourists can expect luxurious accommodation, while a hotel with one star can only be expected 
to provide a very basic level of comfort. Traditionally, classification systems have been created at 
the national level. The arrangements are quite different across the EU. In some Member States, 
such as in France, public authorities are responsible for the classification.90 Classification can take 
place at the national or even at the regional level. In these Member Standards, the standards for 
classification are likely to have been laid down in administrative acts, i.e. in public law. The 
making of the standards might have been delegated to a private body. In other Member States 
classification is provided for by private associations. Regardless of the public or private nature of 
the classification scheme, certain schemes are voluntary, while other schemes require all hotels to 
be classified. 
The extent to which private regulation might play a role in classification depends on the public 
or private nature of the scheme. HOTREC, the European association for hotels, restaurants and 
cafés, has initiated a European-wide classification system, the Hotel Stars Union.91 This scheme 
provides for the possible of classification on the basis of a common, European, set of principles. 
The implications of the scheme for European standardisation will be discussed in the case study 
below. So far, fifteen Member States have signed up and have harmonised their classification 
criteria.92 Interestingly, this includes Member States with both public and private classification 
schemes. Apparently, the fact that classification schemes were administered through public law 
did not necessarily form an obstacle to the use of private regulation in the standard-setting 
process. However, it should be noted that none of the southern Member States, with the 
exception of Greece, have signed up to the Hotel Stars Union. Most of the Member States which 
have signed up to the scheme are Nordic or Central European. 
b. European standardisation in national regulation of tourism services 
In the national regulatory frameworks for tourism services, what role could there be for 
European standards? Tourism is not only a market – it is also a truly European market. As has 
been illustrated above, the density of the national regulatory frameworks is not such that there is 
no scope for private regulation. Furthermore, public law and private law have relatively different 
roles to play in the regulation of tourism services. While public law focusses on the entrance of 
tourism service providers to the market, their actual performance is mainly regulated through 
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private law – primary through contract law, although tort law also has a role to play. The broad 
scope of application of private law and private regulation – in combination with the European 
nature of the tourism sector – means that there is definitely scope for European standardisation. 
This is reinforced by the fact that a significant amount of the national regulation of tourism 
services is based on a European legal instrument, namely the Package Travel Directive. As has 
been discussed above, these legal standards could be supplemented by European standards 
adopted through European standardisation. There are existing European legal standards which 
could be supplemented by European standardisation. However, a recurrent theme throughout 
this chapter is that stakeholders in the tourism sector are afraid of too much standardisation 
since it would threaten national and regional diversity of tourism services. Diversity at the 
national or regional level acts as an obstacle to European standardisation.93 Diversity has to be 
linked to quality. In the tourism sector, it is claimed that there is sufficient transparency for 
tourists to make judgments about quality without a need for European standardisation. 
However, quality is also closely linked to safety. The Package Travel Directive leaves scope for 
standardisation of safety aspects of tourism services. While the European (and international) 
standards on scuba diving do deal with safety aspects of scuba diving,94  there is much more 
scope for European standardisation of the safety of services. In the next section, two case studies 
of European standardisation of tourism services will be discussed. 
iii. Two case studies on European standardisation of tourism services 
 
a. Tourist Guide Training 
A tourist guide is a professional who guides tourists around a certain location. When groups of 
tourists arrive on a coach in London, tourist guides will pick them up from the coach and show 
them the main sites of London. They might have a particular area or site of specialisation, such 
as Westminster Abbey or the Tower of London. As such, tourist guides consider themselves as 
representatives of their country in welcoming and informing tourists from abroad.95 Tourist 
guide are locally established guides who want to share their local knowledge and experience with 
tourists. By definition, this means that someone who is a tourist guide in London cannot also be 
a tourist guide in Paris. Being a tourist guide is considered to be an area-specific profession. As a 
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result, tourist guides are extremely cautious to distinguish their profession from tour managers.96 
Tour managers travel with a group of tourists to a particular destination. They do not necessarily 
possess any special knowledge of the area of destination. Their main function is to supervise the 
group and to make sure that the programme as agreed with the tour operator is carried out 
according to plan. When the tourists get off the bus to visit St. Paul’s Cathedral in London, the 
tour manager will hand over the group to a tourist guide who will guide them through St. Paul’s 
Cathedral. 
The tourist profession guide is a regulated profession in thirteen Member States.97 As a result, in 
these Member States, the State exercises control over entry to the profession and over upholding 
professional standards. The series of cases brought by the Commission against Member States in 
which the tourist guide profession was regulated, which has already been discussed above, 
showed that the profession was too restrictively regulated in a number of Member States. 
Requirements which were imposed by Member States could include license requirements or the 
requirement to sit a local examination. In other Member States, in which the tourist guide 
profession is not a regulated profession, the State does not have any involvement in the 
regulation of the profession. Here, the regulatory function will usually be performed by 
professional associations. In the UK, for example, tourist guides can join the Association of 
Professional Tourist Guides (“APTG”) or the Guild of Registered Tourist Guides (“the 
Guild”).98 Both associations require their members to have passed certain examinations and to 
have obtained a particular qualification. The syllabi for the examinations and the accreditation of 
course providers are the responsibility of the Institute of Tourist Guiding (“ITG”).99 Like the 
two professional associations, ITG is a purely private institute with no State support. Its primary 
functions are to set the standards for examinations and to accredit institutions which want to 
offer courses in tourist guiding. In the UK, tourist guides who have passed the highest 
examination level are awarded the Blue Badge qualification. Sites like Westminster Abbey and 
the Tower of London require tourist guides who want to work there to have a Blue Badge 
qualification. 
Tourist guides operate in a tourism market which is highly competitive and very much focussed 
on free movement of service recipients and service providers. However, due to its local nature, 
the tourist guide profession by definition poses certain problems to free movement. This does 
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not necessarily have to cause problems in the case of tourist guides who want to establish 
themselves in another Member States. However, tourist guides who want to offer their services 
in another Member State on a temporary basis might encounter certain problems. This could be 
because of a licence or examination requirement imposed in Member States in which the 
profession is regulated, or because of a Blue Badge-like requirement imposed by sites or 
professional associations – essentially the private law equivalent of a State-imposed licence 
requirement. 
The series of infringement cases effectively resulted in a wave of liberalisation in the tourist guide 
profession. This was further enhanced by the adoption of the Professional Qualifications 
Directive 2005. The Directive regulates how Member States have to deal with professional 
qualifications in the case of establishment in another Member State or in the case of temporary 
service provision in another Member State.100 Because there are no special provisions for tourist 
guides – such as, for doctors or lawyers -, tourist guides are governed by the general provisions 
of the Directive. They would very much have liked to be exempted from the Directive on the 
basis of the local nature of their profession.101 However, the Commission did not accept that 
tourist guides could be exempted. The Directive is primarily relevant for Member States in which 
the tourist guide profession is regulated. How do they deal with incoming tourist guides from 
other Member States in which the profession is not regulated? Because this is not a profession in 
which health and safety concerns play a direct role, the only requirement Member States with a 
regulated profession can impose is that incoming tourist guides sign a declaration, in which they 
provide a number of personal details – including insurance details – and declare that they have at 
least two years of professional experience in their home Member State.102 Therefore, according 
to the Directive, a guide who has guided tourists through the Notre Dame in Paris for two years 
should equally be able to provide tours of St. Paul’s Cathedral in London. From the perspective 
of tourist guides as a local profession, built on local knowledge and experience, this is obviously 
an undesirable situation. It would encourage a confusion of the duties of tourist guide and tour 
manager, which the tourist guide profession has sought to uphold for a long period of time.103 
As a result, it is not surprising that national associations of tourist guides felt it necessary to take 
action at the European level. Most national membership organisations are members of the 
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European Federation of Tourist Guide Associations (“FEG”).104 Initially, after the adoption of 
the Directive, FEG started working on a common platform, where information about tourist 
guide qualifications could be shared. However, in 2005, stakeholders in Germany and Austria 
decided to take the initiative for a European standardisation process through CEN.105 The 
standardisation process would lay down the required training and examination requirements for 
tourist guides. It would also seek to re-establish tourist guides as a local profession which should 
be distinguished from tour managers. The initiative, which came as something of a surprise to 
FEG, was strongly supported by DIN and ASI and by various other commercial parties in the 
tourism sector – not just tourist guides.106 Despite its initial reluctance, FEG decided to support 
the initiative and the document which had been used for the common platform was used as one 
of the basic documents for the European standard. The secretariat was run by DIN. 
The European standard on Tourist Guide Training was adopted in January 2008. A tourist guide 
was defined as someone with an area-specific qualification. Its key provisions were that the 
minimum training for tourist guides was 600 hours, and that 40% of the training had to consist 
of practical training at the location where tourist guides wanted to offer their services.107 
Furthermore, the standard contained provisions on the assessment and examination of tourist 
guides.108 Another significant part of the standard was the imposition of certain language 
requirements on tourist guides.109  
From the moment of its adoption, the European standard has been controversial. The initial 
opposition against the standard came from tour operators, who were worried that they would no 
longer be able to bring their own guides to guide groups at the destination of their holiday. Tour 
operators were against the very strict separation of duties between tourist guide and tour 
managers which the standard sought to uphold. If the European standard was applied in 
practice, it would mean a loss of flexibility for tour operators in deciding and planning tours for 
groups of tourists. Interestingly, criticism of the European standard did not only come from tour 
operators. In December 2010, at a seminar on standardisation in the tourism sector organised by 
CEN, the Chairman CEN’s Technical Committee on tourism services, who had not been the 
Chairman of the committee which had created the standard, stated that the standard was “no 
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solution for the problems concerning the access to the profession”.110 Its implementation had 
been hindered by the fact that it focussed only on a part of the guiding profession, namely local 
guides. The presentation provoked strong reactions from FEG, who wrote to CEN in support 
of the standard after the seminar.111 
Similarly, the European Commission now regards the Tourist Guide Training standard as an 
example of European standardisation which is not actually facilitative of free movement of 
services.112 The standard constitutes one of the reasons why the Commission believes that it is 
necessary to review the purposes and usefulness of European standardisation of services. The 
standard constitutes an obstacle to free movement of services by providing that tourist guides 
have to be trained in the area where they want to offer their services. From the perspective of 
the tourist guide associations, the Commission has changed its position on the standard.113 While 
it initially accepted the distinction between tourist guide and tour manager, it no longer supports 
this distinction. For tourist guides, the European standard does not constitute a means to restrict 
entry to the market. They recognise that the legislation of some Member States, which was 
attacked by the Commission in the early 1990s, did constitute a restriction, but argue that the 
current European standard does not go quite that far.114 The standard should be seen as a means 
to distinguish themselves from tour managers. As such, it provides a mechanism to make the 
quality of the services they offer more transparent. Such increased transparency is necessary in a 
market in which price concerns are very important for tour operators and in which tourists are 
not always properly informed.115 
b. HOTREC’s opposition to European standardisation and the alternative of 
European classification  
At the European level, hotels, restaurants and cafés are represented by HOTREC. From very 
early on, HOTREC has been one of the main opponents of European standardisation in the 
tourism sector. It adopted a position paper on the development of standards at the European 
and international level in November 2009.116 This position paper still expresses the current 
position of HOTREC on European standardisation – little has changed in the past five years. 
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The main objections of HOTREC to European standardisation are twofold. First, tourism 
services are custom-made and heterogeneity is a key component of tourism services.117 This 
means that, in principle, tourism services should not be open to any kind of standardisation like 
standardisation of goods. This is made very clear in HOTREC’s position paper. 
 
“Heterogeneity is the main competitive feature for the hospitality industry. In relation to our services, diversity 
reflects different cultures, approaches as well as geographical situations, and constitutes one of the major attractions 
for customers. Most of them do not expect nor wish to find standardised conditions everywhere they travel. On the 
contrary, their expectations vary according to their destinations, their ages, their budgets as well as the purpose of 
their trips, be it a business trip or a trip for leisure”118 
 
Second, the European standardisation process through CEN does not sufficiently facilitate the 
wishes of stakeholders in the tourism sector.119 As a result, HOTREC requires that a substantial 
number of changes are made to the European standardisation process. It is made very clear that 
HOTREC is not against standardisation per se, but that the current procedure through CEN is 
not suitable to facilitate the needs and wishes of HOTREC’s members. In reality, this means that 
HOTREC is against European standardisation, because it is unlikely that all changes which it 
requires would be made to the European standardisation process.120  
 
In a way, this objection to standardisation is not too different from the objections raised by the 
medical profession which were discussed in the previous chapter. Although the medical 
profession invokes professional autonomy and evidence-based science as a justification to refuse 
to get involved in European standardisation, the starting point in both sectors is the same: our 
wishes are not sufficiently heard in the European standardisation process. A further argument 
made by the tourism sector is that the market is regulating itself very well.121 Standardisation 
would normally address a need to impose some kind of external regulation on the market. This is 
very clear in the initiative for the European standard on Aesthetic Surgery Services. The lack of 
national regulation, which enables doctors to use certain titles without being supervised, means 
that the market has become non-transparent. Patients suffer from that lack of transparency. 
European standardisation would then attempt to address these market failures. However, 
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according to HOTREC, tourism services are not suffering from a lack of transparency.122 On the 
contrary, because information is spreading fast on the Internet through the various review and 
opinion sites, consumers have easy access to information about the quality of services. These 
sites impose some sort of regulation on the market. Sites like Expedia and Booking.com provide 
a mechanism for consumers to give their opinion about service providers in the tourism sectors. 
Moreover, consumers who are considering certain tourism services can read these websites in 
order to make an informed choice. This review mechanism takes place outside of the control of 
tourism service providers themselves. Of course, there is a risk that they will submit their own 
reviews on the websites, or that they will encourage consumers to write a review. In general, 
however, the review websites provide informative and reliable assessments of the quality of 
service providers in the hotel sector.123 The result is that the market is sufficiently transparent to 
regulate itself – no intervention through standardisation is necessary.  
 
The opposition of HOTREC to European standardisation does not mean that HOTREC has 
not been involved in attempts to make quality of hotels more visible at the European level and to 
come up with a European definition of quality of hotel services. HOTREC has been very 
involved in the creation of a European hotel stars system, the “Hotel Stars Union”.124 This 
system has harmonised the criteria for classification of hotels. At the moment, fifteen Member 
States have harmonised their criteria on the basis of the criteria developed by the Hotel Stars 
Union. According to HOTREC, classification should be clearly distinguished from 
standardisation.125 Although they accept that classification involves elements of standardisation, 
the system has a degree of flexibility which cannot be introduced through the adoption of a 
European standard. Classification is not as strict as standardisation. It is a system which has both 
mandatory and voluntary criteria. Hotels are given points, which determine the number of stars 
which a hotel is awarded. For each category – one star, two stars etc. – there are certain 
mandatory requirements. In addition, there are voluntary criteria which allow hotels to specialise, 
for example as a conference hotel. As a result, it becomes possible for hotels to specialise in 
different services and to distinguish themselves in the market.126 The hotel stars just have the 
function of guidance for tourists. They do not have a direct impact on the contractual 
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relationship between tourist and hotel.127 The fact that a hotel with five stars does not provide 
mini bars in the hotel rooms does not automatically entitle guests to bring a claim for breach of 
contract. However, the non-compliance with the requirements of a certain star category could be 
used as evidence to establish a breach on the part of the hotel.128 
 
As such, classification offers a degree of flexibility which can accommodate the heterogeneity of 
tourism services and of the expectations of customers. At the same time, it provides some 
certainty to customers about to can expect from a particular hotel. Quality is made more 
transparent. Standardisation would be much more inflexible.129 Furthermore, classification allows 
for specialisation within its own framework. Overall, this raises the question of whether the 
European system of classification itself could be standardised through CEN. HOTREC is very 
sceptical about this. This is primarily again because of their concern that stakeholders would not 
be able to get involved in the standardisation process.130 
  
According to HOTREC, the European standardisation process cannot accommodate the needs 
and wishes of stakeholders in the tourism industry.131 It is concerned about the ability to 
effectively participate in European standardisation both at the European level and at the national 
level. At the European level, organisations like HOTREC would only be able to obtain a liaison 
status, which means that they would not be much more than an observer. They would not have 
voting rights. There are insufficient guarantees that European standardisation would always be 
based on market demand. Moreover, national associations are experiencing difficulties with 
getting involved in European standardisation at the national level through the national mirror 
committees.132 They really have to be very cautious about their expenditure, which means that 
they do not want to get involved in standardisation which would not really be desired by the 
sector. Associations would be required to spend thousands of euros just to be able to have a look 
at the documents of European standardisation processes. Classification is significantly less 
expensive and another advantage of classification is that the associations themselves pay for the 
development of the classification schemes. Small enterprises do not directly have to contribute to 
the costs of the development of the scheme.  
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All of this criticism is founded on the argument that European standardisation of tourism 
services would not really be a market-driven activity by the stakeholders. Rather, from the 
perspective of the tourism sector, European standardisation would be abused to impose external 
regulation on the sector. This position is not shared by ANEC, which has lobbied actively for 
more standardisation in the tourism sector – in particular, to improve the safety of hotel 
accommodation.133 This is where a parallel can be drawn with the healthcare sector, in which the 
medical associations have expressed fear that European standardisation would be used by 
external parties, such as public authorities or insurers, to cut costs. In the tourism sector, 
HOTREC is more concerned about certification organisations which would rely on European 
standardisation in support of their certification activities. Certification would be much more 
expensive than classification, and it would again mean that external parties would seek to 
exercise influence on the tourism sector. 
 
iv. An analysis of the interaction between European standardisation and tourism 
services 
 
a. SMEs and stakeholder participation in European standardisation of tourism 
services 
 
The tourism sector consists for 92% of SMEs. For such small businesses to participate in 
European standardisation, the standardisation process must offer certain benefits to them. After 
all, the businesses would themselves be required to pay the costs of participation in European 
standardisation. There must be incentives to get involved. From the discussions with HOTREC, 
it is clear that many stakeholders do not believe that their voices will adequately be heard in 
European standardisation.134 The potential benefits of European standardisation do not 
outweigh the costs which would be incurred. The administrative burden imposed on SMEs who 
want to participate in European standardisation is significant. SMEs would possibly have to 
employ specific persons to take responsibility for the European standardisation process. All of 
this means that participation in European standardisation is an expensive and burdensome 
activity. A possible solution would then be for professional associations to participate in 
European standardisation. However, such associations would often only be granted an observer 
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status. They would have to pay more if they wanted to have access to particular documents 
which are being used in the standardisation process. As a consequence, professional associations, 
particularly at the European level, do not feel that they could adequately participate in and 
contribute to European standardisation.135  
 
Overall, it would seem that the European standardisation process does not sufficiently facilitate 
the possibility for SMEs to participate. Attempts have been made to improve this in the 
Standardisation Regulation 2012. However, as has already been discussed in Chapter II, Articles 
5 and 6 do not significantly change the current situation.136 In particular, Article 6 on access to 
standards for SMEs only contains a very soft obligation, in that it provides a number of 
examples of how standardisation organisations could encourage and facilitate the participation of 
SMEs in European standardisation.137 No “hard” or enforceable obligations are included and, 
more importantly, the Article does not really seem to give SMEs something which do not already 
have. The obligation is imposed on national standardisation organisations themselves, not on the 
Member States.138 No particular role for the European Commission is envisaged. A fundamental 
problem for European standardisation is that the standardisation process is vulnerable to abuse 
by stakeholders who are not representative of a particular sector. European standardisation could 
facilitate the attempts of outsiders to impose regulation on a particular sector. This is primarily 
because they are no strict requirements imposed by CEN as to which stakeholders in a particular 
sector should definitely be represented in a European standardisation process.139 CEN is open to 
any initiative for which there is sufficient support of the national standardisation organisations. 
This means that if SMEs cannot or do not want to participate, it might be possible for other 
parties to use European standardisation as a means of imposing some regulation on their sector. 
 
As a consequence, the self-regulatory nature of European standardisation is questioned by 
stakeholders. In fact, European standardisation can become a tool for external parties to seek to 
exercise influence in a particular sector. In the tourism sector, there are serious concerns that 
European standardisation will be used by private certification organisations or companies. Such 
companies have an interest in the adoption of standards which they can use for their certification 
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activities.140 They would like to make their business out of certifying SMEs against such 
European standards. Obviously, they need standards for their certification activities and 
European standards would broaden the market. The fear of SMEs in the tourism sector for 
certification bodies would suggest that, while certification would normally be supposed to be a 
voluntary activity, once European standards were adopted there would be market pressure on 
stakeholders in the tourism sector to obtain certification. 
 
Finally, and independently from the fear of stakeholders for external regulation being imposed 
on them through European standardisation, European standardisation can also be used by 
fragments of a particular sector to impose regulation on the complete sector. This is the criticism 
which is being made of the Tourist Guide standard. Here, a particular group of tourist guides – 
namely guides with an area-specific qualification – has used European standardisation to attempt 
to impose a particular definition of the tourist guide profession on the entire tourism sector. The 
fact that this definition is not always accepted by another segment of the tourism sector, namely 
tour operators and the European Commission, means that the Tourist Guide standard is not 
considered to be a genuine instrument of self-regulation.141 A parallel can be made with the 
Aesthetic Surgery Services standard, where some of the associations of medical professions have 
accused those involved in the making of the standard of attempting to restrict the market and to 
escape supervision of the entire profession.142 In both cases, a segment of the profession is 
accused of restricting the market to themselves. Their justification for doing this is that quality, 
and patient safety is made more transparent by the standardisation process. As such, the 
standardisation process should contribute to consumer protection. The relationship between 
quality, safety and European standardisation will be discussed below. 
 
b. European standardisation of services and free movement  
 
Based on the inclusion of Article 26(5) in the Services Directive, it is clear that European 
standardisation of services is supposed to facilitate free movement of service recipients and free 
movement of service providers. Therefore, the emphasis of Article 26 is on improving the 
compatibility of services which should result in a minimum level-playing field for services in the 
EU. Such a minimum level-playing field should in turn result in more cross-border movement. 
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The general presumption is that European standardisation should be a tool to strengthen the 
internal market for services.143 This is exactly what happened with products in the New 
Approach – European standards contributed to the creation of a genuine and well-functioning 
European market for products. On that basis, it could be presumed that European 
standardisation of services would contribute to free movement in a similar way. 
 
However, the reality has proven otherwise. So far, European standardisation projects in the 
tourism sector have not had the improvement of the internal market as their primary objective. 
On the contrary, some of the projects seem to have created obstacles to the functioning of the 
internal market. As a consequence, it seems that European standardisation is not naturally a 
market-facilitative exercise, but has to be put in a broader legislative framework in order to be 
able to contribute to free movement of services. The European Commission is now well aware 
of this. Recent standardisation projects, like the European standard for Tourist Guide Training, 
have alerted the Commission about the potential negative impact of European standardisation 
on the internal market. It could be argued that it is the Commission itself which should take 
control of the situation by ensuring that European standardisation of services becomes more 
internal market-friendly. The most radical way of doing this would be through the creation of a 
New Approach for services. However, as it currently stands, the Commission is hesitant to go 
quite as far as that.144 This hesitation has to be explained by the fact that services are very 
different in nature from goods, and that they are much more difficult to put in a unified 
legislative framework. An alternative approach would then be for the Commission to start 
issuing more mandates in the field of services to support or supplement legislative projects. This 
would potentially make stakeholders aware of the role and function of European standardisation 
in the internal market for services. The final possibility would be for the Commission to much 
more closely supervise standardisation projects in the services sector which have been initiated 
by stakeholders.145 It should be emphasised that the Commission formally takes part in every 
standardisation process. As such, it could take up a more pro-active supervisory role. It certainly 
seems necessary to make parties involved in the making of European standards for services 
aware of the role of these standards in the internal market. Closer supervision on the part of the 
Commission could ensure that standardisation projects would not develop in the wrong 
direction. However, this would require quite an investment on the part of the Commission. 
                                                          
143 Interview with DG Enterprise of the European Commission (Brussels) on 29 November 2012. 
144 Ibid. 
145 B. van Leeuwen, ‘Free movement of services, European standardisation and private law’, in H. Micklitz, Y. 





Alternatively, the Commission could also encourage CEN, as the organisation which facilitates 
the making of these standards, to take a more pro-active role in verifying whether or not a 
desired European standardisation project would really contribute to the improvement of the 
internal market. The problem with placing too much reliance on CEN to perform a filtering 
function is that CEN has an interest in as many standards as possible being made.146 As a result, 
it cannot really be relied on to perform a gatekeeper’s role. It might even be argued that this is 
not what it should do – as it mainly facilitates the wishes of the national standardisation 
organisations. In that case, the Commission should certainly take a more supervisory role. 
 
In general, the case study of the Tourist Guide Training standard provides evidence that 
stakeholders cannot be relied on to adopt regulation which improves, or even is compatible with, 
the EU internal market. It was primarily a counter-reaction to protect the interests of local 
tourist guide after the series of judgments of the CJEU which had liberalised the market. The 
tourist guides wished to protect their position in that market. It was based on a very one-
dimensional perception of the wishes of tourists – the idea that local tourist guides will indeed be 
best placed to inform tourists about local guides and attractions. However, as had already been 
emphasised by the CJEU in Commission v France, relying exclusively on local tourist guides “may 
have the drawback that tourists who are the recipients of the services in question do not have a 
guide who is familiar with their language, their interests and their specific expectations”.147  
 
Despite the criticism of the standard made by the tourist guides, the legality of the standard has 
not been tested in court so far. Although the standard appears to have been broadly 
implemented and applied by associations of tourist guides throughout the EU, its 
implementation has not yet led to the provisions of the standard being challenged on the ground 
that they constituted a restriction to the right of tourist guides to provide their services in 
another Member State. What this would seem to suggest is that the application of the European 
standard might have been more flexible than the legislation of some Member States which was 
challenged before the CJEU in the late 1980s. As a consequence, it could be argued that a 
European standard does not constitute as much of an obstacle to free movement as the 
legislation which was challenged in the CJEU cases.148 The application of the standard would be 
more flexible. This is supported by an example of the application of the Tourist Guide Training 
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standard in the UK. Although the standard formally requires tourist guides to have spent 40% of 
their training at the location where they want to offer their services, the ITG has implemented 
the standard in such a way that it is possible for external candidates to take the exams without 
necessarily having spent 40% of the training at the location where the services would be 
offered.149 The assessment requirements would still be similar, but external candidates – meaning 
those who are living abroad – would be given the chance to take the exam without the amount 
of training required by the European standard.  
 
Another, and possibly more likely, explanation for the fact that the Tourist Guide Training 
standard has not been challenged in law could simply be that the impact of the standard in the 
dynamic market for tourism services has been minimal.150 The market, and in particular tour 
operators, has ignored the standard and does not feel bound by it. There are some indications 
that this is what has happened – it would suggest that the forces of the market are in the end able 
to overcome the regulatory power of a European standard. As the tourist guides who support 
the European standard readily admit,151 this would mean that they would have to distinguish 
themselves solely on the basis of quality. The determination of what the required quality level 
should be would then be entirely left to the market rather than to European standardisation.  
 
c. European standardisation of services and quality, safety and diversity 
 
The tourism sector provides a very good example to discuss the interaction between quality, 
safety and diversity in European standardisation of services. As a starting point, it should be 
emphasised that the quality of services is normally left to the market. This is particularly true for 
tourism services, for which the perception of what constitutes good quality tourism services 
might be widely divergent across the EU. If quality is normally not regulated, what impact would 
European standardisation have on quality? And what is the interaction between safety, quality 
and European standardisation? 
 
It would seem that, from the perspective of quality, European standardisation is not necessary in 
the tourism market. The market is sufficiently transparent for tourists to make informed choices 
about the quality of the services that they want to receive. European standardisation is not 
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sufficiently flexible to allow for diversity in the market. On the contrary, the standardisation 
process would eliminate diversity. The result would be that the market would be more limited. 
The regulation of quality would result in a decrease of consumer choice. In the tourism sector, 
classification appears to provide a more flexible means to make quality even more transparent 
without eliminating the diversity of tourism services and tourism service providers. However, 
even classification seems hardly necessary anymore with a highly transparent and visible market 
in which reviews can easily be shared on the Internet. Regulation through European 
standardisation has no role to play in this market. And when it does attempt to play a role, such 
as in the Tourist Guide Training example, it does in fact eliminate diversity through the emphasis 
on one particular example of what constitutes good quality. The Tourist Guide Training standard 
does not just represent an attempt to make quality more transparent. It equally represents an 
attempt to restrict the market to a certain type of quality. From a consumer choice perspective, 
this is undesirable. Overall, it can be concluded that if the market is sufficiently transparent and if 
consumers are sufficiently informed, European standardisation is not necessary from a quality 
point of view and would only eliminate the diversity of the market.  
 
The relationship between quality and safety is different. Safety constitutes a prerequisite for 
quality. Services must satisfy a certain minimum level of safety before they can compete on 
quality. This could mean that there might be more scope for European standardisation on the 
safety aspects of services and service providers. This is supported by the analysis of the Package 
Travel Directive, which leaves scope for European standardisation of safety obligations of tour 
operators. However, it should be noted that while there is scope for such standardisation, very 
few standards have in fact been adopted.152 As a result, it could be argued that stakeholders 
cannot sufficiently be relied on to adequately regulate safety aspects of their services. It could be 
said that such regulation only really takes place in respect of product standards, where the 
regulatory framework has been created with the New Approach and is closely controlled by the 
European Commission. While diversity can be an excuse to refuse to regulate quality, it does not 
provide an excuse to refuse to regulate safety.153 Therefore, it would seem that the scope for 
safety regulation at the European level is then primarily left to public regulation – for example, to 
the courts in tort or contractual cases against tour operators. An alternative solution would be 
for Member States to adopt legislation on the safety aspects of services, which is indeed what has 
happened in most Member States. The only positive example of European standardisation of the 
safety aspects of services is the series of European standards on scuba diving. It should be noted 
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that these standards are very similar to product standards.154 Although some of the standards 
regulate the training of scuba diving instructors, most standards are mainly related to the safety 
of the equipment. As a consequence, they are much closer to product standards, but they do 
provide an example of the possibility of European standardisation of products which are closely 
linked to the provision of tourism services. 
 
v. A preliminary conclusion  
 
In this chapter it has been argued that, in the tourism sector, there is scope for standardisation to 
supplement European legislative instruments, such as the Package Travel Directive. 
Consequently, there is a potential need for European standards. In principle, both the European 
and the national regulatory frameworks would allow for European standardisation to play a role 
in private law. Although a limited number of standards have been made, it seems that the 
tourism sector is generally not very interested in European standardisation. Service providers and 
service recipients are content to rely on competition in the market without the need to rely on 
regulation through European standardisation. The market for tourism services is highly 
transparent and competitive. 
 
One of the important reasons for the lack of interest of stakeholders in standardisation is that 
European standardisation is unable to accommodate their wishes and needs. In a market which 
consists for more than 90% of SMEs it is difficult to raise sufficient financial and administrative 
support for European standardisation projects. This is reinforced by the fact that professional 
associations feel that they are not really able to exercise influence on standardisation processes at 
the European level. In light of this scepticism, and given the fact that they are doubtful about the 
necessity and benefits of European standardisation of tourism services, it is not surprising that 
stakeholders have not been enthusiastic about European standardisation. However, what is even 
more worrying is that there appears to be a genuine fear that European standardisation might be 
used by external parties or by parts of the sector to impose regulation on the entire sector. The 
procedure adopted by CEN and the national standardisation organisations is not sufficiently able 
to guarantee complete and adequate stakeholder representation. This means that one can 
question the extent to which European standardisation actually constitutes genuine self-
regulation. 
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On the substance of European standardisation, it has become clear that the motives for 
stakeholders to get involved in European standardisation initiatives often have little to do with 
the facilitation of free movement in the EU internal market for tourism services. Although there 
is a presumption at the European policy level that standardisation should be facilitative of free 
movement, the reality has proved that European services standards could in fact be obstacles to 
free movement. This could be caused by the fact that European standardisation of services does 
not take place in a regulatory framework which is controlled by the European Commission. As 
such, purely private initiatives might not contribute to the improvement of the internal market 
for services. The Commission considers it necessary to do further research on the purposes and 
usefulness of European standardisation for services sectors.155 However, it should also itself 
intensify the supervision of European standardisation of services and take its role as guardian of 
the Treaties seriously.  
 
Finally, the balance between standardisation, quality and safety has been discussed.  An 
important argument in the tourism sector has been that diversity should be maintained, because 
it is one of the very foundations of tourism services. European standardisation is not sufficiently 
flexible to allow for diversity. From that perspective, classification provides a more reasonable 
alternative for the tourism sector. However, as is clear from the case law on Article 5 of the 
Package Travel Directive, there is a need for regulation of safety aspects of tourism services. This 
regulation is necessary to provide a level-playing field on which service providers can compete 
on quality. With the exception of the standards for scuba diving, there has been no European 
standardisation on safety aspects of tourism services. It appears that this is left by the market to 
public regulation, for example to courts, usually ex post, despite the fact that there are indications 
that the process of safety standard-setting could also be achieved through European 
standardisation.
                                                          




V. THE APPLICATION OF EUROPEAN STANDARDS IN 
CONTRACT AND TORT AND THE ROLE OF THE UCTD 
 
i. From the making of European services standards to their application in 
private law 
The two previous chapters have focussed on the making of European services standards in the 
healthcare and tourism sectors. However, the European standardisation process is just a first 
step towards convergence. The starting point of this thesis was to test whether a link can be 
made between the European standardisation process and the application of European standards 
in private law. The convergence takes place through their application in private law. This chapter 
will focus on the application of European standards to find out to what extent the link between 
European standardisation and private law can successfully be made. As has been explained in 
Chapter I, for convergence to be successful, it is necessary that a link can be made between the 
adoption of European services standards and the liability of service providers in private law. Two 
areas of private law are discussed: contract law and tort law. In both these areas of law European 
standards could be applied and could increase convergence in private law. Furthermore, the role 
of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive as a review mechanism for the application of European 
standards as standard contractual terms will be discussed. In the next chapter, the application of 
European standards in free movement law and competition law will be analysed. Convergence in 
private law can only be successful if European services standards are compatible with the 
requirements which are imposed by free movement law and competition law. As such, 
compliance with these provisions becomes a condition for convergence.  
European standardisation of services is a relatively new phenomenon and most services 
standards have only been developed in the last decade or so. As a result, is difficult to trace the 
application of European services standards in private law. For that reason, this chapter will also 
discuss cases in which European product standards were applied in private law. As has been 
discussed in Chapter II, there is no European regulatory framework which provides for a role for 
European services standards in the ex ante regulation of services. There is no New Approach for 
services which provides that compliance with European services standards is necessary before 
services can be offered in the EU internal market. Similarly, there is no European regulatory 
framework which links European services standards to liability for defective services. The impact 
of European services standards on the determination of liability in private law is not regulated by 




product standards have an important role to play in the New Approach for goods, in which they 
provide a way of establishing compliance with the essential requirements of a directive. Secondly, 
the EU has created a regulatory framework which links European standardisation to liability for 
defective products. Although European standards do not have a direct impact on liability under 
the Product Liability Directive,1 the EU has created a framework in which these standards could 
play a role. Compliance with a European standard becomes a way to prove that a product was 
not defective under the Directive.2 
The main argument of this chapter is that convergence in private law through European 
standardisation of services becomes more difficult because of the absence of a European 
regulatory framework which links European standardisation to liability in private law. The fact 
that there is no European control of the application of European services standards means that 
the application is entirely dependent on national private law.3 This is not helpful from the 
perspective of convergence, which requires a more uniform approach to the application of 
European standards in private law. As a consequence, it becomes more difficult for the EU to 
provide a direction to the process of convergence.  
ii. European standards in contract law 
 
a. Framing convergence in contract law 
Contract law provides one of the main tools for European services standards to be applied in 
private law. If stakeholders are asked what they intend to do with a European services standard 
once it has been adopted, they will usually point to contract law as a strategy for applying the 
standard. Although the contract law terminology in the various Member States is different,4 there 
are essentially three functions that European services standards can have in contract law – three 
different routes towards convergence. 
First of all, a European standard can become applicable by agreement between the service 
provider and service recipient. This would mean that the provisions of the European standard 
would be incorporated in the contract and would become directly applicable to the contractual 
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relationship. They would obtain binding force in law through their incorporation in the contract.5 
The role of the European standard would be very much like that of standard terms.6 For 
example, a contract between a private clinic for plastic surgery and a patient could expressly 
provide that the clinic and its employees would comply with the provisions of the European 
standard for Aesthetic Surgery Services. The result would be that if the surgeon who operated 
the patient did not have the level of training which was required by the European standard, the 
clinic would be in breach of contract. There would be an automatic link between compliance 
with the European standard and a breach of the contractual standard of care. In other words, the 
service would be defect because the clinic did not comply with the European standard. 
Secondly, a European standard could become the objective standard with which service 
providers have to comply in contract law. Although the contract itself would be silent about the 
European standard, the court would apply the European standard as the contractual standard of 
care with which the service provider has to comply. Consider the following scenario: a tour 
operator hires a local tourist guide in London to guide a group of Spanish tourists through the 
Westminster Abbey. The guide does not appear to know very much about recent renovation 
work which has been undertaken in the chapel. It turns out he has not taken any courses for the 
last five years. Therefore, he has not complied with the continuing professional development 
requirements imposed by the European standard for Tourist Guide Training. If the tour 
operator brought a claim for breach of contract against the tourist guide, a court could find that 
the European standard represented the required contractual standard of care and that the tourist 
guide was in breach of contract on the basis of his failure to comply with its provisions. In effect, 
compliance with the European standard would be implied in the contract. Again, the result 
would again be that non-compliance with the standard would automatically result in the service 
provider being in breach of contract.  
The third function would essentially fall within the objective standard category, but there would 
be an important difference. A European standard could also be used to specify a different 
objective contractual standard of care. While the standard would not become a direct source of 
contractual obligations, it would be used to shape an objective standard of care. For example, if a 
patient attends a private clinic in London for plastic surgery, there would be an implied term in 
the contract that the doctors would use reasonable skill and care in the provision of aesthetic 
surgery services to her. The European standard for Aesthetic Surgery Services could then be 
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used to define what reasonable skill and care means in the context of a particular case. Non-
compliance with the European standard could be used as evidence to establish that the service 
provider was not using reasonable care and, as a result, was in breach of contract. The difference 
with the second category is that the European standard would not become a direct source of 
contractual obligations, but would only be used as a “building stone” to establish a breach of a 
different objective contractual standard of care. There would not be an automatic link between 
non-compliance with the European standard and a breach of contract. 
With each of the functions, the application of European standards would increase convergence 
in contract law. The contractual standards which would be expected from service providers 
would become converged through the application of a common European standard in private 
law. At the same time, each of the three functions would provide a slightly different route 
towards convergence and would be dependent on different factors. Before this will be analysed 
in more detail below, we will discuss a case study based on the PIP breast implants scandal, 
which has already been introduced in Chapter III. 
b. Case study: PIP breast implant group litigation in the UK7 
Patients who would like to receive plastic surgery for cosmetic reasons usually seek medical 
treatment outside the public health systems. Chapter III has already illustrated the 
commercialisation of plastic surgery. The result is that plastic surgery services are normally 
offered in private clinics. Patients conclude a contract either with the clinic or with individual 
surgeons who offer their services in the clinic. For women who would like to receive breast 
implants, this contract contains both the provision of services and goods. After all, the surgeon 
offers medical treatment which involves the implementation of breast implants in the patient’s 
body. The result is a mixed contract in which both goods and services play an essential role.8 The 
provision of goods – in this case, the breast implants – is intrinsically linked to the provision of 
services. If the product which is supplied in the process of providing the service is defective, 
from the perspective of the patient, the service itself would be defective as well. As a result, both 
European product and services standards could become applicable to the contractual 
relationship between service provider and service recipient. The European standard for breast 
implants adopted under the New Approach could have a direct impact on the relationship 
between doctor and patient.     
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It is clear that, with the New Approach, the regulatory framework for placing breast implants on 
the EU’s market is complicated with a number of different public and private actors. The 
aftermath of the PIP scandal provides evidence of the difficulties which claimants might 
encounter in their attempts to hold parties liable for the (possible) defects in the breast implants 
which they received. Various litigation strategies have been pursued in different Member States – 
both in contract law and in tort law. In this section, a contractual case will be discussed, while the 
various cases brought in tort law against the certification body TÜV Rheinland will be discussed 
in the next section. 
In early 2015, the English High Court will hear a group action which has been brought on behalf 
of between 1000 to 2000 victims. All victims received PIP breast implants in private clinics in the 
UK. The cases have been brought against the private clinics where they had had their operation. 
In some cases, in which it is uncertain whether victims had concluded a contract with the clinic 
or with the individual surgeon who provided services in the clinic, claims are also brought against 
a number of individual surgeons.9 Furthermore, in certain cases where the victims paid for the 
breast implants with a credit card, it is also possible to bring a claim against the credit card 
companies.10 Originally, the hearing was scheduled for October 2014. However, the judge 
decided to adjourn the hearing – with the consent of all parties – after it was discovered that one 
of the main defendants, a private clinic which provided plastic surgery services in the UK, had a 
dispute with its insurer about the existence of a valid insurance contract.11 As a result, there is a 
risk that the group action has been brought against a business which would not actually have the 
financial means to pay damages and to compensate victims. 
The cases are based on the contracts between the victims and the clinics or surgeons. The judge 
will decide two preliminary issues after the hearing in 2015. First of all, the main issue is whether 
the breast implants were of satisfactory quality. Under the Sale of Goods and Services Act 1982, 
there is an implied term in the contract between doctor and patient that the goods which were 
supplied by the doctor were of satisfactory quality.12 This immediately shows the link between 
goods and services in this case. The claimants are arguing that the goods were not of satisfactory 
quality. The Act provides that the quality of the goods includes their state and condition and a 
number of other aspects, such as their appearance and finish, their safety and their durability.13 
On the basis of these criteria, the judge will have to decide whether or not the PIP breast 
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implants were of satisfactory quality.14 This will be done in a sample of four cases which are 
considered to be representative of the issues and which have been selected for the hearing.15 All 
four victims had their operation in the same clinic. The second preliminary issue is to establish to 
which remedies the claimants would be entitled if the goods were found not to be of satisfactory 
quality. The issue here is whether or not the victims have the right to require the clinics to 
replace the breast implants under the Act – based on what English lawyers call the Euro-
remedies16 provided by the Sale of Consumer Goods Directive.17 The question is whether the 
replacement of the breast implants would be proportionate.18 The alternative would be damages 
under common law. One of the key questions for the English court will be to decide whether or 
not the potential risk that PIP breast implants might rupture is sufficient for them to be of 
insufficient quality. That highlights one of the important issues from the broader EU law 
perspective: are PIP breast implants potentially risky products or simply of inferior quality?19 If 
we are dealing with products of inferior quality, they could come within the scope of the Sale of 
Consumer Goods Directive, which is what the action in the UK is based on.20 However, 
products which only carry potential risks might fall outside the scope of the Directive. The 
traditional distinction that quality is regulated by the market through contract, while safety 
remains the responsibility of the State through monitoring remains important.21 It should be 
noted that in the case of Berger the ECJ has more or less equated inferior quality with potential 
risks in the field of food safety.22 
European standardisation plays a role in the group litigation in the UK. The claimants are aware 
of the existence of the European standard for breast implants and are seeking to use it as a basis 
to establish the contractual liability of the clinics. They are employing two different strategies to 
apply the European standard, which can be directly linked to the different functions of European 
                                                          
14 See G. Brüggemeier, ‘Schadensatz für Implantierte fehlerhafte Medizinprodukte – Zwei Vorlagebeschlüsse des 
Bundesgerichtshofs’, (2014) 32 Medizinrecht 537. 
15 Interview with UK barrister (London) on 28 January 2014. 
16 Section 11M(2) of the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982. 
17 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain aspects of the sale of consumer 
goods and associated guarantees. 
18 See Joined Cases C-65/09 and C/87-09, Gebr. Weber GmbH v Jürgen Wittmer and Ingrid Putz v Medianes Electronics 
GmbH, [2011] ECR I-5257. 
19 G. Brüggemeier, above n 14, 540-541. 
20 Ibid. 
21 P. Rott and C. Glinski, ‘Ramsch-Implantate: Ein Lehrstück europäischer Produktsicherheit’, in C. Joerges, T. 
Pinkel and U. Uetzmann (eds.), Josef Falke zum 65. Geburtstag, ZERP-Diskussionspapier 1/2014, 137-152, 149. 
22 Case C-636/11, Karl Berger v Freistaat Bayern, Judgment of 11th April 2013, not yet reported. See K. Purnhagen, 
‘Beyond Threats to Health: May Consumers’ Interests in Safety Trump Fundamental Freedoms in Information on 




standards discussed above. Their first strategy is to claim that that the European standard 
represented the objective contractual standard of care with which he breast implants had to 
comply – the second category set out above. The claimants submit that there was an implied 
term in the contract between the victims and the clinics that the breast implants supplied by the 
clinics did not only have the CE mark on them, but that they also de facto complied with the 
provisions of the European standard.23 This means that the European standard for breast 
implants would directly set the objective standard with which the breast implants had to comply. 
Compliance with the European standard would become an implied term of the contract between 
clinics and victims. A breach of the European standard would automatically result in a breach of 
contract on the part of the clinics. It is unclear to what remedies the claimants would be entitled 
in case of a breach of this term. This is a new approach in English law, and there is no authority 
to support the arguments of the claimants. It is not one of the issues which will be decided after 
the hearing in 2015.24  
The second strategy of the claimants is to use the European standard to specify the concept of 
satisfactory quality in the Sale of Goods and Services Act.25 This links directly to the third 
function of European standards described above. Evidence of a breach of the provisions of the 
European standard would be used in support of the argument that the breast implants were not 
of satisfactory quality. The European standard would not be the only factor taken into account, 
but would be added to the various factors which have been mentioned in the Act, such as fitness 
for purpose, appearance and safety. In order to be able to use the European standard in this way, 
the claimants have to rely on expert evidence to be able to decide to what extent it can be argued 
that the PIP implants did not comply with the European standard for breast implants.26 The 
difference with their first strategy is that with this second strategy compliance with the European 
standard is only used as evidence in support of the argument that the clinics had breached the 
contractual standard of care. A breach of the provisions of the European standard would not in 
itself establish a breach of contract, but would be used to establish a breach of the implied term 
that the breast implants would be of satisfactory quality. 
c. Convergence in contract law 
The group litigation in the UK is a good example of the potential application of European 
standards in contract law. This case will now be linked again to the three different functions of 
                                                          







European standards in contract law which have been set out in the first section. This will make it 
possible to draw conclusions about the potential for European standardisation of services to 
realise convergence in contract law.27  
First of all, European services standards could become applicable to services contracts by an 
agreement between service provider and service recipient. In that respect, the character of 
services contracts in the healthcare and tourism sectors is important. The contracts in these 
sectors are usually between service provider and service recipient – in other words, between 
business and consumer. It is unusual for direct references to – national, European or 
international – standards to be made in such contracts.28 This has no doubt to do with the fact 
that standardisation of services is a relatively new development. But there is a more fundamental 
reason, which is that service providers are hesitant to make the compliance with standards 
contractually binding. The contract is just the starting point of the relationship between service 
provider and customer which does not require a precise definition of the contractual standards 
of care.29  The delivery of services requires a certain amount of flexibility which enables the 
service provider to tailor the service to the customer and to the particular circumstances of a 
case.30 While standards can always be used as guidelines, in particular for safety aspects, the 
services sectors do not consider it desirable for standards to be made contractually binding. This 
is an important difference with European standards for goods. It is more common for contracts 
in a supply chain to contain direct references to (European) standards.31 Such contracts are 
usually contracts between businesses – “B2B contracts”. The result is that all parties in the 
supply chain know precisely with what criteria the goods have to comply. Such standardised 
performance is unusual for services, which are more tailored and individualised. It is possible 
that services contracts refer to compliance with the relevant guidelines or standards in a 
particular sector, but this is not the same as the express incorporation of a particular standard. It 
leaves discretion to the parties and to the courts to make a decision about the relevance and 
applicability of a certain standard.32 This would not be possible if the provisions of a European 
standard were made an express term of the contract.  
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Secondly, compliance with a European services standard could become an objective contractual 
standard with which the service provider would have to comply. In such cases, although the 
contract itself would be silent on the European standard, it would be implied in the contract that 
the service provider complied with its provisions. This is the first strategy employed by the 
claimants in the UK group litigation. The problem with such an approach is that the 
determination of the objective standard of care is normally based on custom or business practice 
in the sector.33 It has already been emphasised that there is no European legislation which 
imposes compliance with a European services standard as an objective contractual standard. The 
upgrading of European standards made through self-regulation to a binding status in contract 
law would only occur if courts found that the European services standard adequately represented 
the custom in a particular sector.34 At the moment, there is no empirical evidence to suggest that 
European services standards are regularly applied in contractual relations. There is no consensus 
among service providers to apply European services standards in practice. As a result, it is 
unlikely that courts would be willing to imply a term to this effect in contracts between service 
provider and service recipients and would set the European standard as the objective standard of 
care. This is also one of the difficulties which are encountered by the claimants in the group 
litigation in the UK. With their first strategy they argue that the European standard would be the 
objective standard of care with which the breast implants have to comply. However, there is no 
European or national legislation which provides for such a contractual impact and the claimants 
are unable to point to a custom on the basis of which such a term could be implied.  
The claimants could argue that compliance with the European standard should be implied in the 
contract as a matter of EU law. The argument could be made that the effectiveness of the New 
Approach for goods requires that service providers who transfer goods to service recipients 
should provide goods which are compatible with the relevant European standard. The New 
Approach for goods has been created to improve the effective and safe free movement of goods 
within the EU. While it has primarily been created to facilitate free movement of goods, it also 
attempts to protect the recipients of these goods. On that basis, one could argue that the 
effectiveness of EU law, in this case the Medical Devices Directive,35 would require courts in 
contractual disputes to impose an obligation on service providers to provide goods which 
comply with the relevant European standards. A contractual requirement of compliance with the 
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European standard would raise the level of protection for recipients of goods – in the PIP case, 
the women who received breast implants. This would be particularly important if an action under 
the Product Liability Directive was impossible, for example because the manufacturer had gone 
bankrupt. This is something which will be discussed in the next section on tort law. From the 
perspective of convergence, it would be desirable if the European standard was set as the 
objective contractual standard of care because it would result in a uniform standard across the 
EU. Furthermore, convergence would be required as a matter of EU law – to guarantee the 
effective application of EU law – which would mean that national courts would only have a 
limited margin of discretion. 
Thirdly, and finally, it is possible for a European standard to have an evidential role in a 
contractual case. For this third category, the European standard does not directly become the 
contractual standard of care, but can be used to provide substance to a different objective 
standard of care.36 This is the second strategy of the claimants in the group litigation in the UK. 
The claimants are using the European standard to argue that the PIP breast implants did not 
comply with the term that they would be of satisfactory quality. The possible non-compliance 
with the European standard is used to support the argument that the breast implants were not of 
satisfactory quality. Such an evidential application of a European standard relies significantly on 
parties and courts to refer to European standards. They will only do so if they believe that 
European standards adequately reflect the standard of care which can be expected from service 
providers. This also links back to the question whether or not European services standards are 
applied by the sector in practice. In the context of the New Approach, it can certainly be argued 
that European product standards adequately represent the safety standard with which goods 
should comply. They derive a sense of professional legitimacy from the fact that they have been 
adopted in a European regulatory framework. This is different for European services standards, 
which have not been adopted in a European regulatory framework. It is by no means certain that 
parties and courts will choose to rely on European services standards to determine the 
contractual standard of care. The impact of European services standards as professional 
standards will be discussed in more detail in the section on tort law. Overall, the evidential 
application of European standards leaves a significant amount of discretion to national courts to 
determine what role the standard could play in the determination of contractual disputes. 
Moreover, the extent to which the European standards are applied would be determined entirely 
by national private law. 
                                                          




To conclude, convergence in private law through European standardisation of services is a two-
stage process. The initial European standardisation process has to be followed by the application 
of European standards in private law. Contract law is obviously one of the prime candidates for 
the application of European standards. However, the reality is that service providers are hesitant 
to make standards contractually binding. The ex ante regulation of the provision of services 
through the contractual inclusion of European standards is unusual in the two services sectors 
which have been investigated for this thesis. This significantly limits the potential for 
convergence in contract law. It does not prevent the application of European standards ex post to 
determine whether or not service providers have complied with the contractual standard of care 
or to provide substance to different standards such as reasonable skill and care, state of the art or 
satisfactory quality.37 While for European product standards it could be argued that they should 
be set as the objective standard of care in services contracts to guarantee the effectiveness of the 
New Approach, there is no New Approach for services which would require such an application 
of services standards in services contracts. What remains is a purely evidential function of 
European standards. From the perspective of convergence, the evidential application of 
European standards has severe limitations. It cannot be guaranteed that the standard will be 
referred to – everything depends on the parties and the courts to decide whether or not to base 
their arguments or reasoning on a European standard. The role that the standard will play is 
dependent on the particular circumstances of a case. Therefore, the harmonising impact of the 
standard will be limited and difficult to test. 
iii. European standards in tort law 
 
a. Framing convergence in tort law 
Tort law has an important role to play in the regulation of liability of service providers for 
defective services. Unlike contract law, which provides a tool for ex ante regulation of services 
through an express agreement to comply with European services standards, its focus is on ex post 
regulation. This means that courts are required to identify after the event whether or not the 
service provider has complied with the required standard of care in tort. Private standards are 
frequently used to specify, or to provide substance to, general duties in tort law such as 
“reasonable skill and care” or “state of the art”. As a result, tort law is open to the application of 
European services standards. At the same time, regulation through tort law has its limitations. 
Because of its ex post application, the success of tort law as a means of regulating services is 
                                                          




dependent on the extent to which service providers are deterred from behaving in a certain way 
by the possibility of liability in tort.38 European standardisation of services could then have a 
deterrent effect by forcing service providers to comply with a certain set of European 
standards.39 This would mean that the ex post focus of tort law would be combined with an ex ante 
approach based on European standardisation.  
An important advantage of tort law in comparison with contract law is that it is more flexible 
about the question against which party claimants could bring an action for defective services. 
This also means that a broader set of standards becomes applicable. This can be illustrated by 
looking at the PIP case. In addition to the contractual claim against the clinics where the victims 
received their breast implants, victims could also bring a claim against the manufacturer of the 
breast implants, the PIP factory. This claim would be brought in tort under the Product Liability 
Directive. The key issue for courts would be to decide whether the fact that a significant 
proportion of PIP breast implants contained industrial silicone gel and were at a higher risk of 
rupture was sufficient to establish that the breast implants were defective. It should be noted that 
the Bundesgerichtshof (“BGH”) has referred two cases to the ECJ in which the question is 
whether a product is defective under the Product Liability Directive if it is part of a group of 
products which are at a higher risk of becoming defective, but where the risk has not yet 
materialised.40 In his recently delivered Opinion, AG Bot argued that such products are 
defective, since they form part of a group of products in which the defect has already 
materialised. This means that the products have a higher potential to become defective and do 
not meet the reasonable safety expectations of patients.41 It is clear that the concept of defect 
under the Product Liability Directive is being stretched, which also means that services which 
include the provision of products could be brought within the scope of the Product Liability 
Directive. This is in line with the CJEU’s judgment in Veedfald,42 in which it held that the 
Directive was applicable to defective medical products which were supplied in the course of 
medical services. In the PIP case, the European product standard for breast implants would play 
an important role in the determination of whether or not the implants were defective. However, 
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the PIP factory has gone into liquidation and it has become impossible for victims to seek 
redress directly from the manufacturer. 
Another option for claimants could then be to bring an action against the certification body 
which was responsible for the conformity assessment procedure of the PIP breast implants. 
Various claimants in Germany and France have brought cases against TÜV Rheinland (“TÜV”), 
which is the certification body which undertook the conformity assessment procedure for PIP’s 
breast implants. These cases will be discussed in detail below. From the perspective of tort law, it 
is important to note that the choice for a different defendant means that different standards 
become applicable. The cases against TÜV are not directly concerned with the European 
standard for breast implants – they are not about the substantive provisions of the European 
standard. Rather, it is alleged that TÜV has breached the standards which are imposed on 
certification bodies in the New Approach. The standards which are applicable to these cases are 
those for the conformity assessment procedure, which have been laid down in the Medical 
Services Directive.43 The Medical Devices Directive provides what steps certification bodies have 
to take during the conformity assessment procedure. Since this procedure constitutes a service, 
which creates a contract for services between the certification body and the manufacturer, the 
EU has effectively harmonised services standards for certification bodies. It is the regulatory 
framework which has been created by the New Approach which imposes these European 
standards. Finally, a third possible defendant could be the public supervisory agencies which 
were responsible for market surveillance. Again, this would mean that different standards would 
become applicable to the case. It would shift the standards from European standards for the 
conformity assessment procedure to European standards on market surveillance by supervisory 
agencies. These have also to some extent been laid down in the Medical Devices Directive.44 
However, it is unclear to what extent a general obligation on public agencies to supervise the 
market, which is imposed by EU law, enables claimants to argue that they have an individual 
right to damages against a public agency based on its alleged lack of adequate supervision. The 
decision of the ECJ in Peter Paul45 makes it difficult for victims in the PIP case to argue that they 
should be individually compensated by the State for its failure to take adequate actions after the 
discovery of the PIP breast implants scandal. 
In essence, European services standards could have two different functions in tort law. First of 
all, a European service standard could be used as a sword to establish liability of a service 
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provider. A breach of the provisions of the European standard would result in liability on the 
part of the service provider. The liability would not necessarily be automatic, but the breach of 
the European standard would shift the burden of proof to service providers to establish that they 
did comply with the required duty of care in tort. For example, the European standard for Cleft 
Lip Surgery could provide that a cleft lip has to be closed between six months and a year after 
birth.  If a surgeon closed the cleft lip two years after birth, this could significantly impair the 
child’s ability to talk and could result in a claim against the surgeon in tort law. The non-
compliance with the European standard could then be used to establish that the surgeon had 
breached his duty of care towards the child. It could raise a presumption that the standard of 
care in tort had been breached. 
Secondly, a European standard could be used as a shield against liability in tort law. A service 
provider could rely on compliance with a European standard as a defence to a claim in tort. 
Again, although the effect would not be automatic, the fact that the service provider had 
complied with the relevant European standard could raise a presumption that he had also 
complied with the required standard of care in tort. For example, a European standard for tour 
operators – which does not exist – could provide that tour operators had to conduct inspections 
of the accommodations with which they contracted at least twice a year. If a tourist then brought 
a liability claim against a tour operator under the Package Travel Directive, the tour operator 
could claim that it had adequately fulfilled its supervision duties and had not breached the 
standard of care in tort on the basis that it had carried out biannual inspections as required by 
the European standard. 
With both of these functions, it is assumed that the existence of a European standard has a 
direct impact on tort law. Although it does not automatically determine whether or not a service 
provider should be held liable in tort, at the very least it imposes an obligation on service 
providers to explain why they did not comply with the European standard or why the standard 
did not represent the required standard of care in tort law. Moreover, courts could go beyond the 
requirements imposed by a European standard and impose stricter standards on service 
providers. However, the existence of a European standard would normally require them to 
justify why the standard of care should be higher than the European standard. Therefore, it 
could be argued that the existence of a European standard creates an obligation both on courts 
and on service providers to justify why the standard did not represent the required standard of 
care in tort in the particular circumstances of a case. This links back directly to the procedural 




did not have such a strong presumptive impact on liability in tort, they could still be used as a 
factor to be taken into account in deciding whether or not service providers had breached the 
required standard of care. This would mainly be an evidential function of European standards, 
which would be very similar to the third function of European standards in contract law. Before 
these functions will be analysed in more detail, the case study on the liability of TÜV after the 
PIP breast implants will be discussed.  
b. Case study: TÜV Rheinland in the German and French courts46 
As an alternative to bringing a case in contract against the service providers who implanted the 
breast implants, victims could also bring a case in tort against the certification body which was 
responsible for the certification of the breast implants on the basis of European standards.47 In 
Germany and in France, cases have been brought against TÜV Rheinland (“TÜV”), which was 
the certification body which undertook the conformity assessment procedure for the PIP breast 
implants. The conformity assessment procedure has to be undertaken by a “notified body”. As 
has been explained in Chapter II, notified bodies have an ex ante regulatory function in inspecting 
the quality management system and design dossier of the product – their certificate is necessary 
to be able to place the products on the market. Once they are on the market, the Member States’ 
public supervisory agencies, in cooperation with the European Commission, are primarily 
responsible for the surveillance of the market.48 But notified bodies still have a role to play – they 
have to undertake surveillance to ensure that manufacturers comply with the approved quality 
system.49 From 1997 to 2004 TÜV has undertaken the conformity assessment procedure for PIP 
and has issued a number of certificates.50 As such, it has visited the PIP factory a number of 
times for inspections. After the discovery of the sub-standard industrial silicone gel in PIP breast 
implants in 2010, TÜV claimed it had been deceived by PIP and joined the criminal proceedings 
against the PIP management in Marseille with the status of victim. However, this has not 
prevented a number of claimants from bringing legal proceedings against TÜV. They claim that 
TÜV has not complied with the required standards of care for the conformity assessment 
procedure, as a result of which PIP could continue to be place its breast implants on the market. 
Therefore, they claim that if TÜV had undertaken a stricter conformity assessment procedure 
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the harm to the victims of PIP breast implants could have been avoided or limited, because the 
fraud by PIP would have been discovered much earlier. 
This is the first time that the certification activities of notified bodies are challenged in the 
context of the New Approach. It could be argued that the case is only relevant to the New 
Approach, and, as a result, not of much use for European standardisation of services. However, 
its implications are not limited to the New Approach. The various cases after the PIP illustrate 
how and to what extent ex ante regulation through European standardisation combined with 
certification can be linked to ex post liability claims in tort law at the national level. The cases 
against TÜV have been brought in tort and it is claimed that TÜV has breached its duty of care 
in that it has not complied with the provisions of the Medical Devices Directive. The claimants 
argue that TÜV should have paid unannounced visits and should have tested whether the 
products actually complied with the design dossier. If they had done this, they would have 
discovered the fraud committed by PIP. Proceedings have been brought against TÜV both in 
the German and in the French courts. The approach which has been taken by the courts is 
remarkably different. While in November 2013 the Tribunal de Commerce in Toulon upheld the 
claim against TÜV and awarded interim damages,51 the lower German courts have consistently 
dismissed the cases.52 Because of the number of cases and the importance of the issues, they 
have now been referred to the BGH. First of all, the German judgments will be discussed. 
Secondly, the differences with the judgment of the Toulon court will be analysed. 
The claimant in the German proceedings received PIP breast implants in December 2008. 
Unlike some of the German and Austrian victims who travelled to other Member States to 
receive – cheaper – breast implants,53 such as the Czech Republic or Hungary, the claimant 
received her breast implants in a clinic in Germany. After a number of press reports and 
warnings, she decided to have them removed in March 2012 and to have them replaced by new 
breast implants. She subsequently brought an action against TÜV before the Landgericht (“LG”) 
Frankenthal. Her claim was dismissed on three grounds. First of all, the claimant had not 
established any medical harm. There was no evidence that she had breast cancer or had incurred 
any other medical problems as a result of the PIP breast implants. The mere risk of rupture was 
not sufficient and there was no evidence to suggest that she was at a higher risk of breast cancer 
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as a result of having the PIP breast implants.54 Secondly, the claimant had been unable to prove 
that the specific breast implants which she had received did in fact contain industrial silicone gel. 
It was not sufficient for her to rely on an interview with PIP employees in which they said that 
industrial gel was used “all the time”. It would have been possible for the claimant to have her 
breast implants tested to be able to establish the type of silicone gel which they contained. As she 
had not done so, her claim had to fail.55  
Thirdly, and most importantly, the LG Frankenthal held that TÜV had not breached its 
obligations under the Medical Devices Directive.56 It was the responsibility of manufacturers to 
ensure compliance with the provisions of the Medical Devices Directive – they did so by affixing 
the CE mark on their products. The obligations of a notified body were clearly set out in Annex 
II of the Medical Devices Directive. Firstly, TÜV had to check the conformity of the quality 
management system with the provisions of the Directive. This meant that it had to undertake an 
audit of the quality management system. However, at that point, it was under no obligation to 
check whether the quality management as presented by PIP was also brought into practice.57 
Secondly, TÜV was under an obligation to check the design dossier, which gave information 
about the contents and design of the product.58 Again, it was not obliged to inspect the actual 
products. The fact that PIP did not respect its own quality management system and design 
dossier could not be used to establish fault on the part of TÜV. Thirdly, as to the inspections, 
TÜV was under an obligation to assess whether the quality management system was put into 
practice.59 While this did indeed require an assessment of the extent to which the quality 
management system was put into practice, there was no actual obligation to test products. The 
assessment of whether or not the quality management system was brought into practice was 
again primarily based on an assessment of the paper work.  
With regard to the possibility of unannounced visits, the LG Frankenthal held that TÜV had 
been under no obligation to carry out unannounced visits.60 The Medical Devices Directive used 
the word “may” and an obligation would only arise if there were specific circumstances which 
demanded an unannounced visit. The claimants had not shown that there were any such 
circumstances. Overall, the LG Frankenthal made a clear distinction between the duties of 
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notified bodies and the duties of public supervisory agencies. Notified bodies are no market 
surveillance agencies.61 They do not have the same powers as supervisory agencies. Their role is 
limited to the conformity assessment procedure. In France, AFSSAPS was the agency 
responsible for surveillance. The role of a notified body vis-à-vis the manufacturer could be seen 
as that of a “Begleiter” – a companion.62  
The judgment of the LG Frankenthal was upheld on appeal by the OLG Zweibrücken on 30th 
January 2014.63 However, its grounds were significantly different. The LG Frankenthal assumed 
that the obligations imposed on notified bodies by the Medical Devices Directive constituted the 
required duty of care in tort owed to women with breast implants and held that these obligations 
had not been breached. However, the OLG Zweibrücken went one step back to consider 
whether a duty of care, either in contract or in tort, was owed by TÜV to women with breast 
implants at all. First of all, it held that the contract between TÜV and PIP was a contract for 
services which did not created protective effects for women with PIP breast implants. It 
constituted merely a “building block” for the manufacturers to show that they complied with the 
requirements of the Directive.64 As a result, TÜV did not owe a contractual duty of care towards 
the women. The responsibility for compliance with the requirements of the Medical Devices 
Directive remained with the manufacturer. Similarly, the OLG Zweibrücken held that TÜV did 
not owe a duty of care in tort to women with PIP breast implants. There was no general duty of 
care to prevent bodily harm.65 Such a duty of care could arise if a specific duty of care was 
imposed by way of legislation, but the Medical Devices Directive did not impose such a duty of 
care on TÜV – despite the reference to the protection of the interests of patients in the preamble 
of the Directive.66 The conformity assessment procedure undertaken by TÜV did not create a 
legal guarantee that the products complied with the requirements of the Directive.67 The OLG 
Zweibrücken reaffirmed the strong separation of duties between notified bodies and public 
supervisory agencies.68 Product certification could and should not be placed at the same level as 
market surveillance.69 Finally, and only in the alternative, it held that if a duty of care in tort was 
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owed by TÜV to women with PIP breast implants, there had been no breach of the duty of 
care.70 Here, it essentially followed the reasoning of the LG Frankenthal. Reference was made to 
the “almost perfect scheme of deceit” developed by PIP.71 Because of the public importance and 
of the fact that a number of German jurisdictions were dealing with the same legal questions, the 
OLG Zweibrücken gave permission to appeal to the BGH.  
In France, a large group of distributors and women with PIP breast implants brought a case 
against TÜV before the Tribunal de Commerce in Toulon (“the Toulon court”). The Toulon 
court delivered its judgment in November 2013.72 Its reasoning is remarkably different from the 
German courts. From early on in the judgment, it put emphasis on the fact that the risks of 
breast implants were well known after a series of incidents in the early 1990s.73 Furthermore, it 
held that the functions performed by TÜV constituted a real delegation of public services.74 This 
is in direct contradiction with the reasoning of the German courts. An important factor in the 
French judgment was the fact that the audits undertaken by TÜV had been performed by TÜV 
France rather than by TÜV Germany. However, TÜV France was not a notified body under the 
Medical Devices Directive and, as such, was not entitled to undertake the conformity quality 
assessment procedures under the Directive. Therefore, the Toulon court held that TÜV had 
breached the provisions of the Directive and had to assume the consequences following from 
that breach.75 Importantly, the Toulon court found that if TÜV had made an unannounced visit 
to the PIP factory the fraud committed by PIP would easily have been discovered and the extent 
of the scandal would have been limited. It held that TÜV should have been put on notice by 
incidents in 2000, when PIP breast implants had temporarily been taken off the market because 
they contained sub-standard silicone gel. More specifically, it should have been evident to TÜV 
that the amount of medical silicone gel which had been bought by PIP were not consistent with 
the amount of breast implants manufactured in the factory.76 Overall, the fact that TÜV had kept 
to an absolute minimum of the obligations required by the Medical Devices Directive meant that 
all of its activities were focussed on profit-making. The Toulon court concluded that TÜV had 
breached its obligations of control, surveillance and vigilance.77 On that basis, it held that TÜV 
was liable to the claimants. Experts were instructed to determine the precise damages suffered by 
the claimants. In the meantime, the Toulon court ordered that interim damages be awarded to all 
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claimants. TÜV has brought an appeal before the Court of Appeal of Aix-en-Provence. The 
substantive appeal hearing will be on a later date. However, on 21st January 2014, the Court of 
Appeal upheld the award of interim damages of 3,000 euros per victim.78  
c. The impact of PIP on convergence in tort law 
The cases against TÜV were about the certification activities of a notified body. They were about 
TÜV’s alleged failure to undertake the conformity assessment procedure with sufficient care 
based on the standards imposed by the Medical Devices Directive. Although it could be argued 
that the standards for the conformity assessment procedure apply only to the New Approach, it 
is clear that the discussion is also relevant to certification which has taken place outside the New 
Approach. The question to what extent certification bodies are under an obligation to monitor 
performance of certificate holders and what impact certification should have on liability in tort is 
also important outside the context of the New Approach. Because certification is one of the 
most common ways for European standards to be applied in the services sector, the role and 
potential liability of certification bodies is very important. However, the important difference is 
that outside the New Approach the EU does not exercise direct influence over the standards 
with which certification bodies should comply. 
The cases brought against TÜV show that it is difficult for consumers to claim that the 
certification of a service provider has an impact on the private law relationship between service 
provider and consumer. The impact of the relationship between certification body and service 
provider remains restricted to those two parties. Courts are hesitant to impose a duty of care in 
tort on certification bodies vis-à-vis the consumers of the certified service provider. The nature 
of certification is such that it creates a relationship between certifier and service provider.79 This 
is very clear from the judgment of the OLG Zweibrücken.80 It is not likely that courts will make 
a link between the standards used for certification and the standard of care required in tort. As 
such, it could be said that the ex ante regulatory framework developed through the New 
Approach cannot easily be applied ex post – this is what could be described as a mismatch 
between the ex ante regulation through European standardisation combined with certification and 
the ex post regulation of liability for defective products.81 Again, this is very clear from the OLG 
Zweibrücken’s judgment – the fact that certain requirements have been imposed on certification 
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bodies by the Medical Devices Directive does not automatically mean that they result in the 
imposition of a duty of care owed to consumers in tort. Nevertheless, it is possible to use them 
as a basis for the imposition of a duty of care in tort. This is clear from the judgment of the 
Toulon court, which held that TÜV had breached its obligations of control. However, the 
question whether or not a duty of care should be imposed remains a question for national law. 
The effect of the European regulatory requirements on liability in private law is considered 
through the lens of national private law, which acts as a filter for its application. It is only if the 
regulatory requirements are consistent with the requirements of national private law that they can 
be applied. In the context of the New Approach, this raises questions about the extent to which 
Member States have to ensure the effet utile of the Medical Devices Directive. It could be argued 
that a failure to provide adequate remedies to consumers after the PIP breast scandal does not 
sufficiently guarantee the effet utile of the Medical Devices Directive. This could mean that liability 
has to be extended to certification bodies if the manufacturer of medical devices has gone 
bankrupt. In the aftermath of the PIP breast implants scandal, the EU has already extended the 
obligations of notified bodies under the Medical Devices Directive.82 Similarly, Member States 
are required to supervise the activities of notified bodies more strictly and to impose stricter 
criteria before certification bodies can become notified bodies.83 Finally, the PIP breast implants 
cases raise questions about the interaction between the New Approach and the Product Liability 
Directive.84 If it is not possible to protect patients or customers under the New Approach, the 
scope of protection of the Product Liability Directive could be extended.85 It could even be 
argued that notified bodies should be considered as producers to be brought within the scope of 
the Product Liability Directive.86  
Although national courts have reached different conclusions about the potential liability of 
certification bodies, is clear that the New Approach has created a framework in which 
convergence in tort law becomes a realistic possibility. The TÜV cases illustrate that certification 
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bodies are held accountable for their activities more broadly than just towards the manufacturer. 
Indirectly, through the imposition and enforcement of European standards for the conformity 
assessment procedure, this development could improve the effective enforcement of the 
European standard for breast implants. The result would be convergence in tort law. However, 
the possible convergence is not based on the European standard for breast implants itself, but 
rather on the regulatory framework in which the standard is applied. Convergence is being driven 
by the New Approach. The potential liability of certification bodies can be defended on the basis 
that the effectiveness of the New Approach would be compromised if certification bodies were 
allowed to do a lazy job without being held responsible and liable. The pressure for convergence 
comes from the regulatory framework in which the European standards play a role. 
Outside the New Approach, and similar to the application of European services standards in 
contract law, there is no European drive for convergence. European services standards could 
also be used for certification.87 However, there would not be a European ex ante regulatory 
framework which would impose the application of the European services standards and which 
would provide pressure for them to play a role in liability in tort law at the national level. The 
pressure for convergence would not come from the EU, but rather from professional 
associations which would require certification, for example as a condition for membership. 
There would not be a European framework in which the certification would play a role. As a 
result, there would be no guarantee or pressure that the European standard would be used to 
determine the required standard of care in tort. It would be much more difficult to expect a 
degree of harmonisation through such certification. 
d. Convergence in tort law 
After the discussion of the PIP case, we will now return to convergence in tort law more 
generally. As a starting point, there is no European regulatory approach which links European 
standardisation of services to liability for defective services in tort law. The application of 
European services standards in tort law at the national level is not regulated or controlled by the 
EU. The result is that the pressure to comply with European services standards has to come 
entirely from the stakeholders and courts at the national level. The simple adoption of a 
European services standard does not guarantee its application in tort law. Nevertheless, the way 
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in which European standards are applied in tort law at the national level shows significant 
similarities across the EU.88  
In the first section, two different functions of European standards were introduced. First of all, 
non-compliance with a European standard could automatically result in liability in tort or in a 
very strong presumption of liability. However, national courts have not been willing to make 
such a direct link between the breach of a European standard and liability. For example, while 
the UK courts were initially willing to make this link, they have now changed to a more flexible 
approach. In Ward v Ritz, the English Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had not given 
sufficient weight to a standard adopted by BSI.89 Although they were not strictly speaking legally 
binding, they provided strong evidence about the professional standards to be expected. As a 
result, the judgment could be interpreted as supporting a clear link between a breach of a 
standard and a breach of the duty of care. It would seem that a breach of a BSI standard at the 
very least would put a burden on defendants to prove that they had not breached their duty of 
care – it would reverse the burden of proof and result in a prima facie presumption of a breach of 
the standard of care. However, the Court of Appeal has since moved back from making such a 
direct link. Only a few years later, in Green v Building Scene Ltd, the Court of Appeal held that 
standards cannot define what is reasonably safe in all the circumstances of a particular case:90  
This statement implies that a breach of a European standard is not in itself sufficient to establish 
a breach of the standard of care in tort. It is part of a bigger picture, namely all the circumstances 
of a particular case. The standard is insufficient as a tool to define the precise requirements of 
the duty of care, which means that a breach of the standard can never automatically result in a 
breach of the duty of care. A similar position has been taken by the German courts.91 That does 
not mean that the standard plays no role at all. Particularly in product liability law, the existence 
of a standard can give rise to a presumption of compliance. Non-compliance imposes a burden 
of proof on manufacturers to establish that they have not breached their duty of care in tort. 
However, the strength of the presumption will be different from case to case. Moreover, it might 
be that such a presumption is less strong in liability cases for services, in which a broader set of 
circumstances has to be taken into account.92 The result is that the ‘presumptive impact’ of the 
standard becomes less strong. Finally, the strength of the presumption will depend on the extent 
                                                          
88 See H. Schepel and J. Falke, above n 2, 233. 
89 Anthony Philip Ward v The Ritz Hotel (London) Limited [1992] PIQR 315, 327.  
90 Green v Building Scene Limited [1994] PIQR 259, 269. 
91 J. Falke, Rechtliche Aspekte der Normung in den EG-Mitgliedstaaten und der EFTA – Band 3: Deutschland:, (Luxembourg, 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2000), 349-351.  




to which the standard has been accepted as the professional standard in a particular sector. This 
will be discussed below. 
The second function of European standards in tort is to provide a defence to liability. 
Compliance with the European standard would be a way for service providers to prove that they 
have complied with the required standard of care. For example, if legislation has provided 
binding effect to standards, private parties cannot be held liable if they can prove that they 
complied with the relevant standard. However, without references to private standards in 
legislation, courts have not been willing to apply European standards in such a direct way. A 
good example of this can be found in a judgment of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal.93 In this 
case, a five-year-old boy, while shopping with his mother, got stuck between the end of an 
escalator and the floor. As a result, he suffered extremely serious injuries. In its defence, the shop 
claimed that it was not liable as the escalator had fully complied with the requirements imposed 
the European standard.94 However, an expert report had found that the European standard had 
not taken the possibility of a young child getting stuck between the end of the escalator and the 
floor into account. On that basis, the Court of Appeal held that compliance with the European 
standard was not sufficient to avoid liability.95 The question was whether the escalator was safe in 
the circumstances of the case. Because the European standard had not taken the particular 
circumstances of this case into account, it could not serve as a defence to the claim against the 
shop.96 The court imposed obligations which went beyond the European product standard. This 
illustrates a tendency for courts to consider European products standards as the absolute 
minimum and to increase the level of protection offered to consumers beyond what is offered by 
the European standard. Tort law then imposes duties which go beyond the requirements of the 
European standard.97  
Since European standards do not have a direct impact on liability in tort law, their main function 
remains evidential. Essentially, this is similar to their application in contract law. The European 
standards can be used to specify the required professional standard of care. In the absence of a 
European regulatory framework, it remains for stakeholders to use the European standards in 
legal proceedings and for courts to decide whether or not the European standards adequately 
reflect the professional standard which can be expected from the service provider. As a result, 
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the extent to which European standardisation of services will be able to result in convergence in 
tort law is dependent on the extent to which European services standards are applied as 
professional standards in tort law.98 This is where the professional legitimacy of European 
standardisation of services becomes very important. It is by no means certain that in liability 
cases experts and courts will apply European standards. They have to deserve or earn the status 
of professional standard. The professional legitimacy which is more obvious in the case of 
technical product standards adopted under the New Approach cannot automatically be assumed 
for European services standards.  
The requirements of the state of the art could be defined by reference to professional standards 
or guidelines adopted in the sector.99 There is a variety of international, European and national 
standards that courts can use in reaching a decision about the required standard of care. More 
specifically, in the healthcare sector, in some Member States, like the Netherlands, there is a 
presumption that doctors will comply with the relevant standards and guidelines adopted by the 
profession. If the doctor has not complied with the relevant standards, a duty is imposed on him 
to explain why he has not complied with the standards. This is called the “comply or explain” 
principle.100 However, such a presumption of compliance will only arise if it is beyond doubt that 
the relevant standard expresses the professional standard required from the doctor. In the 
healthcare sector, it is by no means certain that European standards adopted through CEN will 
be accepted as the professional standard. On the contrary, it has been strongly argued by the 
European associations of doctors that CEN standards do not constitute the professional 
standard.101 As has been discussed in Chapter III, this opposition is based both on the European 
standardisation process, which is not sufficiently evidence-based, and on the representativeness 
of the participants in the European standardisation process, who do not adequately represent the 
entire profession. The European standardisation process is also considered to be too slow to 
adequately reflect the current state of the art in the healthcare sector.102 Furthermore, there is no 
formal requirement of verification by scientific associations of medical professions.103 Overall, 
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for all these reasons, there is insufficient professional control by the medical profession of the 
making of European standards through CEN. On that basis, the associations argue that 
European standards do not constitute the professional standard. The lack of professional 
acceptance of European standards means that the application of European standards in tort law 
becomes less likely. 
Finally, the fact that European standards adopted through CEN are European rather than 
national standards might cause problems for their application in tort law. Unlike with the New 
Approach for goods, there is no reason for courts to assume that the professional standard 
should be a European standard. It is important to remember that European standards adopted 
through CEN only attempt to lay down minimum standards.104 From the analysis above it is 
clear that tort law frequently adds additional requirements to European standards, which means 
that compliance with a European standard is not sufficient to avoid liability. Outside the context 
of the New Approach, the minimum nature of European standards could not only be a reason to 
go beyond the requirements of a European standard. It could also be a reason to reject the 
standard in its entirety and to prefer a different – probably national – standard which more 
precisely reflects the standard of care which can be expected from service providers in a 
particular sector. For example, in the healthcare sector, in which professional standards are 
widely divergent across the EU, courts might find that the standard which is required at the 
national level is higher than a European standard.105 It will be remembered that the Cross-Border 
Healthcare Directive 2011 expressly provides that treatment shall be provided in accordance 
with national standards or guidelines.106 This is directly linked to the lack of EU competence to 
regulate the delivery of healthcare services at the national level. As a result, it cannot 
automatically be presumed that national courts will refer to European standards to determine the 
standard of care in tort. Their starting point is much more likely to be national standards or 
guidelines. A European standard would then only be relevant if there were no national standards 
in place. For example, this has been one of the reasons for the initiative for a European standard 
for Cleft Lip Services – it has been argued that there are not sufficient standards in the new 
Member States.107 While this discussion has focussed primarily on the healthcare sector, there is 
no reason to believe why the situation would be different for other services sectors. In the 
tourism sector, the strong objections to European standardisation as lacking sufficient 
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professional legitimacy have a similar detrimental impact on the willingness of stakeholders to 
rely on European standards in tort law.108 
To conclude, the convergent impact of European standardisation of services on tort law depends 
to a significant extent on their application as professional standards. At the moment, in the field 
of services, European standards are not considered to have the required professional legitimacy 
to be applied in tort law. The various problems with the European standardisation process 
discussed in Chapter II and in the chapters on the healthcare and tourism sectors come back to 
bite at the moment of the application of the standards. In the New Approach for goods, 
convergence is very much driven by the regulatory framework which has been established by the 
EU. In this framework, as the PIP case has shown, European standardisation plays a pre-
determined role which also has an impact on tort law. Without such a regulatory framework for 
services, the role of European standards is entirely dependent on stakeholders and courts at the 
national level.109 At the moment, the opposition to the application of European services 
standards in tort law is fierce, which makes the possibility of convergence in tort law more 
difficult.  
iv. European standards and the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
 
a. Framing convergence and the UCTD 
This section on the relationship between European standardisation and the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive110 is difficult to place in the structure of Chapter V and Chapter VI. In essence, 
the UCTD provides a review mechanism to test the fairness of provisions of European 
standards which are incorporated in contracts between service providers and consumers. From 
that perspective, this section would be more appropriate in the next chapter, which discusses the 
role of the free movement and competition provisions as review mechanisms for the application 
of European standards. At the same time, the UCTD is closely connected to the application of 
European standards in contract law. For that reason, the role of the UCTD will be discussed in 
this chapter. As such, this section will serve as a transition to the next chapter. 
Although the section on convergence in contract law has concluded that European standards are 
not frequently directly applied as contractual terms in contracts between service providers and 
                                                          
108 Interview with HOTREC (Brussels) on 29 November 2012. See also U. Magnus and H. Micklitz, above n 29, 
554. 
109 F. Cafaggi, above n 3, 119. 




service recipients, it cannot be excluded that such contractual application becomes more 
common in the future. In particular, European services standards could be applied as standard 
terms in consumer contracts. The application of European standards as standard terms is a kind 
of private regulation, since the standards are applied, most frequently by associations of service 
providers, to impose certain standards on service providers and their customers.111 This means 
that the application of European standards as standard terms would become subject to review.112 
One of the review mechanisms could be the UCTD, which imposes standards of fairness on the 
inclusion of terms in consumer contracts.  
In general, the review under the UCTD would be different from the free movement provisions 
or the competition law provisions. The free movement provisions are used to review whether or 
not European standards create obstacles to free movement, while the competition law provisions 
test to what extent European standards could create obstacles to competition in the internal 
market. The UCTD would test specifically to what extent a European standard has an impact on 
the fairness of the contractual relationship between service provider and consumer. As such, its 
review is limited to the application of European standards in contract law.  
From the perspective of convergence, the UCTD has a dual function. First of all, the UCTD 
could create an obstacle to convergence by preventing the application of European standards in 
contract law. If provisions of a European standard were found to be unfair under the UCTD, 
courts would be obliged not to apply these provisions. The result would be that the European 
standard would not be effectively applied in private law. Secondly, the UCTD could provide 
pressure on stakeholders to adopt European standards with provisions which were fair from the 
perspective of the UCTD. As a result, the possibility of review under the UCTD would impose a 
duty on stakeholders to think about the effect of provisions on the contractual relationship 
between service provider and service recipient. The UCTD could encourage a process of ‘fair 
convergence’ in private law. 
These two functions of the UCTD presume that a link between European standardisation and 
the UCTD can be made. However, this assumption has to be tested at three different levels: 
(i) European standards have to be subject to review under the UCTD 
(ii) European standards have to contain provisions which would be (potentially) unfair 
under the UCTD 
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(iii) Consumers, consumer organisations and public authorities have to be able to enforce 
the UCTD  
Each of these aspects will be analysed before some conclusions will be drawn as to the ability of 
the UCTD to have an impact on convergence in private law through European standardisation 
of services.  
b. The ex ante abstract review and the ex post concrete review of European 
standards  
A distinction should be made between two types of control under the UCTD. Firstly, European 
standards could be reviewed ex ante if courts found that they were recommended or made to be 
used as standard terms in contractual relations. This would be a more abstract review of 
European standards which would not be directly linked to their application in services contracts. 
The review would be based exclusively on the provisions of European standards – it would not 
be linked to the incorporation of European standards in contracts. The adoption of European 
standards would be sufficient for review under the UCTD if they were recommended or made to 
be used in contractual relations. The actual use of European standards as standard terms would 
not be necessary – this kind of review would have a preventive function. This will be discussed 
further below. 
Secondly, the specific application of European standards as contractual terms in service 
providers could be controlled ex post under the UCTD. This would require courts to assess in 
concreto the fairness of the provisions of European standards in the specific circumstances of their 
incorporation in services contracts. Such control would only be possible if European standards 
were directly incorporated in services contracts. Normally, this would require a reference to 
European standards in the contracts.  
Furthermore, Article 3(1) clarifies that the UCTD only applies to terms which have not been 
individually negotiated. Finally, Article 1(2) provides that the UCTD does not apply to 
contractual terms which reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions. As a result, 
European standards would be outside the scope of application of the UCTD if they were 
regarded as individually negotiated or if they were regarded as mandatory statutory or regulatory 
provisions. These two exemptions have to be discussed as well. 




Article 7 of the UCTD provides for the possibility of an ex ante review of the provisions of 
European services standards. This is possible if European standards are recommended or made 
for use as standard terms. The aim of Article 7 is prevention – it enables consumer organisations 
or public supervisory agencies to identify and challenge contractual terms which could potentially 
be unfair for consumers before they have been brought into practice. 
From the perspective of European standardisation, the first question is whether European 
standards are recommended or made for use as standard terms. It is clear that European 
standards are not expressly made as contractual terms – there is nothing in the standards which  
states that they are made to be used as standard terms. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the 
adoption of a European standard constitutes a recommendation that the standards be used as 
standard terms in services contracts. The intention with which the standards are made is 
irrelevant – the test for recommending is objective.113 Although the concrete application of 
European standards in contracts in the services sector is not very common, it could be argued 
that the purpose behind the standardisation process is to make standards for use in services 
contracts. At the moment, European services standards do not look very much like contract 
terms or standard terms. This makes it more difficult to argue that the standards are made to be 
applied in service contracts. However, this does not prevent one from arguing that they are 
recommended for use as standard terms.  
The second question is who could be said to recommend the use of European standards as 
standard terms. In other words, against which party would the abstract review under Article 7 of 
the UCTD be directed? Against which organisation could consumer organisations or public 
authorities bring an action to review the provisions of European standards? If actions under 
Article 7 were brought directly against standardisation organisations, this could have an 
important impact on the freedom of standardisation organisations to decide on the content of 
European standards. The first candidate would be CEN, which is the organisation through 
which European standards are made. A distinction should be made between standards which 
have been mandated by the EU and standards which have been developed at the request of 
national standardisation organisations. For mandated standards, CEN has put in a tender to the 
EU and could, therefore, be said to actively promote these standards for use as contract terms. It 
would go beyond mere facilitation – it could be argued that CEN is the motor behind the 
making of European standards and that European standards are implicitly recommended by 
CEN as standard terms. The consequence of this would be that consumer organisations could 
                                                          




directly bring an action against CEN to challenge the provisions of European standards. This 
would be a much more direct way for consumer organisations to influence the substantive 
provisions of European standards. However, since – even for mandated standards – CEN is not 
directly responsible for the publication of European standards, it becomes more difficult to 
argue that CEN is actually recommending the use of European standards as standard terms. 
Moreover, it should be noted that in the case of mandated standards the real initiator could be 
said to be the European Commission, which has issued the mandate to CEN. Again, CEN’s 
function would be primarily that of a facilitator – the initiative had been taken by the European 
Commission which would like a European standard to be made.  
Alternatively, an action could be brought against the national standardisation organisations. This 
would be most likely for standards which had been made at the request of a particular national 
standardisation organisation. Moreover, it should be recalled that national standardisation 
organisations are responsible for the publication of both mandated and non-mandated European 
standards. Again, however, it is doubtful whether the sole publication of European standards can 
be considered a recommendation that European standards be used as standard terms. The more 
likely candidates for the abstract review are professional associations – expressly mentioned in 
Article 7(3) of the UCTD – which might have been involved in the making of European 
standards for the purpose of their application as contract terms. This would mean that the 
abstract review would create pressure on standardisation organisations to disclose information 
about which parties took the initiative for European standards and which parties were involved 
in their making of the standards. The standardisation organisations could then seek to rely on 
intellectual property rights to prevent having to disclose which parties were behind a certain 
standard.114 The abstract review under the UCTD would challenge the confidentiality of 
European standardisation. It would create a direct link with the transparency of European 
standardisation, which will be discussed below. In the healthcare sector, it is difficult to identify 
associations which are recommending the use of European standards as standard terms. Most of 
the associations of doctors have opposed European standardisation. In the tourism sector, 
professional associations in the UK require compliance with the European standard for Tourist 
Guide Training as a pre-condition for membership. However, this standard is not directly 
relevant to the contract between tourist guide and tourists, because it deals solely with the 
qualifications of the tourist guide. 
(ii) The ex post individual review of European standards 
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Article 1 of the UCTD provides that the Directive applies to unfair terms in contracts concluded 
between a seller or supplier and a consumer. European standards can be incorporated in and 
become applicable to consumer contracts. As has been discussed above, this is not yet customary 
in the services sectors which have been investigated for this thesis. However, if European 
standardisation of services becomes more common in these sectors, it is possible that service 
providers will adopt or refer to European standards in their contracts and that they will be 
applied as contractual terms. It could even be the case that service providers would copy certain 
provisions of European standards and incorporate them directly in their contracts. European 
standards could be exempted from review on the basis that they are not freely accessible and 
have to be bought from the standardisation organisations. However, it is difficult to see why the 
fact that standards become products and are protected by copyright would have an impact on 
their coming within the scope of the UCTD. The fact that European standards have to be 
obtained through national standardisation organisations has an impact on their transparency as 
contractual terms, but it does not mean that they cannot become contractual terms and would be 
outside the scope of the UCTD. 
(iii) European standards and individual negotiation 
European standards would be exempted from review under the UCTD if they were individually 
negotiated. Since the provisions of European standards have been adopted by CEN, it is difficult 
to see how they could be regarded as individually negotiated. Their provisions have been laid 
down in advance and cannot be amended without amending the European standard itself 
through CEN. An argument could be made that the UCTD should not be applicable if there had 
been a specific discussion between service provider and consumer about whether the European 
standard should be made applicable to the contract. In practice, however, such a discussion is 
unlikely to take place. Nevertheless, the fact that European standards have not prima facie been 
made as standard contract terms remains important. On the basis of the legislative history of the 
UCTD it has been argued that these standards, which would fall in a separate category of pre-
formulated terms, would require an additional element to establish that they have not been 
individually negotiated.115 In such cases, consumers would have to show that they had not been 
able to influence the pre-formulation of the terms. This would mean that the concept of 
individual negotiation in the UCTD would be extended to collective bargaining. It would require 
an assessment of the extent to which consumers are able to influence the making of contractual 
terms.  
                                                          




In the context of European standardisation, consumers could be said to influence the adoption 
of European standards through their participation in the standardisation process. ANEC is 
frequently involved in European standardisation processes and the same applies to consumer 
organisations at the national level.116 Such collective bargaining leading to the adoption of a 
European standard could result in the European standard being taken out of the scope of the 
UCTD. For collective bargaining, it is essential that discussions take place with a view to 
accommodate the views of the other side and to reach a compromise on the basis of bringing 
two parties with opposite interests together.117 In his Opinion in Albany, AG Jacobs stated that in 
the context of collective bargaining, “a measure of equilibrium between the bargaining power on 
both sides helps to ensure a balanced outcome for both sides”.118 However, the analysis in 
Chapter II has shown that consumer organisations are having real difficulties to participate in 
European standardisation. Often, they are not even sitting at the table where the European 
standard is made. Even if they are able to participate, they only have an observer status which 
does not allow them to vote on the provisions of the standard. Although it could be said that 
they are in a position to influence the provisions of European standards through consensus-
building in the standardisation process, it is clear that without the power of voting the influence 
of consumer organisations remains limited. Furthermore, most of the time they do not have the 
technical expertise which is necessary to influence the formulation of the substantive provisions 
of European standards. As a consequence, European standardisation cannot be considered as 
collective bargaining between service providers and consumers, since it is essentially a process 
which is controlled by businesses. Consumers might be consulted in the process, but the 
standardisation process does not involve negotiations between two sides which each have equal 
bargaining power. The equilibrium mentioned by AG Jacobs in Albany does not exist in 
European standardisation. As a result, it is not likely that the involvement of consumer 
organisations in European standardisation would result in European standards being exempted 
from review under the UCTD. 
(iv) European standards and mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions 
Finally, European standards would be outside the scope of the UCTD if they constituted 
mandatory statutory or regulatory provisions as provided by Article 1(2). The correct 
interpretation of Article 1(2) has been the subject of discussion by the CJEU in a number of 
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cases. In Cofidis,119 it held that that terms which were imposed by French legislation did come 
within the scope of the UCTD because the terms went beyond the requirements which had been 
imposed by the legislation. On that basis, they could not escape review under the UCTD. In 
RWE Vertrieb,120 the CJEU held that if it is absolutely clear that a term was imposed by 
legislation, this would mean that the legislature has already performed a balancing exercise 
between the rights of the seller and the consumer. The result of the balancing exercise was that a 
fairness review under the UCTD was no longer possible and the exception under Article 1(2) 
applied. However, it has to be absolutely clear that the contractual term which is disputed comes 
within the scope of the national legislation. If there is any uncertainty about this, as was the case 
in Cofidis, the UCTD will be applicable. Most recently, in Barclays Bank,121 the CJEU held that 
Article 1(2) applied to contractual terms imposed by statutory legislation if no other arrangement 
had been made between the parties and the only applicable terms were those imposed by the 
legislation. 
Without the application of European standards in legislation, the main question with respect to 
their application in consumer contracts is whether these standards are mandatory regulatory 
provisions. In other words, are European standards adopted in a regulatory framework which 
makes compliance with the standards mandatory? In the context of the New Approach, which is 
clearly a European regulatory framework, it could at least be argued that European standards 
become de facto mandatory. Although it is clear from the construction of the New Approach that 
European standards provide but one way of showing compliance with the essential requirements 
of a directive, in reality the New Approach puts significant pressure on manufacturers to comply 
with European standards.122 It is made much more difficult for manufacturers to show that they 
comply with the essential requirements of a directive if they want to use other standards than the 
European standards made through CEN.  On that basis, it is arguable that European standards 
are mandatory regulatory provisions under Article 1(2). However, following RWE Vertrieb, the 
main question is whether the legislature has performed a balancing exercise between the rights of 
the seller and the consumer. In European standardisation, it is difficult to identify such a 
balancing exercise. The balancing would have to take place in the context of the standardisation 
process – the general set-up of the New Approach is not sufficient. As has already been said 
above, it is difficult for consumers to participate effectively in the standardisation process. It is 
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unlikely that businesses which participate in European standardisation could be relied on to 
perform such a balancing exercise. As a result, it is much more difficult to guarantee that the 
required balancing exercise takes place. This would mean that European standardisation, also in 
the context of the New Approach, should not benefit from the statutory exemption in Article 
1(2).  
Furthermore, even if European standards were considered as mandatory regulatory provisions 
under Article 1(2), the contractual application of European standards in consumer contracts 
would not be mandatory. Although compliance could be considered mandatory ex ante, since 
manufacturers would have to declare or prove that they complied with the European standard 
before they could place their products on the market, the New Approach does not impose the 
application of European standards in the contract between manufacturer and consumer. 
Therefore, it becomes more difficult to make an analogy with Barclays Bank, since the contractual 
inclusion of European standards would not be imposed by the legislation under the New 
Approach. However, it will be remembered that, in the discussion of the PIP case in the 
previous chapter, it was argued this application could be considered necessary to guarantee the 
effet utile of directives adopted under the New Approach. 
Outside the New Approach, which includes European standards for services, it is even clearer 
that European standards do not become mandatory regulatory provisions. This is because 
European standardisation of services is not incorporated in a regulatory framework and 
compliance with the standards does not become mandatory. As has been argued in Chapter II, 
Article 26(5) of the Services Directive 2006 does not create a regulatory framework for European 
standardisation of services. The mere encouragement of the making of European services 
standards does not establish a legally binding regulatory framework in which European standards 
are adopted. Although the Standardisation Regulation 2012 has formalised the possibility of the 
Commission to issue mandates for standards in the services sector, this is still quite far away 
from imposing legally binding obligations on service providers through European 
standardisation. European standards are not legally binding and do not obtain the status of law. 
Therefore, European services standards, whether they have been mandated by the Commission 
or not, cannot be considered as mandatory regulatory provisions and come within the scope of 
the UCTD. The next question is to what extent the provisions of European services standards 
could be regarded as unfair terms under the UCTD. 




In essence, there are three ways for the provisions of European standards to be regarded as 
unfair under the UCTD: 
(i) The provisions could be covered by the indicative list of terms which might be 
regarded as unfair provided in the Annex to the UCTD 
(ii) The provisions could breach the transparency requirement imposed by Article 5 of 
the UCTD 
(iii) The provisions could cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and 
obligations to the detriment of the consumer under Article 3(1) of the UCTD 
To consider the potential fairness of European standards it is necessary to take a close look at 
their provisions. In general, if we look at a number of standards which have been adopted in the 
healthcare and tourism sectors, it becomes clear how difficult it is to link the UCTD to the 
provisions of European standards. In Chapter I, the various elements of the service process 
which could be dealt with by way of European standardisation were set out from the perspective 
of convergence. Hans Micklitz has suggested a number of subjects which are usually covered in 
European standards, such as education, equipment or facilities, pre- and post-contractual 
obligations and monitoring.123 Many of these subjects can be found in European standards. For 
example, the Aesthetic Surgery Services standard has provisions on competences, facilities and 
communication with patients. The European standard for Recreational Diving Services has 
provisions on information, training and education. However, from the perspective of the UCTD, 
it is problematic that the way in which these provisions are set out in the European standards 
does not look like a contract at all. It is clear from the introduction of many of the European 
standards that they intend to provide a number of recommendations for service providers. They 
do not set out the mutual rights of obligations of service providers and consumers. The 
recommendations in the standards have not been adopted with a view to impose contractual 
obligations on service providers. If a comparison is made with some of the standard terms and 
conditions which are used by private clinics for plastic surgery, there are numerous important 
differences. The standard terms set out precisely what patients are entitled to under the contract 
and how they should be pay for it. The key difference is that these standard terms are based on 
the mutual rights and obligations of the parties to the contract. This mutuality of obligations, 
which is the foundation of a contract, is missing in European standards. They remain 
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recommendations for service providers which are not intended to be binding on them, and 
certainly not on consumers or patients. As a result, before the provisions of European standards 
could be regarded as standard terms, it would be necessary to include a provision in European 
standards to link the European standards directly to a contract for services.124 This is an 
important proviso for the discussion which follows below, which is based on the assumption 
that European standards can be regarded as standard terms per se.  
Returning to the three possible ways to regard provisions of European standards as unfair, the 
first possibility would be to find that they came within the scope of the indicative list of unfair 
terms in the Annex to the UCTD. This requires an assessment of the contents of European 
standards which have been adopted in the healthcare and tourism sectors. In both sectors it is 
difficult to find provisions of European standards which could potentially be regarded as unfair. 
The main reason for this is that the European standards contain provisions which are primarily 
focussed on the delivery of the service – they are standards which are directly linked to the 
service process. Furthermore, it could be argued that, since most provisions of European 
standards are directly about the service process, they should be excluded from the scope of the 
UCTD because they are essentially about the definition of the main subject matter of the 
contract as provided by Article 4(2).   
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some terms which could come within the scope of the 
indicative list. For example, both the Aesthetic Surgery Services standard and the Recreational 
Diving Services standard contain provisions which define procedures for risk assessments.125 
These provisions include a definition of what constitutes an ‘adverse event’ and guidance on how 
to deal with complications and emergencies. These provisions could potentially be regarded as 
attempting to exclude or limit the legal liability of a service provider ‘in the event of the death of 
a consumer or personal injury to the latter resulting from an act or omission of that seller or 
supplier’ as provided in 1(a) of the Annex to the UCTD.126 Moreover, the provisions of 
European standards could be regarded as ‘irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which 
he had no real opportunity of becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract’ as 
provided in 1(i) of the Annex. As has been discussed before, European standards are covered by 
copyright which means that they become products which have to be bought from the national 
standardisation organisations. This has a real impact on the ability of European consumers to 
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become aware of the provisions of European standards. The applicability of Article 1(i) of the 
Annex would depend on the extent to which consumers would be able to obtain the provisions 
of European standards and to what extent they could reasonably be expected to buy European 
standards.127 This is closely linked to the transparency requirement imposed by Article 5 of the 
UCTD. 
Secondly, Article 5 of the UCTD provides that contractual terms ‘must always be drafted in 
plain, intelligible language’. In Commission v Netherlands,128 the CJEU made it clear that this means 
that a service provider has to ensure that the consumer is in a position to obtain sufficient 
knowledge before the contract is concluded. A distinction should be made between the plainness 
of contractual terms and their intelligibility. Terms have to be written in plain language so as to 
enable the consumer to understand their implications. Furthermore, they must have been set out 
in such a way that they are intelligible to the consumer. This could also mean that they must have 
been drafted in the consumer’s language. For European standards, it could be problematic that 
they have been drafted by stakeholders. Although most of the time they have been adopted with 
the intention to improve the protection of the consumer, they have not always been drafted in a 
language which is easily understandable to the consumer. This could be particularly problematic 
for the healthcare sector. For example, the Aesthetic Surgery Services standard contains very 
detailed descriptions of medical treatments and links them to different categories of risk. Such 
provisions are inevitably difficult to understand for consumers, because they are primarily 
intended for practitioners in aesthetic surgery. However, it could again be argued that they come 
within the scope of Article 4(2) of the UCTD because they define the subject matter of the 
contract. 
The transparency requirement goes beyond the mere wording or language of the terms. It is 
ultimately based on enabling competition in the market.129 A proper understanding of the 
contractual terms enables consumers to make decision about whether to conclude a contract 
with a competitor who might using other contractual terms. It is clear from the CJEU’s 
judgment in RWE Vertrieb130 that a positive obligation is imposed on service providers to provide 
sufficient information to enable consumers to prefer a competitor. Such an onerous obligation 
could be problematic for European standardisation. It would link European standardisation 
directly to competition law. Article 5 could be interpreted in such a way as to impose an 
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obligation on service providers who apply European standards to provide more background 
information about the standards.131 If consumers have to be able to make an adequate 
assessment of the role that a European standard plays in the services market, it might be 
necessary to disclose information about why and by whom it has been made. In other words, 
consumers might have to receive information about which parties are behind the making of 
European standards. The implications of such an obligation for European standardisation would 
be serious. After all, the European standardisation process is entirely confidential. Information 
about the negotiations leading to the adoption of a European standard is not accessible to 
outsiders. This includes the names of participants in the European and national technical 
committees. In its recent judgment in Schulz,132 in the context of a contract for the supply of gas 
which was not directly governed by the UCTD, the CJEU imposed a very far-reaching obligation 
to disclose information on service providers – including the grounds for adjustment of the price 
of the contract.  
In the context of European standardisation, this obligation to disclose could have serious 
consequences. The Aesthetic Surgery Services standard could be an interesting example. One of 
the major purposes of the standard is to provide which qualifications practitioners in aesthetic 
surgery should have before they can perform certain treatments. One of the provisions states 
that practitioners should not make misrepresentations to patients about their qualifications. 
However, it could be argued that they are under a positive obligation to inform patients about 
their precise qualifications. This is particularly important since the European standardisation 
process was started with a view to limit the amount of treatments that could be performed by 
medical practitioners who do not have sufficient qualifications.133 As a result, another link 
between the transparency of the European standardisation process and the application of 
European standards has been identified. The lack of knowledge about the background to 
European standards could be a reason for courts to refuse to apply the provisions of European 
standards on the basis that they did not comply with the transparency requirement imposed by 
Article 5. It could even be argued that consumer organisations should be able bring an action 
against service providers who rely on these terms and could indirectly obtain access to European 
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standards on the basis of the positive obligations imposed by the transparency requirement in 
the UCTD.134 
Finally, the provisions of European standards could be regarded as unfair on the basis that they 
cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations to the detriment of the 
consumer. This is covered by Article 3(1) of the UCTD. There have been few cases at the 
European level in which the CJEU has had the occasion to interpret this general fairness clause. 
Recently, in Aziz,135 the CJEU seemed to interpret this test as very much linked to the specific 
circumstances of a case. This would suggest a test based on an abuse control of unfair terms.136 
This test would be very much linked to the national legal order in which the contract terms 
would be applied. Because of the in concreto application of the test under Article 3(1), it is difficult 
to assess what its implications for the provisions of European standards will be. However, 
similarly to the indicative list in the Annex, it would seem unlikely that the provisions of 
European services standards, which are primarily aimed at providing standards for the service 
process, would be considered as unfair on the basis of Article 3(1). They are not sufficiently 
focussed on the contractual rights and obligations of service providers and consumers. 
Therefore, overall, the transparency requirement in Article 5 would be the most likely candidate 
to cause problems for European standards.  
d. The role of the injunction and the impact of the UCTD on convergence 
Finally, assuming that European standards come within the scope of the UCTD and could 
contain potentially unfair terms, the next question is how consumers, consumer organisations or 
public authorities could enforce the UCTD against service providers. Here, an important role 
could be played by the remedy of an injunction. Article 7(1) makes clear that Member States 
have to provide adequate remedies to prevent the continuing application of unfair terms. 
Furthermore, the UCTD is one of the Directives to which the Injunction Directive137 applies. 
This means that, under Article 7(2) of the UCTD, Member States have to acknowledge and 
facilitate the possibility of public authorities and consumer organisations seeking injunctions in 
consumer disputes.  
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From the perspective of the UCTD, the CJEU delivered an important judgment in Invitel.138 
Invitel was a Hungarian telecom provider whose standard terms included a term which enabled 
the provider to change the rates without explaining the basis on which this would happen and 
the reasons for it. The key question was whether a finding of unfairness in court proceedings 
brought by a consumer organisation or a collective group of claimants would also be applicable 
to parties which did not take part in the proceedings – in other words, if a ruling of unfairness 
would have an erga omnes effect. The CJEU held that the UCTD did not prevent an actio popularis 
which would have erga omnes effect. However, it did not actually have to rule on whether the 
effective application of the UCTD required such an erga omnes effect of a finding of unfairness. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the judgment gives a clear impetus to public authorities and 
consumer organisations to challenge the fairness of contractual terms without having to worry 
about whether such proceedings would actually be effective in protecting consumers. 
From Invitel and from the very wording of Article 7, it is clear that the UCTD has a preventive 
function – it enables organisations to bring actions against service providers to prevent the use 
of unfair contract terms. This also means that the injunction is not limited to the concrete 
application of standard terms in particular contracts. Although in Invitel the action was directed 
against the application by a Hungarian telecom provider of standard terms which were applied in 
its contracts with customers, the review could also be extended to the recommendation of 
contract terms. It is clear from the CJEU’s judgment in Commission v Italy139 that the abstract 
review under Article 7 of the UCTD would be deprived of its effectiveness if it could not be 
aimed at standard terms which are recommended or which have been made for use but which 
have not yet been brought in practice. Therefore, it also applies to the future use of standard 
terms which contain unfair terms.140 In practice, the possibility of an injunction is often used by 
consumer protection organisations in ex ante negotiations with service providers or associations. 
They could then be forced to remove the terms from the contracts before they are actually 
brought into practice. This has important consequences for European standards, which are often 
not directly incorporated in contracts.  It means that consumer organisations could bring actions 
for injunctions against standardisation organisations simply on the basis of the adoption of 
European standards which contain unfair contract terms. Alternatively, an action could be 
brought against an association of service providers if they recommended the use of European 
standards as standard terms. Once again, this raises the question whether the standards should be 
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made publicly available to facilitate the abstract review. It could be argued that the abstract 
review would not be effective if consumer organisations or public authorities were required to 
buy standards from the national standardisation organisations.141 It should be reminded that 
actions against standardisation organisations would only be successful if it could be shown that 
European standards adopted through CEN were recommended or made for use in contractual 
relations. It is uncertain if European standards in the healthcare and tourism sector could be said 
to fall in this category.  
In conclusion, the UCTD could have a similar function to the free movement provisions and the 
competition law provisions. It could prevent the application of European standards in contract 
law if they were regarded as unfair. As such, the UCTD could act as an obstacle to convergence 
– convergence would only occur if European standards complied with the fairness and 
transparency requirements imposed by the UCTD. However, it is clear from the way in which 
European services standards are made that they do not have a focus on contractual rights and 
obligations. In the absence of a contract in which European standards could be incorporated, 
there is little evidence to suggest that they would contain potentially unfair terms. In the 
healthcare and tourism sectors European standards do not resemble a contract.142 Although this 
does not preclude the abstract review of European standards, the role that the UCTD is likely to 
play in the review of such standards is limited. Moreover, it means that the function of the 
UCTD to impose a process of ‘fair convergence’ on European standardisation – meaning that 
stakeholders are encouraged to include fair terms in their standards – is limited as well. At the 
moment, the connection between European standardisation of services and contract law is too 
tenuous for the UCTD to have an important impact on the European standardisation process 
for services. 
v. A preliminary conclusion 
The previous chapters have shown that it is complicated and difficult to make European 
standards in the healthcare and tourism sectors. The conclusion has to be along similar lines for 
the application of these standards in private law. Even if European services standards have 
successfully been adopted, they still face a lot of difficulties at the moment of their application in 
private law. Although there are differences between contract law and tort law, in essence both 
suffer from the lack of a European regulatory framework which links European standardisation 
to private law. Convergence does not come out of nowhere – there has to be a certain pressure 
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to increase convergence in private law across the EU. At the European level, there is no such 
pressure for European standardisation of services. Given the concerns that have been raised by 
the Commission about the direction European standardisation of services is taking, it is 
surprising that it has not taken matters more strongly into its own hands. Although it would like 
European standardisation of services to develop in a certain direction, namely to become more 
facilitative of free movement, it is not willing to provide that direction itself. Article 26(5) does 
no more than to encourage European standardisation and cannot be considered as pressure for 
convergence in private law. A New Approach for services could provide the necessary pressure, 
but there are no indications that such a regulatory framework will be created. 
In the absence of a European regulatory framework, the pressure for convergence has to come 
almost entirely from the stakeholders. However, it is difficult to rely on stakeholders to apply 
European standards in practice. The direct application of European standards in private law is 
uncommon. European standards are not frequently applied by way of ex ante regulation in 
contract law. Similarly, their ex post regulatory function is limited to providing evidence to specify 
the required standard of care. This is essentially similar in contract and tort law.143 No automatic 
effect is achieved by the adoption of a European standard – its function remains purely 
evidential. With such an evidential function convergence is difficult to achieve, since there is no 
European coordination. The precise impact of the standard will be dependent on national private 
law and will be different from case to case. In addition, the various problems with the making of 
European services standards also have an impact on the application of European standards in 
private law. The strong objections to European standardisation of services in the healthcare and 
tourism sectors make it less likely that the standards will frequently be applied in contract or tort 
law. In general, it is not possible to identify a coordinated pressure on the part of the 
stakeholders to increase convergence in private law. Although they develop European services 
standards for certain reasons, these reasons are not sufficiently linked to their application in 
private law. Stakeholders do not really seem to care about what happens with a European 
standard after its adoption. The result is that the application of European standards in private 
law remains uncertain and fragmented. This also means that the role of the UCTD as a review 
mechanism for the application of European standards in contract law will remain limited. 
                                                          




























VI. THE APPLICATION OF EUROPEAN STANDARDS IN FREE 
MOVEMENT AND COMPETITION LAW 
i. From the application of European standards to their review 
The previous chapter has discussed the role of European standards in contract and tort law and 
the impact of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. The application of European standards in 
free movement and competition law is conceptually different from their application in contract 
and tort law. Free movement and competition law do not constitute a separate field of private 
law in which European services standards could be applied. Rather, they impose certain 
requirements on the application of European standards in private law. They provide a frame for 
convergence in which European standards have to fit. The application of European standards in 
contract law or tort law will only be successful if the standards are compatible with the free 
movement and competition provisions. They are used as a review mechanism to review the 
provisions of European standards. If they contain provisions which breach the free movement 
or competition provisions, these provisions will not be enforced in private law.  
The result is that convergence in private law through European standardisation becomes 
conditional on compliance with the free movement and competition provisions. At the same 
time, the possibility of review imposes a process of convergence itself, since it provides pressure 
on European standardisation organisations to adopt standards which are compatible with the 
free movement and competition provisions. Even if convergence in contract and tort law is 
relatively limited, it could still be that the free movement and competition provisions have a 
strong convergent impact on private law. 
ii. European standards in free movement law 
 
a. Framing convergence in free movement law 
Two different functions of the free movement provisions can be identified. These two functions 
are not mutually exclusive, but rather supplement each other. First of all, the free movement 
provisions can be used by a court to refuse to apply a European standard in a private law 
dispute. It can be illustrated by the following fictional scenario:1 a Dutch health insurer offers its 
customers the possibility, for a monthly supplement, to be insured for a limited number of 
cosmetic interventions. For this purpose, the health insurer concludes contracts with a number 
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of private cosmetic clinics in the Netherlands and Belgium. These contracts expressly provide 
that the clinics will comply with the requirements imposed by the European standard for 
Aesthetic Surgery Services. Mrs Houben lives in Rotterdam, but she would like to get some 
Botox treatment from COSMOBILE, a private clinic based in Belgium which occasionally sends 
its cosmetic surgeons to the homes of their customers to treat them at their homes. Under the 
contract with the health insurer, they are not allowed to do this as it would be in breach of the 
European standard. COSMOBILE claims that this contractual provision constitutes a breach of 
its right to freely provide services and refuses to comply with it. It sends a “mobile doctor” to 
Mrs Houben to treat her at her home and sends an invoice to the health insurer. The health 
insurer refuses to reimburse COSMOBILE for the treatment and COSMOBILE brings an 
action for payment against the insurer. If the Dutch court finds that the provision of the 
European standard breaches the right to freely provides services of COSMOBILE, it could 
refuse to enforce this provision in the contractual relationship between the health insurer and 
COSMOBILE. The result would be that the health insurer would become liable to 
COSMOBILE in contract law on the basis of the non-compliance of the European standard 
with the free movement provisions. As a consequence, the application of the free movement 
provisions would create an obstacle to convergence in private law because the European 
standard is not compatible with free movement law. 
To illustrate the first function more broadly, a second fictional example will be provided.2 An 
English private certification body certifies tourist guides who want to provide tourist guide 
services in the UK. The European standard for Tourist Guide Training requirements is used as 
the basis of its certification activities. It refuses to certify Mr Von Amsberg, a German tourist 
guide who wishes to provide his services in Oxford, because he has not spent 240 hours in 
Oxford as part of his practical training. Mr Von Amsberg studied Classics in Oxford forty years 
ago and believes that this requirement constitutes an obstacle to the exercise of his right to freely 
provide services in the UK. He brings an appeal against the refusal to provide him with a 
certificate claiming that the 240 hours requirement is incompatible with free movement law. If a 
court found that the requirement breached Mr Von Amsberg’s right to freely provide services, 
the court would refuse to apply the standard. The certification body would be liable to Mr Von 
Amsberg in contract law because the European standard breached the free movement 
provisions. The requirement of certification based on the European standard prevented Mr Von 
Amsberg from offering his services in the UK and from concluding contracts with possible 
customers in the UK. If Mr Von Amsberg had suffered damages as a result of his lack of 





certification, he could also bring a claim for damages against the certification body. Overall, this 
second example illustrates the market access dimension of the free movement provisions. The 
refusal of the court to apply the European standard for Tourist Guide Training would enable the 
service provider to access the UK market for tourist guides.  
The second function of free movement law is more indirect. The examples above have shown 
that European standards are unlikely to be applied in private law if they do not comply with the 
free movement provisions. This puts pressure on standardisation organisations and on 
stakeholders to adopt European standards which are compatible with free movement law.3 It 
would be useless for stakeholders in the services sectors to adopt and apply European standards 
if they were not applied in private law because they breached the free movement provisions. In 
effect, the free movement provisions themselves stimulate a process of convergence. However, 
this convergence is not based on European standardisation, but on the requirements which free 
movement law imposes on European standardisation. As a result, the application of free 
movement law provides a regulatory tool to the EU to control the compatibility of European 
standardisation with the free movement provisions. It could be exercised ex post, by courts 
refusing to apply European standards in contractual disputes. The effectiveness of this ex post 
tool would be dependent on the willingness of national courts to scrutinise the compatibility of 
European standards with free movement law. Similarly, it could be exercised ex ante, by putting 
pressure on stakeholders to adopt standards which respect the free movement provisions. This is 
also where the Commission could play a more prominent role in ensuring that stakeholders 
understand the obligations which are imposed on them by free movement law. 
The success of the two functions of free movement law is dependent on the extent to which 
private parties are bound by the free movement provisions. The two examples discussed above 
assume that private parties are bound by free movement law and that the free movement 
provisions are applicable in contractual disputes between private parties. In other words, it is 
assumed that the free movement provisions have horizontal direct effect. However, this issue is 
far from fixed. Therefore, the judgment of the CJEU in Fra.bo will be analysed to determine the 
scope of horizontal direct effect of the free movement provisions. 
b. Case study: Fra.bo4 
                                                          
3 See L. Azoulai, ‘The Court of Justice and the Social Market Economy: The Emergence of an Idea and the 
Conditions for its Realization’, (2008) 45 CML Rev 1335. 
4 This case study is to a significant extent based on a case note published in the European Journal of Risk 
Regulation: B. van Leeuwen, ‘From Status to Impact, and the Role of National Legislation: The Application of 




Fra.bo SpA (“Fra.bo”) is an Italian manufacturer of copper fittings.5 Such copper fittings are 
used to connect two pieces of piping for water or gas. They have sealing rings made of malleable 
material at the ends to make them watertight. Fra.bo wanted to sell these copper fittings on the 
German market. They were not covered by the New Approach for goods, which meant that 
there was no harmonised European standard with which Fra.bo could comply. In Germany, the 
Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches eV (“DVGW”) made standards which laid 
down the technical requirements with which copper fittings had to comply.6 It was an 
association established under private law. The applicable German legislation provided that 
products in connection with the supply of water could be lawfully brought on the German 
market if they had a CE mark. If they did not have a CE mark, the alternative was for products 
to be certified by DVGW. As such, DVGW was given an important a role in the regulatory 
framework by the German legislation. Because Fra.bo’s copper fittings did not come within the 
New Approach, Fra.bo was dependent on certification by DVGW. This certification would take 
place in accordance with standards which had been developed by DVGW itself. The German 
State had no influence on either the standard-making process or the certification process – in 
that respect, DVGW was independent.7 
In 1999, Fra.bo applied for certification by DVGW. In 2000, it was awarded a certificate for the 
duration of five years. The certification assessment procedure itself had been subcontracted by 
the German laboratory which was normally used and approved by DVGW to a non-approved 
Italian laboratory. During the five-year period in which the certificate was valid DVGW received 
complaints by third parties which resulted in a re-assessment procedure, directly undertaken by 
the approved German laboratory. In 2005, DVGW informed Fra.bo that its fittings had not 
passed the ozone test, but that it was free to submit its own assessment report within three 
months. Fra.bo then had another assessment done by a non-approved Italian laboratory, which 
found that its fittings did pass the ozone test. However, DVGW refused to recognise this report 
because it had not been undertaken by one of its approved laboratories.8 As a consequence, it 
cancelled Fra.bo’s certificate in June 2005. Therefore, Fra.bo was no longer able to place its 
copper fittings on the German market. 
                                                          
5 Case C-171/11, Fra.bo SPA v Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches EV, Judgment of 12th July 2012, not yet 
reported. For a more detailed discussion of the factual background, see H. Schepel, ‘Case C-171/11, Fra.bo SPA v 
Deutsche Vereinigung des Gas- und Wasserfaches’, (2013) 9 ERCL 186. 
6 Fra.bo, above n 5, paras 6-7. 
7 Fra.bo above n 5, para 24. 




After the cancellation of the certificate, Fra.bo brought an action against the cancellation before 
the Landgericht Köln, which dismissed its claim.9 It appealed to the Oberlandesgericht (“OLG”) 
Düsseldorf, which decided to stay the proceedings to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU. 
Its main question was whether Article 34 TFEU, which provides for the right to free movement 
of goods, was applicable to the standardisation and certification activities of DVGW.10 On a first 
impression, this case seemed to be a good occasion for the CJEU to clarify to what extent the 
right to free movement of goods had horizontal direct effect. While it was already clear that the 
rights to free movement of persons, services and establishment were more or less horizontally 
directly effective, the situation was significantly less clear for the right to free movement of 
goods.11 According to Advocate General (“AG”) Trstenjak, there was no justification to maintain 
a different approach for the free movement of goods. In order to get rid of this inconsistency, 
she invited the CJEU to recognise that all free movement provisions were horizontally directly 
effective.12 After all, in the previous decades, the CJEU has gradually moved from an approach 
based on the public or private status of regulators to an approach based on the impact of their 
actions on the internal market.13 Whether a regulator was private or public is no longer decisive 
for the applicability of the free movement provisions. Given that DVGW had obtained a 
position of significant power in the certification market as a result of the German legislation, it 
was virtually impossible to place the fittings on the German market without a certificate awarded 
by DVGW.14 This effect was reinforced by the fact that the referring court had found that the 
copper fittings were not covered by a harmonised European technical standard, which meant 
that this was not a case in which Fra.bo could obtain a CE mark. Certification by DVGW was 
then the only alternative. AG Trstenjak argued that given this de facto competence to decide 
which products could lawfully be placed on the market, which had been granted to DVGW by 
the German legislation, its activities had to be caught by the provision on free movement of 
goods.15 
Unlike AG Trstenjak, the CJEU did not provide a clear answer about the possible horizontal 
direct effect of the free movement of goods.16 It decided not to use any conventional formulas 
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14 Opinion of AG Trstenjak in Fra.bo, above n 5, para 25. 
15 Ibid., para 50. 
16 H. van Harten and T. Nauta, ‘Towards Horizontal Direct Effect for the Free Movement of Goods? Comment on 




about the horizontal or vertical direct effect of the free movement provisions. No reference was 
made to its case law based on Walrave and Koch,17 which could certainly have been applied to this 
case.18 In this line of cases, the free movement provisions were applied to private parties which 
were involved in collective regulation on the basis of the exercise of legal autonomy. These two 
functional criteria were not referred to. Rather, the CJEU decided to rely on three factors which 
collectively justified the application of the free movement of goods provision to DVGW. First of 
all, German legislation had provided that goods certified by DVGW would be compliant with 
national law and could be lawfully brought on the market.19 Secondly, DVGW was the only body 
which certified copper fittings in Germany. As a result, the only possibility for businesses to 
obtain a certificate of compliance was through certification by DVGW.20 Thirdly, a lack of 
certification by DVGW would result in serious difficulties to place products on the German 
market.21 Almost all German consumers bought copper fittings which had been certified by 
DVGW.  
On the basis of these three arguments, the CJEU held that “a body such as the DVGW, by 
virtue of its authority to certify the products, in reality holds the power to regulate the entry into 
the German market of products such as the copper fittings at issue in the main proceedings” 22 
and that, consequently, Article 34 TFEU was applicable to its standardisation and certification 
activities. When the case returned to the OLG Düsseldorf, it held that the specific ozone test 
requirements imposed by DVGW constituted a restriction to Fra.bo’s right to free movement of 
goods which could not be justified.23 DVGW had to pay compensation to Fra.bo. Permission 
has been given to appeal to the BGH.24 DVGW has already announced that it will bring a claim 
for State liability against the German State. As a result, the BGH might also have to determine 
which party is ultimately responsible for the breach of Fra.bo’s right to free movement of goods 
and which party is liable to pay damages to Fra.bo – the private certification body which adopted 
a standard which was in breach of the free movement of goods or the State which provided the 
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legislative framework which protected the activities of DVGW which breached the right to free 
movement of goods.25  
c. The impact of Fra.bo on convergence in free movement law 
First of all, it is necessary to determine the scope of application of the CJEU’s judgment in 
Fra.bo. There has been a substantial amount of discussion about whether or not the application 
of the free movement provisions to DVGW in Fra.bo really constituted horizontal direct effect 
or whether the judgment was in fact directed against the German legislation.26 The fact that the 
relevant German legislation had granted an important role to DVGW was no doubt an 
important reason to extend the application of the free movement provisions to DVGW. This is 
also clear from the final ruling of the CJEU, in which it held that “Article 28 EC must be 
interpreted as meaning that it applies to standardisation and certification activities of a private-
law body, where the national legislation considers the products certified by that body to be 
compliant with national law and that has the effect of restricting the marketing of products 
which are not certified by that body”27. On that basis, the fact that the German legislation had 
provided a clear role and effect to DVGW’s standardisation and certification activities was one 
of the very foundations of the judgment.  
In the traditional line of case law based on Walrave and Koch, the horizontal applicability of the 
free movement provisions was determined by the question whether or not a private regulator 
was involved in collective regulation on the basis of the exercise of legal autonomy. As far as 
collective regulation is concerned, the collective dimension in Fra.bo was primarily vertical – the 
important nation-wide effect of DVGW’s activities was the result of the German legislation.28 It 
is not likely that DVGW would have enjoyed the same market power if the German legislation 
had not provided such an important role to it. Although it could be argued that DVGW should 
not be held responsible for being the only certification body in the market, which could be seen 
as a matter for the market, this exclusive position was probably the result of the reference to 
DVGW in the German legislation. At the same time, from the perspective of the exercise of 
legal autonomy, the role of the German legislation was not so important.29 It was expressly stated 
in the judgment that the German State did not exercise any decisive influence over DVGW’s 
activities. Through its legislation, the German State had effectively given DVGW a carte blanche 
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to exercise its activities in accordance with its own standards.30 On that basis, the case against 
DVGW would seem to be much more horizontal in nature. The actual measure which was being 
challenged was of a private nature, but the impact of that measure had been reinforced by public 
legislation. Overall, this interaction and tension between the collective regulation aspect and the 
legal autonomy aspect in Fra.bo, in combination with the ambiguous approach of the CJEU, 
means that it is difficult to determine whether the case should be interpreted as horizontal or 
vertical direct effect. 
However, these difficulties do not mean that it is impossible to make more general observations 
about the scope of the Fra.bo judgment. It is clear from the structure of the judgment that, in 
order to determine the applicability of the free movement provisions, the CJEU has moved 
towards an approach based on the impact of private regulation on the internal market.31 The 
three arguments set out above used to justify the application of Article 34 TFEU to DVGW 
were provided after the CJEU referred to the definition of a restriction of the right to free 
movement of goods based on the Dassonville32 formula.33 Traditionally, the determination of the 
applicability of the free movement provisions preceded the determination of a restriction. In this 
case, the issue of applicability is determined on the basis of the identification of a restriction. To 
put it in simple terms, Article 34 TFEU was held applicable to DVGW because its actions 
constituted a restriction of the free moment of goods.34 Therefore, it is clear that the free 
movement of goods provision was applied to DVGW’s activities because of the impact its 
activities had on the internal market, not because of its public or private status as regulator. 
Moreover, it means that while in Fra.bo the German legislation played an important role, it 
cannot be excluded that Article 34 TFEU will be applied to certification bodies which enjoy 
significant market power without them having been given a special role by public legislation. It 
should be equally possible for standardisation or certification bodies to obtain an important 
position in the market independently from the State. In such circumstances, there is no good 
reason to maintain that the free movement provisions would not be applied to their activities. 
On the contrary – it is submitted that Fra.bo provides authority for the argument that the impact 
of the exercise of private regulation on the EU’s internal market determines whether or not they 
will be held accountable under the free movement provisions. As a consequence, the impact of 
free movement law on convergence depends on the extent to which European standardisation 
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has an impact on the market and to what extent it creates obstacles to the ability of service 
providers to offer their services in the EU internal market. 
d. Convergence in free movement law 
Finally, the analysis of Fra.bo will be linked back to the two functions of the free movement 
provisions introduced at the start of this section. The impact of free movement law on three 
different parties involved in European standardisation and the application of European 
standards in private law will be analysed: (i) the (European) standardisation organisations, (ii) 
certification organisations and (iii) service providers and their customers. 
First of all, organisations such as CEN and national standardisation organisations are engaged in 
collective regulation on the basis of their legal autonomy. The intention of European 
standardisation is to have a collective impact on a particular services sector. As such, it is 
probable that the free movement provisions are applicable to them, since they satisfy the Walrave 
and Koch criteria. However, in the context of the application of European standards in private 
law, it is unlikely that cases will be brought directly against standardisation organisations. 
Although CEN facilitates and administers the European standardisation process, the simple 
adoption of a European services standard does not achieve an important effect in law. A second 
step is necessary to apply the European standard in private law. For European services 
standards, it is more likely that cases will be brought directly against parties which apply a 
European standard in their regulatory conduct. It is at this point that the European services 
standard will actually start to have an impact on the internal market. Nevertheless, the second 
function of free movement law is important for standardisation organisations. Knowing that 
European standards might not be enforced because of their incompatibility with the free 
movement provisions will make stakeholders more cautious during the standardisation process.35 
It also provides an incentive for standardisation organisations to raise awareness among 
stakeholders about the necessity of compliance with the free movement provisions. If they want 
to be able to effectively use and apply their standards, they had better ensure that their standards 
were free movement proof. An important role here will be played by the European 
Commission.36 They should provide clear guidance to parties involved in European 
standardisation to ensure that they do their best to make European standards compatible with 
the free movement provisions. However, this becomes difficult if one of the main purposes of 
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the standardisation process is market restriction, such as in the example of the Tourist Guide 
Training standard.37 In such cases, the Commission should be alert from the moment of the 
submission of the proposal to ensure that parties do not embark on the making of such a 
standard or that they are made fully aware of the likely impact of the standard on the internal 
market.  
Secondly, the free movement provisions can have an impact on the activities of certification 
bodies. This is also where a link can be made to the PIP case discussed above. After Fra.bo, it 
could be argued that the free movement provisions are applicable to certification bodies on the 
basis that the requirement of certification could create an obstacle to free movement. However, 
if one lesson is to be drawn from Fra.bo, it is that one has to carefully scrutinise the impact of 
certification activities on the market. The key question is whether a lack of certification 
constitutes a real obstacle to provide services in a particular Member State. Again, the European 
standard for Tourist Guide Training provides a good example. In the UK, the professional 
associations for tourist guides require guides to be certified. This certification can be obtained by 
passing an exam. However, the tourist guide profession is not regulated in the UK – there is no 
“tourist guide police”.38 There is no State control on whether or not a tourist guide is certified. It 
could be possible that the standard is de facto enforced by the market.39 The question then is how 
seriously certification is taken by the tourist guide market. At the moment, attractions like 
Westminster Abbey and St Paul’s Cathedral only allow access to tourist guides who have been 
certified by ITG.40 As such, a lack of certification would have a serious impact on the ability of 
tourist guides to offer their services in London. Moreover, it would have an indirect impact on 
the ability of tourist guided by uncertified tourist guides to visit these attractions. However, there 
are signals that, after significant market pressure, attractions will no longer require tourist guides 
to be certified.41 This would open up the market to uncertified tourist guides. As a result, it could 
be argued that, in this case, the market itself is able to correct and to overcome obstacles to free 
movement created by private parties through the application of European standards. It would 
seem that in this example the ability of the market to overcome a lack of certification is higher 
than for the copper fittings in Fra.bo, in which a lack of certification made it virtually impossible 
to bring products on the German market.42 This was the result of the protective effect granted to 
certification by DVGW by the German legislation. In the absence of such protective effect, a 
                                                          









lack of certification would not have the same impact on the right of service providers to freely 
offer services in another Member State. On that basis, it would seem less likely that the free 
movement provisions were applied to such cases. In conclusion, the free movement provisions 
are likely to be applied to certification organisations if a lack of certification constitutes a real 
obstacle to free movement which cannot be overcome or remedied by the market. 
Thirdly, another situation in which free movement problems could arise would be the 
application of a European standard in the contract between service provider and service 
recipient. In such cases, the provisions of the standard would obtain contractual force. In free 
movement law, the approach of the CJEU towards contractual terms has been ambiguous and it 
is unclear in which circumstances contractual terms come within the scope of the free movement 
provisions. While the CJEU held in Sapod Audic43 that contractual agreements between private 
parties can never be reviewed under the free movement provisions, in Haug-Adrion44  it seemed 
willing to review the impact of the provisions of a private insurance contract on the ability of a 
customer to exercise his rights to free movement. Gareth Davies has argued that the correct 
approach is to ask whether or not the contractual term intervenes in the ability of parties to 
conclude contracts with third parties – whether the term had a third-party effect outside the 
contractual relationship between contractor and contractee.45 Another approach could be to see 
whether the party which is insisting on the contractual term is in a position of dominance vis-à-
vis the other party.46 With such an approach, market dominance would be a decisive criterion for 
the application of the free movement provisions. The result of the application of the free 
movement provisions to the contractual terms could be that a term in the contract between 
service provider and customer would not be enforced by the court on the basis of its 
incompatibility with the free movement provisions. There could then also be a damages claim on 
the basis of the breach of the free movement provisions. After the judgment of the Swedish 
Labour Court in Laval,47 it is clear that a breach of the free movement provisions in a case 
between two private parties could also result in horizontal liability.48 In that case, Swedish trade 
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unions were held liable for a breach of the right of a Latvian company to freely provide services 
in Sweden. This is also what is happening after the CJEU’s judgment in Fra.bo – the Italian 
company has successfully claimed damages against DVGW in the German courts.49 It is unclear 
to what extent DVGW will be able to reclaim these damages from the State.50  
Similarly, in the context of European standardisation, private parties which have had to pay 
damages to other private parties because of their application of European standards which 
breached free movement law could also bring a claim for damages against the standardisation 
organisation which had made the standard. This raises the difficult question to what extent 
standardisation organisations are under an obligation towards stakeholders to adopt European 
standards which are compatible with the free movement provisions. In principle, there seems to 
be no objections against stakeholders, such as the Dutch health insurer in the scenario discussed 
above, claiming damages from the standardisation organisation which was responsible for the 
adoption of the European standard. This would increase the pressure on standardisation 
organisations to guarantee compliance with the free movement provisions in the standardisation 
process.51  
Finally, it is important to analyse to what extent, and in what way, parties involved in European 
standardisation can avail themselves of the justifications provided by the Treaty. After the 
CJEU’s judgment in Bosman,52 it is clear that private regulators can rely on the same justifications 
for restrictions to free movement as the Member States. This should also apply to regulation 
through European standardisation. However, in the case of European standardisation of 
services, a distinction should be made between the standardisation process and the application of 
the standard in private law. Although there might be very good justifications for stakeholders to 
make a European standard which contains provisions which could potentially be restrictive of 
free movement, such justifications should be kept separate from the application of the standard 
in private law. In order to justify a potential breach of the free movement provisions, service 
providers will have to show how their decision to apply the European standard to the case in 
question could be justified. This has a particular impact on the reasoning on proportionality.53 
While a European standard might have sought to strike a balance between health protection and 
free movement, the relevant question is whether the application of the standard in private law 
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was proportionate. This requires a case-by-case approach. As a result, private parties which have 
applied European standards in their regulatory conduct cannot hide behind the general aims of a 
European standard – what matters is the impact of the standard on the case in question. 
In conclusion, there is a direct link between convergence and the increasing horizontal 
application of the free movement provisions. In the context of European standardisation of 
services, the free movement provisions are most likely to be applied to parties which are applying 
European standards in their regulatory activities rather than to standardisation organisations. 
However, they still put pressure on standardisation organisations to comply with free movement 
law. Moreover, it cannot be excluded that stakeholders who have been held liable for the 
application of European standards in breach of the free movement provisions will seek damages 
from the standardisation organisation which was responsible for the adoption of the standard.  
As such, free movement law has a dual function for convergence – on the one hand, it prevents 
convergence through European standardisation if European standards do not respect free 
movement law; on the other hand, it stimulates convergence by putting pressure on European 
standardisation to comply with the free movement provisions. However, the potential for 
convergence ultimately depends on the impact of European services standards on the market. 
The free movement provisions will only be applied to European services standards if they really 
have an impact on the market. Without a New Approach for services, it might well be the case 
that European services standards are unable to create a real obstacle to free movement.  
iii. European standards in competition law 
 
a. Framing convergence in competition law 
The functions of competition law with respect to European standardisation and the application 
of European standards in private law are similar to those of the free movement provisions. First 
of all, they could be used to challenge the European standardisation process itself. Secondly, they 
could be used to review the provisions of a European standard and to prevent the standard 
being applied in private law. Thirdly, they could put pressure on standardisation organisations 
and stakeholders to comply with the competition law provisions in the adoption of European 
standards.  
The relevant competition law provisions are distinct, in that Article 101 TFEU focusses on anti-
competitive agreements between businesses, while Article 102 TFEU focusses on the exercise of 
regulatory power by a business which has a position of dominance in the market. This distinction 




European standards in private law. Since the adoption of a European standard constitutes an 
agreement between businesses, Article 101 TFEU provides a direct tool for stakeholders to 
challenge the standardisation process itself, including its purpose, transparency and inclusiveness. 
In that respect, it also has a different function from the free movement provisions, which are 
more likely to focus on the impact of European standards on the internal market. Article 102 
TFEU could also be applied to the standardisation process, for example if stakeholders claimed 
that one of the participants in the process had abused its position of dominance in the market by 
forcing the inclusion of certain requirements in the European standard. However, Article 102 
TFEU is more likely to be applied to the application of European standards in private law. 
The different functions of the competition law provisions can best by illustrated by a few 
examples. First of all, the competition law provisions could be used to challenge the adoption of 
a European standard. For example, tour operators could claim that the adoption of the 
European standard for Tourist Guide Training constituted an anti-competitive agreement 
between associations of tourist guide associations with the sole purpose to exclude tour 
managers from the tourist guide market. The possible non-compliance with Article 101 TFEU 
would be used to challenge the adoption of the European standard in competition law. This 
could also lead to a claim for damages against the tourist guide associations. After the judgment 
of the CJEU in Courage v Crehan,54 it is clear that a breach of the competition law provisions can 
result in a claim for damages between private parties.55As such, the validity of a European 
standard is challenged on the basis of the aim of the standardisation process. Similarly, a 
European standard could be challenged on the basis that the parties which had made the 
standard had conspired to exclude a particular party from the standardisation process. This will 
be illustrated by the case study of EMC Development discussed below.  
Secondly, the competition law provisions could be used to challenge the application of European 
standards in private law. For example, a number of professional associations of tourist guides in 
the UK have created a body which examines and certifies tourist guides who want to offer their 
services in the UK. Mr Von Amsberg, whose case was already discussed in the section above, 
could also challenge the refusal to provide him with a certificate on the basis that the creation of 
a certification body which applied the European standard constituted an agreement under Article 
101 TFEU to exclude non-local tourist guide from the market. The challenge would then be 
more directly linked to the substantive provisions of the European standard. The application of 
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the European standard by the certification body meant that Mr Von Amsberg was unable to 
offer his services in the UK market and to conclude contracts with tourists. Similarly to the free 
movement provisions, the application of competition law would facilitate market access by 
ensuring that anti-competitive provisions of European standards would not be applied. Mr Von 
Amsberg could also choose to base his claim on Article 102 TFEU, if the certification body was 
the only one in the market. He would then base his challenge directly on the exercise of 
regulatory power by the certification body.  
The third function of the competition law provisions would be to provide pressure on 
standardisation organisations and stakeholders to adopt European standards which complied 
with competition law. Convergence in private law would only take place if European standards 
were compatible with the requirements imposed by the competition law provisions. 
Furthermore, the competition law provisions have horizontal direct effect which makes them 
directly applicable to private law disputes. However, the potential of competition law to 
influence convergence in private law is dependent on the extent to which standardisation 
organisations and stakeholders fear that competition law would really bite and prevent the 
effective application of European standards in private law. This will be discussed after an analysis 
of the EMC Development case. 
b. Case study: EMC Development 
EMC Development (“EMC”) is a Swedish business which is involved in the development, 
making and exploitation of a particular kind of cement which is energetically modified. Cement is 
a construction product which is covered by the New Approach. The essential requirements for 
construction products have been laid down in the Construction Products Directive56 while the 
technical specifications have been laid down in a harmonised European standard.57 This 
European standard sets out the various types of cement which are produced in the EU. Products 
which comply with the European standard can carry the CE mark which is required to place 
them on the market. 
A European standard for cement was adopted by CEN in 2000. EMC was not happy with the 
provisions of the standard. It claimed that the standard was designed in such a way as to exclude 
its own type of energetically modified cement and that the cement industry had formed a cartel 
in the standardisation process to favour current manufacturers. The result was that EMC was 
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unable to offer its type of cement on the market. Therefore, it claimed that there had been a 
breach of Article 101 TFEU as well as of Article 102 TFEU. The businesses which had been 
involved in the standardisation process had abused their dominant position – not just during the 
standardisation process but also afterwards. In 2001, EMC decided to complain to the European 
Commission. The Commission replied that it did not believe that the European standard 
constituted a regulatory barrier to entry to the cement market and that there had not been a 
breach of the competition law provisions. EMC then submitted a formal complaint to the 
Commission in 2002. The Commission subsequently assessed EMC’s complaint on the basis of 
its Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 TFEU to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements 
(“the Guidelines”). In these Guidelines, there is a specific section on standardisation 
agreements.58 A significant part of this section is devoted to the impact of standardisation on 
intellectual property rights and to standard terms adopted through standardisation. It states that 
the “European standardisation bodies recognised under Directive 98/34/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of 
information in the field of technical standards and regulations and on rules on Information 
Society services are subject to competition law to the extent that they can be considered to be an 
undertaking or an association of undertakings within the meaning of Articles 101 and 102”.59 In 
the Guidelines, the Commission states that standardisation agreements usually produce 
significant positive economic effects and increase competition. According to the Commission, 
“[s]tandardisation agreements which do not restrict competition by object must be analysed in 
their legal and economic context with regard to their actual and likely effect on competition. In 
the absence of market power, a standardisation agreement is not capable of producing restrictive 
effects on competition”.60 The effect on competition is determined by reference to criteria which 
focus on the standardisation process itself: whether participation in the standardisation process is 
unrestricted, whether the standardisation process is transparent, whether there is an obligation to 
comply (the binding nature of the standard) and whether access to the standard is on fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.61 It is also important to assess whether or not there is a 
possibility to develop other standards. If it is found that European standards restrict competition 
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under Article 101(1), it is still possible that Article 101(3) provides an escape route. According to 
the Commission, standardisation agreements frequently give rise to efficiency gains.62 
In EMC Development, the Commission reviewed the standardisation process leading to the 
adoption of the European standard for cement and concluded that there had not been any 
breach of the Guidelines. The complaint was formally dismissed in 2005. EMC brought a case 
for annulment of the Commission’s decision before the General Court. This case provided an 
occasion to the General Court to decide to what extent European standardisation through CEN, 
as part of the New Approach, was covered by the competition law provisions and what the legal 
status of the Commission’s Guidelines was. EMC had made a number of complaints which 
focussed directly on the standardisation process. First of all, it complained that the 
standardisation process had been controlled by Cembureau, an association of cement producers 
which were already well established in the cement market. Secondly, it submitted that the 
Chairman of the Technical Committee which was responsible for the making of the standard 
was biased and had a conflict of interests because he worked for one of the main cement 
producers. The Commission should have ensured that the Chairman was neutral. As a 
consequence, the process had not been non-discriminatory. EMC also complained that the 
Commission should have supervised the standardisation process more closely. Finally, the 
process had not been sufficiently transparent. The interests of parties which had not been 
directly involved in the Technical Committee had not been taken into account and the 
Commission was under an obligation to inform and consult more broadly than just among the 
national standardisation organisations. 
In 2010, the General Court rejected EMC’s claim in its entirety.63 The involvement of the 
Cembureau had not gone beyond normal lobbying activity. EMC had not provided sufficient 
evidence to substantiate its claim that the Chairman had been biased. The European standard 
had been developed in accordance with CEN’s own guidelines which ensured that a sufficiently 
broad range of interests was taken into account in the standardisation process. Furthermore, the 
Commission had not made any error in deciding that the evidence submitted by EMC was 
insufficient to establish a lack of transparency in the procedure leading to the adoption of the 
European standard. More generally, the General Court approved the Commission’s application 
of its own Guidelines. This could be considered to be a judicial endorsement of the 
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Commission’s Guidelines.64 An appeal to the CJEU was dismissed in 2011.65 The result of this 
case is that if the Commission Guidelines have been complied with a European standard 
developed through CEN does not constitute a restriction to competition and falls outside the 
scope of Article 101 TFEU. Even if there has been a breach of the guidelines, a breach of Article 
101 could still be avoided if the Commission found that the standard could be justified on the 
basis of Article 101(3). 
c. Convergence in competition law  
Since the primary purpose of European standardisation is to conclude an agreement between 
businesses – in the form of a European standard – which is intended to have an impact on the 
market, it could be expected that European standardisation and competition law would regularly 
interact and perhaps even clash.66 However, this has not been the case. European standardisation 
appears to have a privileged position in competition law.67 It has enjoyed this privilege for some 
time and it has been questioned whether this is entirely deserved. Harm Schepel already argued 
in 2001, on the basis of the Commission’s Guidelines adopted in that year, that the European 
Commission’s approach towards standardisation was suspiciously lenient.68 Furthermore, he 
noted that the CJEU had been unwilling to get involved by discussing the interaction between 
European standardisation and competition law.69 This unwillingness to scrutinise standards for 
their compatibility with the competition law provisions can most recently be observed in the 
CJEU’s judgment in Fra.bo.70 The CJEU was asked two questions – one on the free movement 
provisions and the other on the competition law provisions. The German court had only asked 
the competition law questions as an alternative if the reply to the first question was negative. The 
CJEU did not find it necessary to discuss the applicability of the competition law provisions, 
although it could still have been relevant.71  
It is not surprising that the Commission is protective of European standardisation, which is one 
of the foundations of the New Approach. The New Approach would not be effective if constant 
challenges were being made against European standards on the basis of the competition law 
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provisions.72 The very adoption of the New Approach itself means that the Commission puts a 
lot of faith in, and places significant reliance on, European standardisation. This is also reflected 
in the Guidelines. After the CJEU’s judgment in EMC Development, it is possible to conclude that 
the Guidelines have now been obtained judicial approval.73 However, it should be noted that, 
although reference is made to the role of standardisation in the New Approach, the Guidelines 
also apply to European standardisation outside the New Approach – including European 
standardisation of services. 
In general, it is clear that the assessment criteria laid down in the Guidelines are very much 
focussed on the standardisation process – on the procedure. This is not surprising, particularly 
for standards adopted under the New Approach, as the impact of these standards after their 
adoption is significant. From that perspective, it is important to focus on the standard-making 
process.74 This is not necessarily the case for European standards adopted outside the New 
Approach. They have to gain their impact through a second regulatory step, such as the 
application of the standard in contracts or in certification. If there is a legality challenge, the 
focus is likely to be on the impact of the application of the standard. In the section above, it has 
been argued that the free movement provisions have been applied in such a way as to 
concentrate on the impact of the application of standards on the market. As such, it could be 
argued that competition law is more likely to play a role for standards adopted under the New 
Approach, while the free movement provisions are more likely to be applied to standards which 
need a second step to have a regulatory impact on the market. The procedural focus of the 
competition law review under Article 101 TFEU would not be suitable to test that impact. 
Furthermore, there might be a practical reason why parties are more likely to rely on the free 
movement provisions than on the competition law provisions. For competition law cases, there 
is quite a burden on claimants to show that conduct has an anti-competitive effect. This requires 
a substantial amount of work, statistics and economic analysis. There is more flexibility with the 
free movement provisions. Here, the CJEU is more likely to assume a breach on the basis of the 
hypothetical impact on the market, which would then have to be justified by the defendant. In 
other words, with the free movement provisions, it is easier for claimants to shift the burden of 
proof to defendants. This could be a reason, for example in Fra.bo, for why the free movement 
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provisions were preferred by the claimants, which meant that the CJEU did not have to rule on 
the compatibility of DVGW’s certification activities with the competition law provisions.75 
While the focus of Article 101 TFEU has been more on the standard-setting process, Article 102 
TFEU is more likely to be applied to the application of European standards. From that 
perspective, it is surprising that the German court did not ask any questions about the potential 
applicability of Article 102 TFEU to the dispute in Fra.bo. However, despite the theoretical 
possibility of Article 102 TFEU being applied, it is unlikely to be of much relevance to European 
standardisation of services. Certification activities would only be likely to be caught if the 
certification body itself enjoyed a dominant position in the certification market. The creation of a 
certification body by a number of businesses in a particular market would probably come under 
Article 101 TFEU. Secondly, and even more importantly, there are very few businesses which 
enjoy a dominant position in the market in the healthcare and tourism sectors. This finding can 
be extended to services more generally, with the exception of services which were previously 
owned by the State and which have now been liberalised in many Member States. In such 
services sectors, such as telecom and energy, there are still a lot of former incumbents with 
significant power in the market. With the exception of postal services,76 there have been no 
European standardisation initiatives which deal with the delivery of services in these markets. 
This can be explained by the fact that the EU itself has adopted a lot of instruments with the aim 
of encouraging competition in the market. These instruments have had an important impact on 
the private law relationship between service provider and consumer and have focussed on the 
contractual standards of care.77 As a result, both the need for and scope of European 
standardisation in these sectors is limited. In the healthcare sector, there are very few businesses 
which enjoy a dominant position. This is firstly because there are very few businesses in this 
sector anyway, and in those Member States in which healthcare insurance has – to a certain 
extent – been privatised there is a significant amount of competition among insurers. In the 
tourism sector there might be some relatively dominant tour operators, but most of the service 
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providers are SMEs and small businesses.78 Therefore, it is unlikely that Article 102 TFEU will 
frequently be applied to the conduct of businesses in the healthcare or tourism sectors. 
In conclusion, and linking the discussion back to the possible functions of competition law for 
European standardisation, it seems that the competition law provisions are unlikely to play a 
prominent role in European standardisation of services. This means that there is little pressure 
from competition law to adopt standards which are competition law proof. In a way, they are in 
competition with the free movement provisions which, now that the CJEU is moving to an 
effects-based approach, are more easily able to focus on the impact of regulatory conduct on the 
market. The current approach towards European standardisation adopted by the Commission 
remains protective of the standardisation organisations. However, it should be noted that this 
protection is very much based on the dependency of the Commission on European 
standardisation in the New Approach. It cannot be guaranteed that the Commission will be 
equally lenient to European standardisation outside the New Approach. There are indications, 
and the EMC Development case is one of them, that European standardisation can be used by 
groups of stakeholders to impose a particular type of product or service on the market. While 
this could be justified in the context of the New Approach, in which the EU is effectively asking 
stakeholders to impose standards on the market, a more critical approach could be adopted 
outside the New Approach. 
Case studies such as the Aesthetic Surgery Services standard and the Tourist Guide Training 
standard provide evidence that it is possible for stakeholders to argue that European 
standardisation would have anti-competitive effects and that the intention of European 
standardisation was to restrict access to particular services markets. If the EU and the 
standardisation organisations do not respond to these concerns, it is possible that the 
stakeholders will increasingly seek to challenge European standardisation initiatives and the 
application of these standards on the basis of the competition provisions. However, they are only 
likely to do so if the standardisation has a real impact on their ability to access particular markets. 
While it is clear that in EMC Development the standardisation process had a real impact on the 
company’s ability to participate in the cement market, this does not necessarily have to be the 
case for European services standards. For such standards, the regulatory impact is left entirely to 
the market.  
iv. A preliminary conclusion 
                                                          




Even if European standards have been applied in private law, it cannot be guaranteed that they 
will result in effective convergence in private law. The free movement provisions and the 
competition law provisions each impose certain conditions on convergence. In the absence of a 
regulatory framework for European standardisation of services such as the New Approach, they 
could provide European pressure on standardisation organisations and stakeholders for 
European standards to be developed and applied in a way which guarantees compliance with the 
requirements imposed by EU law. However, the extent to which this pressure will be successful 
depends on whether European standards come within their scope of application.  
The free movement provisions and competition law provisions are more likely to play a role in 
the application of European standards than the UCTD, which was discussed in the previous 
chapter. However, European standards will only really come under their review if the standards 
are able to have an impact on the market. The application of European standards must be 
regarded as an obstacle to free movement or competition in the market before courts will apply 
the free movement or competition law provisions. The cases which have been discussed in this 
chapter suggest that European standards might not have such an impact on the market without 
being protected or reinforced by public legislation – Fra.bo – or by a European regulatory 
framework – EMC Development. Without such public protection, services markets might be able 
to overcome the potential obstacles created by European standards without having to resort to 
free movement law or competition law. As the Tourist Guide Training example illustrates, the 




VII. PARADOXES OF CONVERGENCE 
 
i. Returning to the theme of convergence 
After the analysis of the making of European services standards in the healthcare and tourism 
sector and the application of European standards in private law, this chapter will now return to 
the theme of convergence which has been introduced in Chapter I. Its intention is to make some 
broader comparisons between European standardisation in the healthcare and tourism sectors 
and to link these discussions directly to the possibility of convergence in private law. The same 
will be done for the application of European standards in private law. This analysis will enable us 
to draw conclusions about the potential of convergence in private law through European 
standardisation of services. 
In Chapter I, the process of convergence in private law through European standardisation has 
been set out. The test for convergence has two limbs. First of all, European standards for 
services have to be made. The European standardisation process has to lead to the successful 
adoption of European standards in the healthcare and tourism sectors. Secondly, these European 
standards have to be applied in private law. Through their application in practice, the European 
standards have to have a convergent impact on private law at the national level. There must be a 
link between the adoption of a European standard and the liability of service providers in private 
law. If one of these two steps does not take place, the process of convergence in private law 
through European standardisation encounters difficulties. The previous chapters have shown 
that there are in fact serious problems at both stages of the process for convergence. Very few 
European standards for services have been adopted so far. Although it has to be acknowledged 
that European standardisation of services is a relatively new phenomenon, the reluctance to get 
involved in European standardisation of services highlights some fundamental problems. 
Furthermore, the low number of European services standards makes it more difficult to assess 
their ability to be applied in private law. Comparisons have had to be made with European 
standards for products. It is clear that the application of European services standards in private 
law is complicated. The European standards suffer from a legitimacy problem – both from the 
point of view of professionals in the sector and from the perspective of consumers, who have 
limited access to the process and to European standards. If European standards are applied in 
private law, the manner in which they are applied makes it difficult for them to realise 
convergence. Therefore, convergence in private law through European standardisation of 




Convergence is dependent on the compatibility of the three components in the triangular 
relationship between European standardisation, (free movement of) services and private law. 
The comparisons and analysis made in the next sections show that the relationships in this 
triangle encounter difficulties which act as an obstacle to convergence. The causes of these 
difficulties can ultimately be traced back to two paradoxes which have been uncovered in the 
analysis in the previous chapters. The first is the European paradox: the EU would like 
European standardisation of services to develop in a certain direction which is compatible with 
the internal market and free movement of services, but it is not taking control to ensure that 
European standardisation is really developing in that direction. The second paradox is that of the 
stakeholders who are involved in European standardisation of services: they would like 
European standardisation to be applied in private law and to play a role in the legal framework 
which regulates their services, but at the same time they do not really care about private law and 
about the legal framework in which the European standards would have to play a role. These 
two paradoxes have to be resolved before convergence becomes a more realistic possibility. 
However, before the paradoxes will be analysed in more detail, the main problems in the 
relationship between European standardisation, services and private law will be discussed.   
ii. European standardisation and services 
 
a. Outsiders and European standardisation: who initiates convergence? 
Who are the stakeholders who take the initiative for European standardisation of services? In 
both the healthcare and the tourism sector European standardisation is often initiated by 
outsiders. While outsiders is a general term, in the context of European standardisation it means 
that the process is started by stakeholders who are not sufficiently representative of a particular 
sector and who are having difficulties to obtain a more prominent role in that sector. This also 
explains the fierce opposition to certain initiatives for European standardisation of services. 
European standardisation provides a platform to a group of outsiders to set standards which 
would become applicable to the entire sector. In the healthcare sector, the Aesthetic Surgery 
Services standard provides a good example. Medical practitioners who practise in aesthetic 
surgery do not necessarily belong to any of the existing medical specialties. Their attempts to be 
recognised as a separate specialty have been unsuccessful after a rejection by the European 
association of medical specialists. European standardisation provides an alternative route to them 
to establish a form of recognition vis-à-vis the rest of the medical profession. The result of such 




professions. European standardisation is not a common means of setting standards for medical 
practice, but it provides a way which enables medical practitioners in aesthetic surgery to set 
standards without direct interference by the rest of the profession. In the tourism sector, the 
Tourist Guide Training standard was initiated by a group of tourist guides who sought to protect 
and impose their own definition of what a tourist guide should be like – a locally trained guide 
with local qualifications. This interpretation was in stark contradiction with the interpretation of 
tour operators and travel agencies, who might prefer to use tour guides who travel with tourists 
and who are not based at the location where they offer their services.  
In both examples, European standardisation was used by groups which were not representative 
of the sector. However, they were at least service providers in the relevant sectors. The example 
of the European standard for Cleft Lip Surgery was initiated by a patient organisation. The 
European Cleft Organisation had been campaigning for years for a European standard on cleft 
lip care. However, it did not have a way to make standards which would have a certain authority 
in the sector. Again, European standardisation provided a means to work on a standard which 
could not otherwise be made through the traditional routes for medical standardisation. It 
enabled patient or consumer organisations to try and promote higher quality standards. As such, 
it would enable a broader interpretation of the term “stakeholders” to include organisations 
which are historically having difficulties to get involved in European standardisation. However, 
these organisations are struggling to get the support of the service providers in the sectors. For 
example, the Cleft Lip Surgery project is not supported by the main European associations for 
medical professionals. Similarly, in the tourism sector, hotel owners fear that European 
standardisation would be used by certification bodies to impose standards on their hotels. 
European standardisation would enable them to extend their market because more standards for 
certification would be available at the European level.   
Overall, it is clear that the process of convergence is frequently initiated by parties which 
represent a minority (view) within the profession. They are having difficulties to be effective 
within the sector. European standardisation constitutes their attempt to embrace the entire 
profession and to reach broader consensus on difficult issues. The problem is that the initiation 
of European standardisation does not have a convergent impact, but rather provokes divergence. 
The European standardisation process forces the insiders to distinguish themselves from the 
outsiders and to put renewed emphasis on the differences in approach between them and the 
outsiders. The problem is that the procedure for European standardisation has no way to deal 




by an unrepresentative minority to impose standards on other stakeholders in a sector. The only 
formal requirements are that five Member States must participate in the European 
standardisation process and that a 71% weighed majority of the Member States must have voted 
in favour of the standardisation project.1 However, CEN cannot impose requirements on which 
parties should or should not participate in a European standardisation process. It is entirely 
dependent on which parties which are willing to invest and participate in European 
standardisation of services. Because CEN ultimately has to make its money out of 
standardisation projects, one cannot realistically expect CEN to refuse to start a particular 
standardisation project on the basis of a lack of adequate representation.2 Moreover, there is also 
the problem of resources – European standardisation is more accessible to stakeholders which 
have the financial resources to participate in the process. This again enables a particular group of 
outsiders – such as certification bodes vs. SMEs in the tourism sector – to impose their 
standards via European standardisation. 
The dominance of outsiders in European standardisation is more of a problem for services than 
for product standards made under the New Approach. This is because in the New Approach 
there is direct control by the EU of the parties which participate in the standardisation process. 
Even if it is argued that this control might not always be effective, there is much more incentive 
for a broader range of stakeholders to participate in European standardisation. After all, they 
know that in the framework of the New Approach a European standard will obtain a quasi-legal 
effect. As a consequence, it becomes much more important for them to participate in the 
standard-setting process.3 These incentives do not exist for European standardisation of services. 
At the same time, it also shows that the limited impact of European services standards might be 
a reason for stakeholders not to participate in European standardisation. The attempts of 
outsiders to impose standards on the entire sector could then be considered as futile, since their 
effect in law will remain limited. 
b. Triggers for European standardisation: what are the drivers for 
convergence? 
Without a New Approach for services, the EU is unable to exercise real control over the aims of 
European standardisation initiatives in the services sector. In the New Approach for goods, 
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European standardisation has a clear market-facilitative purpose. The primary purpose of the 
New Approach is to facilitate free movement and to improve the internal market for goods. 
Standardisation has been made an instrument to increase the functioning of the internal market.4 
The absence of a clear regulatory framework for European standardisation of services means 
that the same impetus cannot be given for standardisation of services. The result is that many of 
the European standards for services have had very little to do with the improvement of the 
internal market for services. On the contrary, a substantial number of the few European 
standards that have been developed for services could better be described as obstacles to free 
movement. The motivation for stakeholders to start a European standardisation process for 
services was certainly not focussed on the facilitation of free movement. The European standard 
for Tourist Guide Training was a clear counter-reaction to the liberalisation of the profession 
brought about by the judgments of the CJEU in the 1990s. Its aim was to protect the position of 
local tourist guides in the dynamic and transforming tourism sector. Similarly, although the 
Aesthetic Surgery Services standard may have the improvement of the quality of aesthetic 
surgery as its primary aim, it is at the same time vigorously criticised on the basis that it 
constitutes an attempt to protect or reserve the market to a particular group of medical 
professionals. Market fragmentation and market protection are commonly used terms to describe 
the motivation behind European standardisation of services. This is not at all what the 
Commission and the EU foresaw when they included European standardisation in Article 26 of 
the Services Directive, but the Commission has very limited means to do something about it. It 
could be argued that the Commission should raise more awareness among CEN and 
stakeholders about the potential impact of European standards on the internal market. The fact 
that the application of European standards which obstruct free movement might be more 
difficult after the gradual extension of the application of the free movement provisions to private 
parties could serve as an indirect stimulus to stakeholders and to CEN to focus more on market-
facilitative European standards for services. 
If the healthcare and tourism sectors are compared, it becomes clear that the potential function 
of European standardisation would be different in each sector. With the adoption of the Package 
Travel Directive,5 the EU has created rules on the information which tourists should be provided 
with before the conclusion of a contract. When it comes to performance, Article 5 of the 
Directive expressly provides that tour operators or travel agents are liable for the proper 
performance of the contract. This means that there has been European harmonisation of the 
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existence of liability – including a limited number of defences – which could be supplemented by 
European standards which would lay down standards for service providers in the tourism sector. 
The Package Travel Directive provides an incentive for the creation of such European standards, 
which would primarily focus on the extent to which tour operators are required to check the 
safety of the service providers at the destination of the holiday. Standardisation would fulfil a 
clear market-facilitative role in the European regulatory framework for package travel. The fact 
that very few standards have been made which could be said to give substance to Article 5 of the 
Directive shows that stakeholders cannot be relied on to take the initiative for the adoption of 
safety standards. The result is that these standards remain to be identified ex post via litigation at 
the national level and that the standards will remain national standards. The situation is different 
in the healthcare sector. Although the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive 2011 lays down 
standards on the information which should be provided to patients,6 the Directive clearly 
provides that the standards of treatment remain national.7 There is no European harmonisation 
of liability for medical negligence in a cross-border context. Therefore, there is less impetus for 
European standards on medical treatment to be adopted – there are no European legal standards 
which could be supplemented or specified through European standardisation. While it is true 
that an increased level of cross-border movement of patients could encourage the creation of 
European standards in the healthcare sector, there is no European legal framework which would 
encourage the adoption of such standards.   
Convergence works well if there is a common, or uniform, drive which initiates the process.8 In 
the EU, the common drive behind convergence has always been the building of the EU’s 
internal market. Although the process of convergence might have more than one purpose, its 
central aim is to facilitate free movement within the internal market. This requires European 
control of the direction in which the process of convergence is going. At the very least there has 
to be a degree of European coordination about the purposes of convergence and its role in the 
internal market.9 Such control or coordination is missing for European standardisation of 
services. Article 26 of the Services Directive is insufficient as a tool to provide a frame in which 
it can be guaranteed that European standardisation of services contributes to the internal market 
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for services. The same applies to the Standardisation Regulation 2012.10 Although the 
Standardisation Regulation recognises European standardisation of services, it does not establish 
something like a New Approach for services. Such a New Approach for services would be a 
possible means for the EU to ensure that European standardisation for services would 
contribute to the functioning of the internal market. However, if this is considered to be one 
step too far, the Commission should at the very least take more control of the purposes of 
European standardisation of services and should check that standardisation projects are 
compatible with the free movement provisions. This would be a less drastic way of trying to 
impose a common drive for convergence. At the moment, convergence through European 
standardisation of services is fragmented. Stakeholders in the healthcare and tourism sectors start 
to work on European standards for all sorts of reasons, but they do not share a common 
motivation behind the initiation of European standardisation of services.  
c. Quality of services and European standardisation: what is the impact of 
convergence on quality? 
Quality is an inherently personal concept. Because of the strong subjective nature of quality, it is 
normally left to the market. Tourists can choose the hotel they would like to stay in on the basis 
of their own definition of what standards and characteristics a hotel should have. Patients, in the 
ideal scenario, can choose their own doctors on the basis of what qualities they should possess. 
In both sectors, there is ex ante regulation which imposes certain requirements which service 
providers have to fulfil before they can provide their services on the market. Hotels usually have 
to obtain a licence, while doctors have to obtain qualifications through training and 
examinations. Once the service providers have complied with these requirements, they are 
allowed to enter the market and to distinguish themselves so as to enable consumers to make an 
assessment of the quality of their services.  
The various case studies in this thesis show that, from the perspective of the quality of services, 
there are essentially two categories of convergence through European standardisation. The first 
category, to which the Aesthetic Surgery Services and Cleft Lip Surgery initiatives belong, 
includes standards which aim to identify a minimum level of quality above which competition in 
the market can take place. The intention behind these projects is that competition on quality is 
only really possible if a certain minimum quality level is guaranteed. This minimum level of 
quality is very close to the identification of a minimum level of safety. Certain safety standards 
have to be imposed to enable consumers to make safe choices about the kind of treatment they 
                                                          




would like to receive. This additional layer of regulation through European standardisation is 
necessary because the market is not sufficiently transparent and because consumers suffer from a 
lack of information. The PIP breast implants scandal provides good evidence of the failures of 
the market for aesthetic surgery services.11 European standardisation is then used as a tool for 
consumer protection. In the healthcare sector, the problem is that European standardisation is 
not accepted as a tool to identify a minimum level of quality of healthcare. The medical 
profession claims that it will lead to a process of de-professionalisation, which will ultimately lead 
to a lowering of the quality of healthcare rather than an improvement. There are insufficient 
guarantees that European standardisation in the healthcare sector is an evidence-based activity. It 
would open up the healthcare sector to market forces which would not result in a higher quality 
of care. As a result, it is not in the best interests of patients to contribute to European 
standardisation. However, the medical profession does not deny that it is necessary for a 
minimum level of quality of healthcare to be identified. The criticism is directed against 
European standardisation as a tool for that exercise. Moreover, it is argued that the minimum 
level of care should not be identified at the European level, but should rather be left to the 
Member States. 
The second category of convergence includes European standards which attempt to impose one 
particular type of quality on the market. This is the main objection against European 
standardisation in the tourism sector. The Tourist Guide Training standard provides the best 
example. It constitutes an attempt to impose one particular kind of tourist guides on the market 
– namely those who are locally established and who have received local training. As a 
consequence, European standardisation would lead to a reduction in diversity, which is 
undesirable from the perspective of consumers. This kind of standardisation is not necessary to 
identify a minimum safety level for services, but it rather limits the market. Its aim is inherently 
protectionist – the European standard is intended to protect locally established tourist guides 
from the market. The possibility of European standards for hotels raises similar objections. 
European standardisation of hotel services would seek to put hotels in a particular European 
frame, which would reduce the level of diversity of hotels. As such, the objections in the tourism 
sector are even more fundamental than in the healthcare sector. While in the healthcare sector 
European standardisation is not considered to be the right tool to regulate quality of healthcare, 
in the tourism sector the very regulation of quality itself is not considered to be desirable. The 
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tourism market is highly transparent and there is plenty of information available for consumers 
to make well-informed choices.  
Both categories are also evidence of the fundamental differences between standardisation of 
goods and services. For European standardisation of goods, quality becomes almost synonymous 
with compatibility. However, the delivery of services has more dimensions than the three 
dimensions of a product. To standardise services means standardising human interaction. In the 
healthcare sector, European standardisation is rejected as a tool. In the tourism sector, the very 
necessity of European standardisation is denied. European standardisation means that consensus 
has to be reached at the European level about the kind of quality which should be offered to 
consumers. However, this kind of consensus could also be considered as fundamentally 
inconsistent with the foundations of an internal market in which different services with different 
levels of quality are offered. There have to be good justifications to attempt to realise 
convergence in that internal market. For products, convergence through European 
standardisation is justified on the basis that it makes the internal market for goods much more 
effective through the harmonisation of product requirements. However, for services, European 
standardisation will only improve the internal market if it contributes to the safety of services in 
the internal market. There is a serious risk that European standardisation will lead to a reduction 
of the diversity of services or that it will facilitate market protectionism. At the moment, there is 
little evidence to suggest that European standardisation of services is able to improve free 
movement of services in the EU. 
iii. European standardisation and private law 
 
a. Convergence without a European regulatory framework: linking European 
standardisation to private law 
European services standards do not obtain a clear legal effect after their adoption. They have to 
rely on public or private law to obtain binding force in law. While stakeholders cannot exercise 
direct control over the application of European standards in public law, they could have a direct 
influence over the application of European standards in private law. From the perspective of the 
EU, there is no European framework which provides or encourages the application of European 
services standards in private law. This is different from European product standards which have 
been made under the New Approach. These standards obtain a clear legal effect after their 
adoption – they provide substance to the essential requirements which have been laid down in 




product liability. Although the PIP breast implants scandal illustrates that the New Approach 
does not have a direct impact on the application of European product standards in private law, 
at least the argument could be made that their application in private law is necessary to guarantee 
the effectiveness of the New Approach for goods. If European standards were not applied in 
private law, this could create obstacles to the free movement of goods, which would indirectly 
endanger the effectiveness of the regulatory framework which has been created with the New 
Approach. Therefore, the driver for convergence would be the protection of the effectiveness of 
the New Approach for goods. In other words, it is the regulatory framework itself which 
requires convergence in private law. For services, there is no European regulatory framework 
which would require or even encourage the application of European standards in private law. As 
a result, there is no European driver for convergence, which becomes entirely dependent on the 
willingness of national private law to apply European standards as the standard of care in 
contract or tort cases. This is similar in both the healthcare and the tourism sector. 
The judgments of the German courts in the cases brought against TÜV Rheinland after the PIP 
breast implants scandal show the difficulties with relying on national private law to create 
convergence through European standardisation. In the absence of a European regulatory 
framework, national courts will revert to national private law principles in determining the legal 
impact of European standardisation. This is not necessarily consistent with a process of 
convergence, since there is no guarantee that a uniform European approach will be taken to the 
application of European standards. Moreover, national courts show a reluctance to make an 
automatic link between ex ante regulation through European standardisation and ex post 
regulation through the determination of liability in private law. In the New Approach, the extent 
to which the effectiveness of EU law requires this link to be made is uncertain. The situation is 
even more unclear for European standardisation of services, for which there is no European 
regulatory framework. This means that the application is not only dependent on national private 
law, but also on the willingness of stakeholders to establish the link from European 
standardisation to private law. The various governance problems which affect European 
standardisation have a negative impact on the application of European standards by stakeholders 
in the services sectors. This is not only caused by the problems with guaranteeing adequate 
representation in European standardisation, but also by the limited transparency and accessibility 
of the European standardisation process. In the tourism sector, SMEs are having real difficulties 
to exercise influence on European standardisation. The result is that, because they have not 
played any part in the making of the European standards, they are unlikely to apply them in their 




bought from the national standardisation organisations means that consumers are unlikely to 
become acquainted with European standards. As a consequence, the extent to which consumers 
can expect compliance with European standards becomes more limited. 
Without European control, convergence is entirely dependent on European standardisation and 
private law to establish a link between them. At the moment, the conclusion has to be that 
European standardisation of services and private law do not sufficiently match for convergence 
to be effective. In effect, this is a fundamental cultural problem. Where Pierre Legrand argued 
that the differences in legal culture prevented the possibility of convergence,12 this thesis has 
highlighted a clash in culture between European standardisation and law. The world of law and 
the world of European standardisation do not sufficiently talk to each other for them to jointly 
initiate and bring about a process of convergence in private law. As a result, the coordination 
which takes place at the European level through standardisation of services does not result in 
convergence in law.13 There is insufficient awareness both among the standardisation 
organisations and the stakeholders who are participating in European standardisation of services 
about the role that European services standards should play in the legal regulation of services 
and to what extent their standardisation projects are consistent with the existing legal framework. 
This lack of legal expertise in the making of European standards and the ignorance of the legal 
regulatory framework in which European standards should play a role result in an inability to 
connect European standardisation to private law. It is not just limited to private law, but it 
applies in a similar way to the free movement provisions. Convergence has to improve to the 
internal market for services. This can only be guaranteed if the European standards which are 
being made actually facilitate free movement of services. The obligations imposed by the free 
movement provisions have been extended to private parties which are involved in collective 
regulation and whose regulatory activities have an impact on the internal market.14 As such, 
compliance with the free movement provisions is imposed as a condition for convergence in 
private law. Therefore, there has to be compatibility between European standardisation of 
services and the free movement provisions. The non-compliance of European standardisation 
with free movement law will prevent convergence in private law. 
b. Convergence through standardisation: the impact of European standards 
on the determination of liability of service providers 
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Once a European standard has been adopted in a services sector and there is willingness on the 
part of courts and stakeholders for the standard to be applied in private law, the next question is 
what impact the European standard could have on the determination of liability of service 
providers. In Chapter I, this was introduced as the procedural dimension of convergence. The 
question was whether the existence of a European standard would encourage a transformation 
from an obligation de moyens towards an obligation de résultat. Traditionally, service providers were 
expected to provide their services with the necessary level of care, but it could not be claimed by 
service recipients that they were entitled to a certain result. European standardisation has the 
potential to transform this if service providers were legally required to comply with the 
provisions of a European standard. If such a development were to take place it would mean that 
service recipients could claim compliance with a European standard as an obligation de résultat. The 
analysis in Chapter V has shown that European standardisation does not have this impact on the 
obligations of service providers. Courts are unwilling to make a direct link between the breach of 
a European standard and liability in private law. The primary reason for this is that European 
standards have not been made with the idea that a breach will immediately lead to liability in 
private law. The possible liability of service providers depends on a whole range of 
circumstances. European standardisation is unable to encapsulate all these circumstances in one 
single instrument. This is particularly important for the provision of services, which is very much 
a process.  
All of this would be solved if European standards were directly incorporated in services 
contracts. This is not something which is happening frequently in the services sector. It could 
become more common if more European services standards are made in the future. The result 
would be that the contract provided the bridge from an obligation de moyens to an obligation de 
résultat – the service provider would become contractually bound to comply with the provisions 
of the European standard. However, the empirical research has shown that there is resistance 
among stakeholders to make compliance with (European) standards contractually binding. In the 
healthcare sector, the objection is mainly based on the protection of professional autonomy. 
Medical professionals must be able to exercise their professional judgment and to act in the best 
interests of patients. Strict compliance with standards would not always be in the best interests of 
patients.15 As a result, although standards will always play a role in the determination of liability, 
they should not have an automatic impact. A similar position is taken in the tourism sector. Here 
the emphasis on professional autonomy is less prominent. The tourism sector relies more on the 
market and considers the application of standards as restrictive of market freedom. Regulation 
                                                          




through European standardisation is considered neither necessary nor desirable. Overall, 
therefore, it can be said that the objections to the application of European standards in both 
sectors are relatively similar to the objections to the making of European standards. 
If courts and stakeholders are not willing to apply European standards directly in private law, this 
does not mean that European standards have absolutely no role to play in private law at all. They 
could still have an evidential role in the determination of liability of service providers. The PIP 
breast implant group litigation in the UK provides a good example. The possible non-
compliance with the European standard for breast implants is used to establish that PIP breast 
implants were not of satisfactory quality. As such, European standardisation is used to specify an 
existing objective standard of care in private law – in this example, the requirement of 
satisfactory quality. Similarly, European standards could be used to provide substance to 
standards such as the state of the art or reasonable skill and care.16 The evidential use of 
European standards in services sectors could also result in convergence in private law. However, 
such a process would be extremely difficult to measure. Again, there would be no control at the 
European level about the precise impact that European standards would have. Furthermore, 
their effect would be very dependent on the extent to which they could be connected to the 
particular circumstances of a case.  
Most importantly, this evidential strategy for convergence requires stakeholders to use European 
standards in liability cases. It was explained in Chapter I that convergence would be very much 
based on the bottom-up application of European standards in practice. The practical application 
of European standards would constitute a bridge from the making of European standards to 
their application in private law.17 European standards would obtain the status of professional 
standards through their application in practice. This is exactly where the difficulties arise and the 
bridge from practice to private law collapses. In both the healthcare and tourism sector there are 
strong objections to European standards being applied as the professional standard. When a 
product standard has been adopted in the New Approach, there can be little doubt that this 
European standard constitutes the standard with which these goods have to comply. When a 
European services standard has been adopted, there is no guarantee that this standard will be 
applied as the professional standard in that services sector. A European services standard would 
not enjoy authority in a sector simply on the basis of its adoption. There are clear indications that 
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stakeholders would be reluctant to apply European standards in practice. This reluctance could 
be based on the methodology for the making of European standards – for example, the medical 
profession could refuse to follow European standards because they were not sufficiently 
evidence-based. Alternatively, the application of a standard could be refused on the basis of the 
parties which had been involved in the making of that standard – for example, SMEs could 
refuse to apply European standards which had been made without their involvement.  
Finally, convergence through European standardisation suffers from the fact that the strategy for 
convergence would involve a combination of what Roger Brownsword has described as soft 
convergence and medium convergence.18 The initial European standardisation process would 
only result in soft convergence at the European level. Medium convergence, the introduction of 
mandatory minimum standards, would be realised through the application of European 
standards in private law. The link from soft convergence to medium convergence will only be 
made if the introduction of European mandatory minimum standards is considered desirable. 
This is a particular problem for the healthcare sector, in which the standards across the EU are 
widely divergent. For both cultural and financial reasons, some Member States have much higher 
standards of care than other Member States. In these Member States, there would be resistance 
to make European minimum standards mandatory, because it would result in lower standards of 
care. They even resist soft convergence at the European level, since it would provide an 
incentive to public authorities and health insurers to cut costs and for lower mandatory standards 
to be introduced at the national level. This why the European standard for Cleft Lip Surgery is so 
strongly opposed by some of the Member States with well-functioning healthcare systems. They 
do not object to providing assistance to some of the new Member States to help them to raise 
the quality of healthcare, but they fear that the adoption of a European standard would lead to 
pressure to lower standards at the national level. Soft convergence through European 
standardisation would then not improve the quality of care, but would rather result in a lowest 
common denominator. 
iv. Paradoxes of convergence 
 
a. The EU paradox 
One of the recurrent themes of this thesis is that the lack of a European regulatory framework is 
making it much more difficult for convergence in private law through European standardisation 
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of services to take place. Such a regulatory framework would be able to provide a drive for 
convergence which is necessary to give it direction and to improve the process. The Commission 
has made it very clear that it is worried about how European standardisation of services could 
develop and that it would like to push European standardisation of services in a direction which 
would help it to improve the internal market for services. However, while it has certain means at 
its disposal to guarantee more directly that European standardisation of services is compatible 
with the free movement provisions it has not taken any steps to do this. This is what could be 
described as the EU paradox of convergence. There is a gap between the EU’s rhetoric and its 
actions. 
There are two possible explanations for this paradox. The first could be uncertainty. The 
Commission is not convinced that European standardisation of services is necessarily a useful 
tool to regulate the internal market for services. As such, it is uncertain about European 
standardisation as a tool for convergence. The reason for this is that very few European 
standards have been made and that it has been difficult to measure their impact. It does not want 
to create a European regulatory framework without knowing more clearly that European 
standardisation of services would actually help to improve free movement of services. However, 
in a way, this argument could be considered circular. The Commission might never discover the 
full potential of European standardisation of services unless it actually embraces it in its 
regulatory strategy for services. Its uncertainty is also based on the position of stakeholders. A 
European regulatory framework for standardisation of services would provide a sense of top-
down legitimacy to European standardisation, but it would still be reliant on stakeholders to 
make standards for services. The Commission has received signals that stakeholders do not 
support European standardisation of services. This has reaffirmed its uncertainty and has made it 
necessary for the Commission to take the initiative for further research and orientation on what 
European standardisation of services could do for the EU’s internal market.19 
A second explanation for the paradox, which is to some extent linked to the first, could be 
disinterest. The limited impact of European standardisation of services on the internal market so 
far could mean that the Commission is not too worried about it. Although there is little evidence 
to support the argument that European standardisation of services is really able to improve free 
movement of services, it is not possible to conclude either that it constitutes a serious obstacle to 
free movement. The impact of European standardisation on the market has been marginal, 
which could also prove that the market has a natural ability to overcome potential obstacles 
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created by European standardisation. The tourist sector could be evidence of this ability of the 
market now that the requirement for licensed tourist guides is being abolished for some of the 
major attractions in London. This significantly reduces the impact and market-restrictive effects 
of the European standard for Tourist Guide Training. As a consequence, it could be said that 
there is no real reason for the Commission to be worried about European standardisation of 
services. Its impact has been marginal and the way in which it has been used is fragmented and 
incoherent. As a result, there is no urgency or pressure for the Commission to get involved. 
European standardisation of services has not proved that it requires more attention.  
b. The stakeholders paradox 
The second paradox which has been identified focusses on the role of stakeholders in European 
standardisation – in particular, those parties which take the initiative for European 
standardisation of services. They decide to start with European standardisation because they 
want to change something in their services sector. There is always a plan or an aim behind 
European standardisation. The problem for European standardisation is that it will always need 
law for the standards to have a real impact on how a particular service is regulated. European 
standardisation of services could be described as soft law, but it is definitely more soft than law. 
Although the legal impact could be based on the practical application of the standards, which 
would mean that the stakeholders would to a certain extent be in control of the legal application 
of standards, the simple adoption of European standards is not enough. European 
standardisation of services needs private law to have an impact. At the same time, stakeholders 
seem to be ignorant of the requirements that the law imposes on them and on the role that their 
European services standard would play in the regulation of that service.20 One of the key findings 
of this thesis is that European standardisation of services does not care enough about the legal 
environment in which the standard will be received. The paradox can be formulated very clearly: 
European standardisation of services needs private law, but European standardisation does not 
care about private law. This is particularly ironic from the perspective of private law, since 
private law could facilitate convergence through European standardisation of services. It would 
enable stakeholders to make the link from standardisation to legal regulation. However, before 
this can be successful, stakeholders have to be aware of the requirements that are imposed on 
them by private law. This includes the compatibility of European standards with the free 
movement, the competition law provisions and the UCTD. 
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Again, two possible explanations for the paradox will be offered. The most logical explanation 
would be inability. Most stakeholders who are involved in European standardisation of services 
are not lawyers. They do not approach the problems which they would like to resolve from the 
perspective of law. The same is true for the European and national standardisation organisations. 
Employees of these organisations often have a technical or scientific background. This is a direct 
consequence of the fact that standardisation organisations have historically become prominent 
through the technical standardisation of products. As a result, they did not directly need legal 
expertise. Moreover, under the New Approach, the mandate of the stakeholders in European 
standardisation remains very technical. The legal framework has been taken care of by the EU. 
For European standardisation of services the situation is quite different. Stakeholders themselves 
become responsible for the application of European services standards in the legal framework. 
At the moment, it seems that they are unable to take up this responsibility. More involvement of 
lawyers in the development of European services standards would be desirable. These lawyers 
should have knowledge and experience of the European regulatory framework for services. 
Furthermore, stakeholders should be educated about the demands that are imposed on them by 
the legal framework. It has to be admitted that lawyers are already frequently sitting around the 
table in European standardisation of services. However, their role has often been to protect 
national legislation and to resist convergence, rather than to facilitate convergence through 
matching European standardisation to the legal framework in which it should play a role. 
Another more difficult explanation for the paradox could be disconnection. This would be 
closely linked to the disinterest explanation provided for the EU paradox. It could be that 
stakeholders understand very well that legal regulation is necessary in their sector, but that they 
do not see European standardisation of services as intrinsically linked to that legal regulation. 
Standardisation would be more of a publicity or promotion exercise to establish the position of 
stakeholders in a particular sector, which could then encourage the start of a similar convergent 
process in law. Stakeholders would not need to worry about law, because law would do a 
different job which would probably take over or overrule European standardisation of services. 
This is also where we can see a clear clash between public and private regulation. For example, in 
the Aesthetic Surgery Services standardisation project, the stakeholders are working under the 
constant threat of their project being overruled by national, and possibility even European, 
legislation. In a way, they would not be unhappy with this, because the standardisation project is 
intended to provoke stricter legal regulation of aesthetic surgery services. The European 
standardisation project could then be seen as a prelude to legislative action. It would mean that 




c. Trying to resolve the paradoxes 
Towards the end of this thesis, it is clear that the picture which has been painted of convergence 
in private law through European standardisation of services is rather pessimistic. A number of 
improvements are necessary for European standardisation of services to become more successful 
– both at the level of the standard-making and at the level of the application in private law. It 
does not seem likely that the Commission will move towards a New Approach for services any 
time soon.  
This thesis has highlighted the complicated relationship between the EU – in particular, the 
European Commission –, CEN and national standardisation organisations. In the New 
Approach for goods, the EU and the Commission have a dominant role vis-à-vis national 
standardisation organisations. Initiatives for European standardisation are taken at the European 
level and their scope and purpose are strictly controlled by the EU. CEN acts as an intermediary 
and coordinates the work. Without a New Approach for services, national standardisation 
organisations are much more powerful in European standardisation of services. The 
coordination and control at the European level is missing. As a result, national standardisation 
organisations do not act in a coordinated way and do not necessarily act in the interests of the 
EU’s internal market. So far, CEN has chosen the side of the national standardisation 
organisations. If European standardisation of services is to make a successful contribution to the 
internal market, the Commission will have to rebalance the relationship with CEN and the 
national standardisation organisations. More control at the European level is necessary. 
Stricter control of European standardisation of services by the Commission would ensure that 
standardisation activities were consistent with free movement law and would contribute to the 
functioning of the internal market. It would also facilitate the application of European standards 
in private law. At the same time, it could increase the tension between national standardisation 
organisations and the EU. Moreover, national law could be resistant to too much top-down 
Europeanisation through standardisation. Therefore, the main challenge for the Commission will 
be to find a balance between ensuring that European standardisation of services is used to 
improve the internal market for services and guaranteeing that stakeholders are sufficiently 
involved in standardisation so that European standards will be successfully in private law. The 
involvement and support of stakeholders remains crucial for the successful application of 




Finally, two recommendations will be made. First of all, the Commission should take a more 
prominent role in European standardisation of services. This should start with stricter 
supervision of European standardisation of services. This supervision should take place from the 
moment that a proposal for a European services standard is submitted until the final adoption of 
the standard. The Commission should take the role of educator to teach stakeholders how 
European services standards can be made compatible with free movement law. Moreover, it 
would be helpful if the Commission started to issue more mandates in the field of services 
standardisation. Even without a New Approach for services, such mandates could provide a 
certain direction to European standardisation of services and could be an incentive for 
convergence.  
Secondly, CEN should reconsider the requirements for the start of a European standardisation 
process. Changes have to be made to ensure that European standardisation of services is 
initiated by stakeholders who are sufficiently representative of a services sector. Furthermore, the 
process has to be made more accessible and transparent. Although it would be a serious threat to 
its business model, CEN should reconsider whether to make more standards freely accessible to 
the public. This will ultimately improve the potential for European standardisation of services to 
obtain a more significant role in the regulation of services. Moreover, CEN will have to make 
internal changes. This also applies to national standardisation organisations. For a real impetus 
for standardisation of services more expertise in the services sector is required within the 
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